US embassy cable - 04BRUSSELS5393

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ENSURING A COORDINATED U.S.-EU MESSAGE IN BIH

Identifier: 04BRUSSELS5393
Wikileaks: View 04BRUSSELS5393 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Brussels
Created: 2004-12-23 12:48:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Tags: PREL PGOV EFIN BK EUN USEU BRUSSELS
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 005393 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/23/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, EFIN, BK, EUN, USEU BRUSSELS 
SUBJECT: ENSURING A COORDINATED U.S.-EU MESSAGE IN BIH 
 
REF: A. STATE 271449 
     B. STATE 267711 
     C. STATE 257497 
     D. SARAJEVO 3294 
     E. USEU BRUSSELS 5226 
     F. THE HAGUE 3301 
 
Classified By: Rick Holtzapple, PolOff, Reasons 1.4 (B/D) 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (C) Our messages alerting the EU to Operation Balkan Vice 
measures (REFS B and C) apparently did not penetrate very far 
into the EU apparatus.  Although the EU and Solana's office 
have been supportive of the measures taken by High Rep 
Ashdown, and understand the steps taken by the US in support 
of OHR, failure to convey that message to their missions in 
B-H has led to grumbling from assorted EU officials in 
Sarajevo (REF D).  The necessary staff work for the EU to 
expand its own travel ban and asset freeze measures has not 
yet been done, however, and will probably have to await the 
Luxembourg Presidency to see what might be possible.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
2. (C) PolOff discussed REF A points with the relevant EU 
officials available in Brussels this close to the Christmas 
holiday.  The EU is indeed hydra-headed.  To wit: 
 
3. (C/NF) Stefan Muller, of the Council's Balkan Task Force, 
told us Solana feels Ashdown did not keep him fully informed 
about what OHR was doing.  Solana was complaining about this 
as recently as Dec. 20.  This is, so far, an internal issue. 
Solana made a very good public statement in support of the 
OHR measures on Dec. 16.  (NOTE:  There is no reason Solana 
should feel suprised by the measures we announced.  We 
delivered REF B details to Solana's chief Balkans advisor 
Stefan Lehne the morning of Dec. 17, and know that he went 
directly from our meeting to a briefing of the assembled EU 
PolDirs on both the OHR and US measures. END NOTE.) 
 
4. (C) At the Commission, Mia Asenius of Enlargement 
Commissioner Rehn's staff (which also has responsibility for 
the Balkans) said the Commission definitely supports 
Ashdown's measures.  She said Commissioner Rehn met with B-H 
FM Ivanic during his visit immediately after the OHR measures 
were imposed only because Ivanic was still officially the FM 
at the time, and Rehn did not want to do anything that could 
provoke more of a political crisis.  Asenius noted there had 
been some grumbling in Rehn's meeting with assembled EU heads 
of missions about not having been informed of US measures. 
She added that some within the EU, including at the 
Commission, are nervous that reaction to the combined OHR and 
US measures could lead to the fall of the state-level 
government and new elections.  They worry this would further 
delay B-H's progress toward a Stabilization and Association 
Agreement, which for some within the EU is the highest 
priority. 
 
5. (C)  The Dutch chair (protect) of the EU's Western Balkans 
Working Group (COWEB) here in Brussels told us he was 
surprised at any flap about OHR's measures, as he had 
understood that, beyond Solana's own statement, an EU HOMs 
statement in Sarajevo supportive of Ashdown was supposed to 
have been teed up.  He said he would check with The Hague to 
see what might have happened to such a statement.  (We note 
REF F from The Hague also refers to a HOMs statement.) 
 
6. (C) Regarding EU travel bans/asset freezes, our Dutch 
contact told us nothing had been prepared within COWEB to 
expand the EU's travel ban list.  He said that in at least 
some past actions by OHR, such steps would have been underway 
in advance to make the EU's list conform with OHR's -- 
although not necessarily the US's.  If Ashdown has now added 
specific individuals to his list of ICTY obstructionists, 
there may be scope (but probably not until under the 
Luxembourg Presidency in January) for the EU to expand it's 
own travel ban list to cover them.  Asset freezes on these 
types of individuals, as we have seen time and again with the 
EU, are unlikely. 
 
7. (C) In all of the above conversations, PolOff has 
underlined to EU contacts that we had given the EU a heads up 
we were planning measures to support those we understood OHR 
was preparing; and it was vital that all of us should now 
stay on message in support of Ashdown's measures.  Even if 
the EU does not take similar steps to the US on travel bans 
and asset freezes against further individuals, our steps have 
usefully gotten the attention of people who have been 
blocking progress in the RS.  All of our contacts understood 
the message.  Given holiday absences, however, we cannot 
guarantee that Brussels will have any immediate success in 
better informing or curbing freelance commentary from various 
EU reps in Sarajevo. 
 
MCKINLEY 

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