US embassy cable - 04CARACAS3928

C O N F I D E N T I A L  CARACAS 003928 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
NSC FOR CBARTON 
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD 
STATE PASS USAID FOR DCHA/OTI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/22/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ECON, VE 
SUBJECT: CHAVEZ GIVES MARCHING ORDERS FOR THE REVOLUTION 
 
REF: A. CARACAS 3506 
 
     B. CARACAS 3622 
     C. CARACAS 3826 
     D. CARACAS 3834 
 
Classified By: Stephen G. McFarland, Charge d'Affaires, 
for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
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Summary 
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1. (C) Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez laid out plans for 
his Bolivarian Revolution to a group of loyalist governors, 
mayors, and other officials November 12-13 in Caracas. 
According to an account of Chavez's presentation put together 
by veteran Marxist writer and Chavez adviser Martha 
Harnecker, Chavez tasked his troops with a "strategic map" 
for implementing ten major objectives -- a "leap forward" -- 
over the next two years.  He ordered his people to work hard, 
be disciplined, and to dedicate themselves "heart and soul" 
to the revolution.  Chavez acknowledged weaknesses in his 
movement, such as failure to communicate effectively the 
GOV's successes and to reform the bureaucracy.  On substance, 
he outlined a foreign policy that explicitly seeks to reduce 
U.S. influence in the world.  On economic models, he rejected 
communism "at this time" but called for a humanist economic 
model to replace capitalism.  Caracas major daily newspapers 
published portions of Harnecker's account in mid-December. 
End summary. 
 
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Chavistas Hold Skull Session 
---------------------------- 
 
2. (C) President Hugo Chavez held a two-day workshop on 
strengthening his "Bolivarian Revolution" on November 12-13 
at Fuerte Tiuna military headquarters in Caracas.  He 
convened newly-elected and re-elected loyal to him, 
ministers, military officers, and other key officials (ref 
a).  Post obtained an account of Chavez's address to the 
participants put together by Chilean socialist and 
revolutionary writer Martha Harnecker.  The two major Caracas 
dailies published portions of the transcript in mid-December. 
 Separately, post obtained a slide presentation supposedly 
from the event that generally tracked with Harnecker's 
account. 
 
---------------------- 
Mapping Out A Strategy 
---------------------- 
 
3. (C) Chavez introduced what he called a "strategic map" for 
the last two years of his current term.  He noted that since 
his release from prison in 1994 after the failed coup, he has 
always relied on a master plan to guide his political 
movement.  He ordered every minister, governor, and mayor to 
develop their own action plans with quantifiable goals based 
on his guidelines.  Chavez told the conference participants 
at the end of his presentation he would return the following 
day to hear presentations of their preliminary ideas for 
moving forward.  (Note:  The due date for the action plans 
was December 12.)  Since then, there has been a steady stream 
of governors, mayors, and ministers delivering their plans to 
Vice President Jose Vicente Rangel, who heads a designated 
strategy commission that also includes Planning Minister 
Giordani, Director of the Office of the Presidency Vice 
Admiral Luis Alfredo Torcatt, and National Armed Forces 
Inspector General Vice Admiral Ramon Maniglia. 
 
4. (C) Chavez laid out ten major objectives during his speech 
(ref b): 
 
1) Revamp social programs ("missions") to give "power to the 
people," with an emphasis on education, inclusion, and 
equality. 
 
2) Develop a public relations strategy that effectively 
communicates the successes of the revolution to the masses 
and counters criticism from the private media. 
 
3) Better organize grassroots movements that support Chavez, 
with an emphasis on mission participants, electoral 
committees ("patrols"), and local planning councils (a 
public-private council that works with mayors to ensure a 
"participatory budget process.").  Chavez proposed a new 
Ministry of Popular Participation to oversee this objective. 
 
4) Accelerate the creation of a state bureaucracy that 
ensures "social rule of law and justice." 
 
5) Fight corruption via new anti-corruption police, 
prosecutors and a presidential anti-corruption office (under 
Vice President Rangel's supervision). 
 
6) Arrive at the 2006 presidential elections in "optimal 
conditions" that guarantee 10 million votes for Chavez (there 
are currently 14 million registered voters).  The key to this 
is continued issuance of national identity cards ("cedulas") 
without which, Chavez said, he would not have won the 
presidential referendum. 
 
7) Strengthen Mission Vuelvan Caras (job creation via 
cooperatives) to create a new production model that relies on 
state-subsidized cooperatives and micro-enterprise. 
 
8) "Make war" against outdated land holding practices by 
elite Venezuelans by forcing them to surrender large shares 
of their rural land.  (Note:  On December 16, the Chavista 
governor of Cojedes State announced the "intervention" of 16 
major holdings of land in that state). 
 
9) Recapture an "authentic" Venezuelan military doctrine that 
erases all vestiges of "imperialist doctrine."  He called for 
redoubled efforts in the development of military reserves and 
of a military-industrial capacity. 
 
10) Implement a "multipolar" international system (refs c and 
d) to counter the U.S. dominated "unipolar" world (see paras 
8 and 9). 
 
------------------------------------- 
Work Hard, Study Hard, Be Disciplined 
------------------------------------- 
 
5. (C)  Chavez told the participants they must support the 
revolution "heart and soul."  He said the era of elected 
officials sitting in their offices and doing favors for 
friends, relatives, and party loyalists is over.  He told 
mayors they are responsible for making the revolution work at 
the local level, ordering them to house and feed the Cuban 
doctors of Mission Barrio Adentro and to visit every day the 
education classes of the Missions.  He promised the most 
supportive mayors funds for pilot projects, and warned that 
though he could not fire elected officials, he could do 
"other things" to ensure their loyalty.  Chavez encouraged 
the participants to read philosophy and literature (he 
recommended "Les Miserables" and "Don Quijote") and be well 
informed on current events.  He told governors and mayors to 
improve their public speaking skills and not to shy away from 
media opportunities.  Chavez asked Rangel to keep track of 
positive and negative points that Chavez observes about each 
official's performance. 
 
-------------------------- 
Weaknesses Still Plague Us 
-------------------------- 
 
6. (C) Chavez raised several risks to the success of the 
revolution, comparing it to Accion Democratica (AD) in the 
1950s, which enjoyed popular support but later abandoned its 
popular base.  He noted that abstention rates among the poor 
in the October regional elections were higher than expected 
and warned of future electoral defeats if the figure is not 
reversed.  He acknowledged that significant numbers of poor 
people voted against him in the presidential referendum, 
attributing it to a failure to convince them of the GOV's 
advocacy for the poor.  He blamed incompetent ministers and 
stifling bureaucracies for prompting him to launch the 
missions as a kind of parallel government.  He admitted the 
bureaucracy had misled him with inaccurate or biased 
information in the past and lamented that shortcomings in the 
 
missions -- such as students and teacher not getting paid on 
time -- are exploited by the private media. 
 
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Opposition As Enemy 
------------------- 
 
7. (C) Chavez advised his governors to include opposition 
mayors in their planning, suggesting that not every 
"adversary is corrupt" and might be better skilled at 
carrying out some government programs.  Despite this 
overture, Chavez said most opposition governors and mayors 
would likely work against his "strategic map" and would 
therefore have to be neutralized.  Chavez said the enemy -- 
opposition governors and mayors, the private media, elements 
of the armed forces, and opposition deputies in the National 
Assembly -- will not rest and will continue to cause problems 
for the GOV. 
 
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An Anti-U.S. Foreign Policy 
--------------------------- 
 
8. (C) In describing his "multipolar" foreign policy, Chavez 
revealed his deep suspicion of the USG.  He said USG actions 
in Fallujah showed that President Bush would continue an 
interventionist, aggressive, genocidal, and savage foreign 
policy and that Venezuela should prepare itself.  He 
predicted that the USG would increase its aggression toward 
him and would undertake new efforts to weaken the GOV.  The 
USG, he said, would try to exploit his mistakes, create 
scandals, demean and belittle him, and try to develop 
opposition leadership to defeat him in the 2006 presidential 
race.  He discounted the idea of a U.S.-backed coup attempt 
or assassination plot, though he said he is sure there are 
"crazies" in the United States that might try to kill him. 
Nevertheless, he mentioned the possibility of having to 
defend Venezuela from a land invasion by the United States 
and vowed to wage a guerrilla war against such an occurrence. 
 
9. (C) Chavez said the strengthening of the four major poles 
-- Europe, Asia, Africa, and South America -- would also 
contribute to his vision for a new international system.  He 
urged an embrace of Spain's new socialist government to take 
advantage of the rift between Spain and the United States. 
Chavez said the GOV supports the continued consolidation of 
the European Union (e.g., a strengthened euro) because it 
"weakens the position of the United States."  Chavez also 
welcomed new popular leaders in the ex-Soviet Union, where he 
said the seeds of socialism and social justice are 
re-emerging.  In South America, he spoke of the need to break 
Washington's influence over Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, 
and Chile, what he called the "Monroe Axis," by forming the 
South American Community.  He said the decision to move 
forward on a pipeline through Colombia would allow Venezuela 
to export hydrocarbons to Asia and thereby resolve 
Venezuela's "geopolitical vulnerabilities" of having to 
export principally to the United States. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Communism Not An Option For Now 
-------------------------------- 
 
10. (C) On economic models, Chavez denied he is trying to 
follow a communist model because it would abolish private 
property, which he said he opposes.  "No one knows what will 
happen in the future," he said, "... but for this moment it 
would be crazy, those who propose it are crazy."  Chavez 
instead advocated a "social, humanist, and egalitarian" 
economic model.  He said this kind of economy is a long-term 
goal and warned against utopian thinking.  Despite his 
endorsement for private property, he vowed to strip idle land 
from rural landowners via executive branch harassment and the 
creation of new agrarian judges to challenge the authenticity 
of land titles. 
 
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Comment 
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11. (C) Harnecker's account is almost certainly an authentic, 
 
accurate rendition of what the President said.  She enjoys 
special access to him as a chronicler of revolution in the 
Americas, and reportedly has an office in Miraflores Palace. 
That said, the account is no doubt intended to put the best 
face on the direction which Chavez's Bolivarian Revolution is 
to take.  For example, Chavez's instructions for waging a 
"war on bureaucracy" are reduced to a single sentence. 
 
12. (C) Chavez is the hardest working politician in 
Venezuela.  He is making plans -- strategic and tactical -- 
to deepen all aspects of his revolution.  Chavez used the 
meeting to make clear to the elected governors and mayors 
that they work for him; defections of the type that marked 
his first years in office will be dealt with harshly.  The 
Chavez in the transcript is more candid than in public about 
his ideology, especially on foreign policy and economics. 
 
13. (C) Chavez's remarks show a leader who is increasingly 
showing his commitment to shift Venezuela's political, 
economic, and foreign policy orientation towards the left. 
Rhetoric aside, Chavez -- unfortunately -- has a strategic 
direction, and is aware that he faces obstacles and 
contradictions in his movement.  He may, however, be 
overreaching; Embassy will send septel its analysis of the 
weak spots in Chavez's strategy and how they could best be 
countered by USG initiatives. 
 
McFarland 
 
 
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      2004CARACA03928 - CONFIDENTIAL