US embassy cable - 04COLOMBO2027

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 002027 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR SA/INS 
USPACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2014 
TAGS: PTER, PGOV, CE, LTTE - Peace Process 
SUBJECT: SRI LANKA:  TAMIL INTERLOCUTORS SEE CEASEFIRE AS 
INCREASINGLY FRAGILE 
 
REF: A. COLOMBO 2018 
 
     B. COLOMBO 1944 
     C. COLOMBO 1920 
 
Classified By: AMB. JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD.  REASON:  1.4 (B,D). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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1.  (C)  Separate discussions with pro- and anti-Liberation 
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) contacts reveal a rare 
consensus:  that the ceasefire is increasingly fragile and 
that Tiger leader Prabhakaran's threat to "advance the 
freedom struggle" if the Government rejects his bid for an 
interim administration should be taken seriously. 
Predictably, however, the contacts offer starkly different 
explanations for the purported change.  Pro-LTTE sources 
claim that Prabhakaran is under popular pressure to 
demonstrate concrete gains from the ceasefire, while 
anti-LTTE interlocutors assert that the Tiger leader has been 
planning all along an eventual return to armed hostilities. 
While the ideological agendas of both sides obviously color 
the objectivity of their analysis, their atypically common 
conclusion--that the ceasefire may have reached the end of 
its useful life for Prabhakaran--underscores the urgency of a 
speedy return to the negotiating table.  End summary. 
 
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THE PEACE PROCESS ACCORDING TO THE TNA: 
PRABHAKARAN FLEXIBLE; PRESIDENT AMBITIOUS 
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2.  (C) In a December 13 meeting, Tamil National Alliance 
(TNA) MPs G.G. Ponnambalam and Joseph Pararajasingham faulted 
President Chandrika Kumaratunga for allowing her personal 
political ambitions (Ref B) to distract her focus on pursuing 
a negotiated settlement with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil 
Eelam (LTTE).  (Note:  TNA MPs, who hold a total of 22 seats 
in Parliament, are described in the local media as Tiger 
proxies.  A leading anti-Tiger Tamil politician derisively 
defines the acronym of their party as "Tiger-nominated 
Agents," a reference to the Tigers' manipulation of 
Parliamentary polling to ensure that only MPs sympathetic to 
their cause won in areas under their influence in the April 
2004 elections.  End note.)  The MPs pointed to the 
Government's nomination of Peace Secretariat head Jayantha 
Dhanapala as a candidate for UN Secretary General as evidence 
of its lack of seriousness in advancing the peace process. 
The President's purported plans to transform Parliament into 
a constituent assembly to abolish the executive presidency 
and change the electoral system (Ref B) "would be disastrous 
for minority parties," Ponnambalam charged, and would mean 
the "end of the rule of law in this country."  Kumaratunga 
has already rejected suggestions for a constituent assembly 
to address the grievances of the Tamil people; pushing for 
one purely in order to ensure her own political longevity 
instead denigrates the Tamils' legitimate aspirations, he 
indicated.  The President cannot expect the LTTE to sit 
patiently by while she tinkers with the Constitution to 
safeguard her political future, he continued; instead, she 
should recognize "it is time to put personal interests aside." 
 
3.  (C)  Tiger leader Prabhakaran has showed "remarkable" 
restraint in maintaining the ceasefire despite the lack of 
progress toward negotiations, Ponnambalam claimed.  Public 
statements from the U.S and others criticizing the LTTE for a 
lack of flexibility are unfair, he complained, blaming the 
Government for a rigid stance that left the LTTE with 
"nothing to show" after participating in several previous 
negotiations with the Government (1990, 1995 and 2002-2003). 
Poloff suggested that the Tigers' insistence that the 
President publicly accept their controversial proposal for an 
interim administration (known as the Interim Self-Governing 
Authority or "ISGA") as the sole basis of resumed 
negotiations was not a convincing display of 
flexibility--especially since the LTTE knows the Government's 
main coalition partner, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) 
is dead set against it.  Why not give the President a little 
political space by stepping back from that position?  "We can 
show flexibility once talks begin," Ponnambalam replied, but 
not in framing the agenda.  "Otherwise we'll never get off 
the ground."  Without public acceptance of the ISGA as a 
starting point, the Tigers can offer their Tamil constituents 
no evidence of progress in the peace talks, he asserted. 
"Any issues can be sorted out (later) at the negotiating 
table."  JVP concerns that the ISGA is a stepping stone 
toward a permanent separate state for the Tamils are 
unfounded, he added, since the ISGA specifically mentions the 
Government of Sri Lanka.  "This should put to rest arguments 
that the ISGA refers to a final solution" for a separate 
state, he said confidently.  (Comment:  We were not wholly 
convinced by this argument and do not believe that the JVP 
and other skeptics would find it persuasive.  End comment.) 
 
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TNA'S BLUEPRINT FOR PEACE: 
JETTISON THE JVP; UNITE WITH UNP 
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4. (C)  Besides the President's preoccupation with her 
political future, the two TNA MPs cited coalition partner JVP 
as the greatest stumbling block to resuming negotiations.  As 
long as the JVP remains in the government, Ponnambalam 
asserted, there will be no negotiations.  The President 
should get rid of the extremist JVP and make common cause 
with the opposition United National Party (UNP), which is 
ideologically closer to the President's Sri Lanka Freedom 
Party,  in the national interest, the MPs suggested.  When 
asked why Opposition Leader Ranil Wickremesinghe would help 
Kumaratunga, his long-time political nemesis, ensure her 
place in history as the leader who brought peace to Sri 
Lanka, Ponnambalam replied that he believed the UNP would 
support the government in exchange for a guarantee that the 
President will not seek to abolish the executive presidency. 
Both MPs urged the U.S. and other members of the 
international community to exert greater pressure on 
Kumaratunga to accept LTTE leader Prabhakaran's terms for 
resuming negotiations, dump the JVP and come to an 
understanding with the UNP in the national interest. 
 
 
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WARNINGS OF A POSSIBLE "STEP BACK" 
FROM THE CEASEFIRE AGREEMENT 
---------------------------------- 
 
5.  (C) When asked if the local media had misinterpreted 
Prabhakaran's Heroes' Day reference to having no choice but 
"to advance the freedom struggle of our people" if the 
Government fails to resume negotiations based on the ISGA 
(Ref C), both MPs replied that the press had highlighted "the 
correct paragraph" in the Tiger leader's speech.  Both MPs 
stressed that the then-pending visit by Norwegian Special 
Envoy Erik Solheim (Ref A) was "crucial" to the peace process 
because it marked the first visit from Oslo since 
Prabhakaran's Heroes' Day Address.  If no substantive steps 
toward resuming talks materialize from the visit, the LTTE 
may have to take a "step back" from the Ceasefire Agreement 
(CFA), they warned.  Otherwise, the Government of Sri Lanka 
(GSL) might misinterpret Tiger passivity as weakness.  The 
GSL is content with the status quo and views the relative 
peace of the CFA--without the inconvenience of pursuing an 
actual settlement--as a sufficient end in itself, Ponnambalam 
indicated, but the status quo cannot last forever.  For the 
LTTE, which he described as "essentially a military 
organization," the current no peace/no war limbo of the 
ceasefire is especially difficult. 
 
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PLOTE PERSPECTIVE 
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6.  (C) In a separate meeting on December 14, D. Sidharthan, 
leader of the People's Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam 
(PLOTE), a largely defunct former Tamil paramilitary 
organization opposed to the LTTE, agreed that the ceasefire 
is under increasing pressure.  Like his TNA adversaries, he 
zeroed in on Prabhakaran's statement that the no war/no peace 
situation is "weakening the Tamil struggle."  Since for the 
Tigers, the LTTE is synonymous with "the Tamil struggle," 
Prabhakaran is essentially admitting that maintaining the 
ceasefire is chipping away at the strength and discipline of 
his guerrilla force, Sidharthan explained, adding, "As a 
(former) militant, I know this is true."  Prabhakaran's 
commitment to achieving a separate state is "absolute," 
Sidharthan declared; he will never accept anything less. 
Prabhakaran is doggedly insisting on the ISGA as the basis 
for negotiations, in Sidharthan's view, because the Tiger 
leader has calculated that once he secures agreement to that 
proposal, he will have secured effective acceptance of a "de 
facto separate state" and, no matter what he says now, will 
never come back for talks on a final settlement.  Instead, 
according to Sidharthan, Prabhakaran is banking on the 
international community, its attention to Sri Lanka flagging 
once an interim settlement is achieved, eventually coming to 
accept the temporary arrangement as a permanent one. 
 
7.  (C) Single-minded and impervious to influence, 
Prabhakaran will not waver from this position, Sidharthan 
predicted.  Even international pressure is ineffective in 
prodding him to change, Sidharthan warned, adding that the 
Tiger leader knows the U.S. and others will do no more than 
issue statements and that India will not intervene directly 
again.  Moreover, Prabhakaran is now confident that Karuna, 
the dissident military commander from the East, no longer 
poses a threat to his authority, Sidharthan said.  For 
example, he noted, the LTTE has recently evicted 300 to 400 
families of Karuna supporters from LTTE-controlled areas in 
the East. (Note:  Even Douglas Devananda, the blustery head 
of the anti-LTTE Eelam People's Democratic Party who 
initially vowed to launch Karuna's political career, has all 
but admitted that his would-be protege no longer poses a 
challenge to the LTTE.  In a separate conversation on 
December 14, the EPDP leader acknowledged that Karuna was not 
yet "ready" to return to Sri Lanka from an undisclosed 
location abroad--let alone enter politics--the closest we 
have heard the usually bombastic Devananda come to 
acknowledging defeat in this misadventure.) 
 
8.  (C)  If Prabhakaran is single-mindedly intent on 
obtaining the ISGA, the Sinhalese south is just as focused on 
denying it to him, Sidharthan said, adding the "Sinhalese 
polity is not ready for the ISGA."  This fundamental clash of 
objectives makes the ceasefire especially tenuous, he 
indicated.  In a rare moment of agreement with his TNA 
rivals, Sidharthan charged that Sinhalese politicians, 
despite what they say, are not really interested in achieving 
a long-term settlement beyond the ceasefire.  "Absence of war 
is peace for them," he said, "but that's not enough for us 
Tamils."  He concluded, "The Sinhalese still don't understand 
what we are asking for." 
 
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NORWEGIANS NERVOUS 
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9.  (C) In a separate conversation on December 13, even 
Norwegian diplomats, who are typically upbeat about progress 
toward negotiations, sounded relatively subdued and cautious. 
 Second Secretary Kjersti Tromsdal said that while she does 
not believe that either party wants to return to war, there 
is a growing danger that they "might stumble into war" 
because of the increasing fragility of the ceasefire.  Given 
the lack of trust between the two parties and the "muddy" 
domestic politics in the Sinhalese south, it will take some 
time before there will be an agreement to come back to the 
table for talks, she predicted.  Political instability in the 
south is making the LTTE particularly reluctant to return to 
direct negotiations, she said, absent some greater clarity 
from the mainstream Sinhalese parties.  She expressed 
particular concern about government coalition partner JVP, 
whose rabble-rousing in Trincomalee after Prabhakaran's 
Heroes' Day speech and whose anti-Norwegian propagandizing 
send conflicting and confusing signals.  The absence of 
negotiations leaves only the CFA for the parties to fall back 
on, she commented; under these conditions, tense situations 
"can quickly escalate."  With no other device to defuse 
tensions, the CFA is under constant pressure, making it all 
the more important that the Agreement be strengthened, she 
said. 
 
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COMMENT 
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10.  (C) It is a rare moment when the TNA and PLOTE can agree 
on something.  It is unfortunate that that something is a 
shared perception that the ceasefire--and Prabhakaran's 
patience with the status quo--are wearing thin.  It seems 
plausible that the guerrilla leader is growing increasingly 
restive under the constraints of a protracted ceasefire--and 
increasingly suspicious that Kumaratunga has no intention of 
altering a status quo she finds favorable to her long-term 
political ambitions.  For Kumaratunga, maintaining the 
ceasefire can be interpreted as a sign of success; for 
Prabhakaran, the head of a militant organization committed to 
an ethnic homeland, an indefinite ceasefire can be 
logistically and ideologically more costly.  Although 
discerning the reclusive Tiger leader's current thinking is 
never easy, the TNA is our best source for learning the 
latest LTTE fare for diplomatic consumption.  Based on this 
most recent TNA tirade, it seems that Prabhakaran--much like 
the President herself--has decided to place all the blame for 
stalled negotiations on the JVP.  The TNA's proposal to 
overcome this obstacle--that the President commit political 
suicide by dumping the JVP in the (almost certainly) 
unfounded hope that the UNP will rush to her rescue--is so 
impracticable as to raise very serious doubts about the 
LTTE's sincerity in pursuing negotiations at all.  With the 
LTTE adamant on the ISGA as the basis for negotiations, and 
the GSL just as adamant in rejecting it, prospects for an 
expeditious return to the table seem bleak. 
 
LUNSTEAD