US embassy cable - 04ABUJA2106

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ABUJA 002106 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, ETRD, EAID, KCOR, NI 
SUBJECT: ENGAGING NIGERIA:  SUPPORT FOR REFORMS 
 
REF: A. ABUJA 1989 
 
     B. ABUJA 1939 
     C. ABUJA 685 
     D. ABUJA 2041 AND 2042 
     E. ABUJA 828 
     F. ABUJA 937 
     G. 03 ABUJA 2184 
 
Classified By: CHARGE D'AFFAIRES THOMAS P. FUREY FOR REASONS 1.5 (B), ( 
D), AND (E) 
 
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Summary 
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1.  (S) The grip of the interlocked coteries that have ruled 
Nigeria since the civil war (ref A) continues to be the 
driving force in Nigerian politics.  In order for Nigeria to 
move ahead, this grip must be loosened.  Until Nigerians gain 
a real stake in their own society, they cannot begin to care 
deeply about the political arrangements that affect them. 
Mission has identified a series of actions intended to 
accomplish three discrete, but overlapping tasks:  a) break 
up the coteries; b) help the "modernizers;" and c) enable 
Nigerian economic development and prosperity.  These three 
elements will be focused on breaking the coteries' hold, but 
should be balanced to limit the institutional disruption that 
pursuing one without the other could bring.  Any success in 
dismantling the groups will support the efforts of Nigeria's 
"modernizers:" its next generation of leaders who say they 
want to break Nigeria's pattern of entrenched corruption. 
These modernizers come from throughout the country and are 
generally younger, western-educated technocrats, much like 
the current regime's economic "dream team."  When the 
coteries are weakened, economic and political development 
will become possible.  The following initiatives have been 
identified by the Mission: 
 
Breaking up Coteries 
 
--  Engage and Lobby National Assembly on Political and 
Financial Reform Measures (Para 4 and 5) 
--  Shift Technical Focus to Embedded Experts (Para 6) 
--  Fund MPRI Civil-Military Program (Para 9) 
--  Restart IMET (Para 10) 
 
Supporting "Modernizers" 
 
--  Support Political Parties (Para 14) 
--  Assist Civil Society (Para 15) 
--  Encourage Judiciary (Para 16) 
 
Enabling Economic Development 
 
--  Continue Visas Donkey Program (Para 19) 
--  Design Debt Relief Linkages (Para 20) 
--  Facilitate AGOA Investment (Para 23) 
 
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Breaking the Coteries - Political 
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2.  (S) Despite its federal structure, the Nigerian political 
system is highly centralized with most of the power residing 
in the Presidency.  Nigeria's political culture is a legacy 
of military rule, colonial governance, and many of the 
indigenous forms of government that preceded the current 
political arrangement.  Decisions, and even non-decisions, 
cannot be made without the President's approval, the National 
Assembly was largely handpicked as supporters of the 
President, and the Judiciary remains under threat both from 
the corrupt members within its own ranks and attacks by the 
GON when court decisions do not conform to the whims of 
government.  With total control of the budget resting in the 
Presidency (a nod to the National Assembly currently provides 
for the barest of oversight authority), almost every funding 
decision has the potential to be both a political sop to 
supporters and a club with which to intimidate critics. 
Encouraging the executive branch to behave as a partner in 
Nigeria's development rather than a (sometimes rather stern) 
father would encourage cooperation from the other levels of 
government. 
 
3.  (S) It is important to develop the National Assembly as 
an institution capable of holding the GON's executive branch 
accountable for its actions.  While elements in the current 
National Assembly appear to be paying more attention to 
oversight of government officials and budgets, in the current 
dispensation the National Assembly remains weak and provides 
little effective oversight.  Many believe the quality of the 
Assembly declined significantly with the 2003 elections.  The 
1999 legislature included many well-known politicians who are 
now gone (some 80% of the politicians who received USG 
technical assistance in the 1999 legislature are now out of 
office). 
 
4.  (S) The U.S. should engage the National Assembly on a 
packet of measures that would strengthen oversight of the 
Presidency, increase the prospects for a democratic election 
in the future, and further professionalize the military (see 
next sections for specific approaches to the military). 
First, the USG should aid in the establishment and operation 
of a National Assembly budget office, in close cooperation 
with the UK and other international donors, particularly the 
European Union and the World Bank.  In conjunction with this 
effort, a strong lobbying effort should be mounted to 
encourage the passage of the Fiscal Responsibility Bill to 
provide oversight over expenditures at every level. 
5.  (S) A second, simultaneous lobbying effort could also 
tackle the military's system of preferential promotions. 
Enacting guidelines that ensured promotions based on 
competence and ability, rather than on ethnic affiliation and 
political ties, would support other USG efforts to instill 
high professional standards. 
 
6.  (S) Most GON ministries are ineffective, existing more to 
provide employment than to take action.  The Presidency is 
the sole decision point for the GON.  In spite of this, parts 
of the Ministries of Health and Education are able to operate 
effectively, to some degree, and should receive U.S. support. 
 The most effective support is in the form of embedded 
technical assistance, but it is important that the U.S. 
actually be able to provide the embedded staff.  It is also 
important to build in some level of control and influence 
over the processes to which these experts contribute. 
Alternatively, there should be no compunction about 
criticizing when best practices are subverted for private 
gain.  Junkets provide no benefits, and the U.S. should not 
provide additional plane tickets to GON bureaucrats. 
 
7.  (S) The states receive half of all GON revenue, and 
implementation of GON programs rests heavily with the states. 
 Several states stand out as more effective than the rest and 
deserve U.S. support:  Gombe, Bauchi, Katsina, Cross Rivers, 
Kaduna, Lagos, Kwara, and the Federal Capital Territory 
(Abuja) among them.  A few other states stand out for their 
lack of demonstrated commitment to improvement and should be 
avoided:  among them Ogun, Adamawa, Plateau, Rivers, Delta, 
Zamfara, and Benue. 
 
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Breaking the Coteries - Military 
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8.  (S) Military corruption is heavily ingrained; long-term 
reform is necessary to help address the problem. 
Regularizing military procurement, pay, contracts, and 
operational expenditures will greatly reduce the scope and 
opportunity for large-scale corruption.  However, many people 
benefit from the current system, so radical changes will 
require significant support from politicians and the middle 
echelons of the armed forces.  The Civil-Military Program, 
IMET, and other professional training form the best route for 
success, but a long journey is required for effective change. 
 The military reflects society at large, so a reduction in 
military-specific corruption can only reasonably be expected 
within the framework of larger governmental and societal 
changes. 
 
9.  (S) The MPRI Civil-Military Program, which has lapsed due 
to the GON's failure to fund its project obligations, is 
important enough that the U.S. should consider fully funding 
it, regardless of the GON's lack of contribution.  The 
Civil-Military Program focuses on reform and modernization 
within the military, civilian control, resource management, 
legislative relations, and training management.  Even though 
there were funding problems, a group of "modernizers" within 
the Nigerian military and the National Assembly recognizes 
the value and necessity of the reforms being worked on by the 
Civil-Military Program. 
 
10.  (S) With the lifting of the Feingold sanctions on 
military assistance, the remaining obstacle to ongoing 
military cooperation is the Leahy sanctions.  Continuing 
sanctions have led to a downward trend in funding for 
Nigerian military assistance, and a waiver or lifting of 
Leahy sanctions is necessary for effective defense 
cooperation.  The sanctions have shut down IMET training, one 
of the USG's most useful and effective means of positively 
influencing military officers.  Our priority should be to 
restart the IMET program. 
 
11.  (S) EUCOM has proposed to track oil bunkering vessels, 
but intelligence sharing is only part of the equation:  the 
GON would need to take action on the intelligence received, 
so Nigerian buy-in on the EUCOM proposal is essential to its 
success.  However, since participation in bunkering runs to 
the highest levels of the GON, full buy-in by the GON is 
unlikely.  Raising this issue could be problematic for both 
sides, with the USG unwilling to share significant portions 
of intelligence and the GON unwilling to act in areas that 
hurt the elites who are deriving the illicit benefits. 
 
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Supporting the "Modernizers" 
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12.  (S)  When searching for "modernizers," Obasanjo's 
economic "dream team" exhibits the desired traits--education, 
experience, and international reputation--but Obasanjo's team 
has little public support within Nigeria.  A wider group of 
business and political leaders exists apart from the Obasanjo 
team and has little interaction with it.  This group of 
"modernizers" is generally supportive of the goals stated by 
Obasanjo and could assist in selling a credible reform 
program, promoting ethical guidelines, and pulling Nigeria's 
political economy from its 20-year miasma.  Composed 
primarily of professionals from all elements of society, the 
"modernizers" are also in agreement that the ongoing excesses 
of the past 30 years need to be addressed.  Some take part in 
politics, others in business; most are not at the forefront 
of the political battle shaping up for 2007.  This group, 
currently operating outside the Nigerian political limelight, 
must be encouraged to contribute to Nigeria's future.  The 
following policy initiatives are designed to encourage 
broader participation by this target group. 
 
13.  (S) AID targets three areas for assistance to strengthen 
Nigeria's electoral process:  INEC, Nigeria's political 
parties, and domestic election monitors. It is a matter of 
debate whether to continue to support the Independent 
National Electoral Commission (INEC), given the serious flaws 
in the 2003 elections, and especially INEC's testimony in the 
Buhari tribunal that it saw no need to be independent (ref 
B).  Without legislation strengthening INEC's independence 
and removing its funding from political caprice, little or no 
improvement can be expected over the dismal 2003/2004 
election cycle.  However, "throwing out the baby with the 
bathwater" would also not serve U.S. interests.  The USG 
should remain engaged with INEC and seek to secure a more 
cooperative working relationship with its officials. 
 
14.  (S) As currently established, the political parties in 
Nigeria range from irrelevant (the 26 mini-parties) to 
regional/ethnic based (APGA and AD) to groups of elite 
seeking to maintain control over Nigeria's resources (PDP and 
ANPP).  It is important to support the development of party 
platforms based on an ideological and/or programmatic agenda. 
 USAID is currently supporting the International Republican 
Institute (IRI) in political party development. 
 
15. (S)  Providing continuing support to civil society will 
be a key activity for the U.S. in preparation for the 2007 
elections and is one of the most important deliverables among 
our programs.  While most "civil society" organizations are 
not representative of their purported constituencies, many 
have talented and dedicated staff.  To ensure that the 2007 
elections are monitored by local observers, much more 
development and training needs to take place.  It is critical 
that Economic Support Funds (ESF) are released by the 
Department to fund programs that support a transparent and 
accountable electoral process, and that engage civil society 
in that process. 
 
16.  (S) In Ref C, Post recommended ways to support rule of 
law in Nigeria.  We need to focus on good governance and 
transparency, both economic and political, and we should make 
our attention toward these issues public, including 
commentary on positive and negative actions by the judiciary. 
 Public support for the process, and not for individuals, is 
an important aspect.  Obversely, private criticism of 
failures should de-emphasize the process and focus on the 
individual.  Depersonalizing our public approach will allow 
us to maintain relations with all the players in the process 
and encourage some to improve.  Efforts to empower the 
judiciary are critical for both the nation and for the 
"modernizers," but we have little in the way of programming 
to offer.  The judiciary, out of the mainstream for many 
years and viewed as a tool of the "powers that be," can 
respond to and be empowered by public encouragement.  An 
added benefit is an expected improvement in the USG's image, 
helping to persuade the increasingly alienated citizens of 
Nigeria that the USG cares that they have a stake in the 
process. 
 
17.  (S) Twelve Nigerian states have adopted Shari'a, or 
Islamic law.  In order to prevent abuses of Shari'a, 
particularly cruel and unusual punishment, the U.S. should 
continue to provide assistance to local Islamic organizations 
that provide legal assistance to Shari'a defendants.  The 
U.S. should not be publicly involved in this effort, however; 
to do so would strengthen those interested in imposing an 
intolerant version of Shari'a.  The U.S. should increase 
opportunities for interaction between American and Nigerian 
Muslims, while avoiding direct confrontation over the legal 
code. 
 
18.  (S) It is essential to continue public outreach efforts, 
especially by maintaining Post's publications such as 
"Crossroads" and its Hausa counterpart "Magama." We should 
expand the American Corners program, and should regularly 
poll public opinion to monitor the success of our activities. 
 
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Enabling Economic Development 
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19.  (S) Corruption is such a pervasive issue in Nigerian 
society that it must be addressed.  If the U.S. rewards the 
modernizers, it must also penalize the transgressors.  A key 
element here is to expand the Visas Donkey program that Post 
began implementing in December (Ref D).  The U.S. should also 
comment publicly and regularly to encourage prosecutions for 
all corruption. 
 
20.  (S) The U.S. should consider options relative to debt 
relief for Nigeria, linking debt relief to transparency with 
no immediate commitment (Ref F).  Any assistance provided to 
the GON should come with an appropriately strong level of 
Nigerian public oversight and access to the processes (not to 
be confused with oversight and access by NGOs, which are part 
of the system and often not Nigerian). 
 
21.  (S) In Ref E, Post recommended ways to reduce tensions 
that lead to ethnic conflict and other communal violence. 
The U.S. should treat Nigeria's many Rule of Law problems not 
as blemishes in its system of governance, but rather as 
fundamental breakdowns.  The U.S. should make strong 
representations advocating that the GON establish Rule of Law 
generally in areas now dominated by heavily armed militias. 
For the Delta, we will first need a consensus with the oil 
majors that security must be established by the GON and not 
through local partners.  We can approach other friends of 
Nigeria to weigh in as well.  The U.S. should take a stand 
that Nigeria's state governments must extend the Rule of Law 
to their "non-indigene" citizens, people categorized legally 
as having family origins in another Nigerian state. 
President Obasanjo, along with other luminaries, has publicly 
called for Nigerians to stop discriminating along 
indigene/non-indigene lines, and U.S. spokesmen can echo his 
call. 
 
22.  (S) The U.S. should raise the priority for the GON's 
establishing a workable land use and easement registration 
system.  A workable system is a necessity for Rule of Law to 
resolve land disputes at the heart of several of Nigeria's 
so-called ethnic and religious conflicts, and it will yield 
additional benefits in improving the GON's tax and utilities 
revenue collection and in capital formation.  An element of 
such an overhaul needs to include a rationalization of 
governmental land holdings.  A rational system of land 
registration and usage should lead to the divestiture of many 
federal and state land holdings, further reducing the 
opportunity for graft in the preferential distribution of 
prime properties. 
 
23.  (S) The U.S. should work to improve the environment for 
U.S. investment in Nigerian industries interested in 
exporting to the U.S. under the African Growth and 
Opportunity Act (AGOA).  The GON would have to commit in 
advance to facilitating such investment, and Post believes a 
USDOC advocacy program on behalf of other U.S. firms seeking 
to make greenfield investments in Nigeria would help (Ref G). 
 
 
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Wrap-Up 
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24.  (S)  Until Nigerians gain a real stake in their own 
society, they cannot begin to affect their own political 
arrangements.  The "modernizers" are Nigeria's best hope for 
developing a sustainable, stable Nigeria.  While currently 
marginalized by the prevalence of the ruling coteries, this 
group of like-thinkers has yet to give up hope.  If the USG 
encourages a more open electoral system and cleaner economy, 
the Nigerians who continue calling for representative and 
accountable governance could be emboldened.  Some elements of 
this program have the potential to introduce a degree of 
uncertainty into the Nigerian polity...but failure to act 
already has. 
FUREY