US embassy cable - 04MADRID4778

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 004778 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/WE, EUR/RPM 
NSC FOR FRIED AND VOLKER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MOPS, SP, NATO 
SUBJECT: SPAIN: INDECISIVE ON ISAF STAGE TWO ROLE 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires J. Robert Manzanares, reasons 1.4(b) a 
nd (d). 
 
1.  (C) Summary:  Charge met December 20 with Spanish 
National Security Advisor Carles Casajuana to discuss Spain's 
role in ISAF stage two.  Casajuana was very reluctant to 
commit the Zapatero government to any role in stage two. 
Casajuana said it was very unlikely the GOS would announce a 
decision on its participation in stage two before early 
February, given that parliament will soon recess until late 
January.  In any event, he believed that if Spain were to 
decide to increase its role in Afghanistan, it would most 
likely add to its troop presence temporarily to provide 
security for parliamentary elections, as it did for 
presidential elections in the fall.  Casajuana believed it 
would be very difficult for Spain to lead a provincial 
reconstruction team (PRT).  Embassy believes that in 
considering its potential role in ISAF stage two, the 
Zapatero government remains intensely focused on minimizing 
any risk to its forces.  End summary. 
 
2.  (C) Charge told Casajuana Spain's role in ISAF stage two 
would be very important for continued progress in 
Afghanistan, and said the U.S. urged Spain to strongly 
consider leading a PRT and assisting with the forward support 
base (FSB) in Herat.  If Spain could not do both, Charge said 
we hoped Spain would lead a PRT.  The U.S., added Charge, 
hoped Spain could announce its decision to increase its role 
in ISAF stage two by mid-January to permit ISAF to begin 
fortifying itself as soon as possible in preparation for 
parliamentary elections. 
 
3.  (C) Casajuana replied Spain was considering the PRT and 
FSB, and was also weighing the possibility of adding troops 
to its contingent in Afghanistan on a short-term basis to 
provide increased security for the parliamentary elections. 
Unfortunately, it was highly unlikely Spain would be able to 
announce a decision on an increased role in Afghanistan 
before early February, because the Spanish government would 
have to take any proposed change in its posture in 
Afghanistan to the parliament, and parliament would soon 
recess until late January.  Casajuana later hedged a bit on 
this, saying the GOS would definitely have to bring a 
decision to lead a PRT before parliament, but might not have 
to do so to move assets to Herat or increase its troop 
presence temporarily.  Nonetheless, even in the latter two 
cases, Zapatero may want to get parliament's assent "for 
political reasons."  Casajuana also said the Zapatero 
government would have to "address public opinion issues" in 
reaching a decision on increasing its role in Afghanistan, 
because many Spaniards question why Spanish forces are in 
Afghanistan in the first place. 
 
4.  (C) Charge said it would be useful if the Zapatero 
government could at least reach a political decision on 
Spain's role in ISAF by mid-January, even if it would not be 
able to bring the decision to parliament before early 
February.  Casajuana thought it would be very difficult for 
the Zapatero government to do so because it did not want to 
"get too far out in front of parliament."  The easiest 
decision for the government to make would be to commit 
additional troops for a short period of time to provide 
security for the elections, as Spain did in the fall for the 
presidential elections. 
 
5.  (C) On the question of public opinion, Charge said he 
hoped parliament and the average Spaniard understood their 
country shares a common interest with the others in 
Afghanistan in fighting international terrorism and in 
reconstructing a democratic Afghanistan that no longer 
harbors terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda.  A PRT, in 
particular, provides Spain a unique opportunity to 
participate in reconstruction efforts and improve the lives 
of the average Afghan.  This should be something the average 
Spaniard could support, emphasized Charge.  Casajuana agreed 
and said he simply meant the government would have to do a 
good job explaining its policy to the public. 
 
6.  (C) Charged then explained the GOS was sending mixed 
signals on what it was willing to do in Afghanistan, with 
Foreign Minister Moratinos suggesting Spain would be willing 
to increase its role, and Minister of Defense Bono later 
saying Spain would not be sending any more troops to 
Afghanistan.  Casajuana said Spain's contribution to ISAF is 
still very much an open debate, and certainly no decision has 
been made not to send additional forces there.  Asked what he 
believed the chances were that Spain would ultimately lead a 
PRT, Casajuana said he thought it would be difficult but he 
wasn't ruling it out. 
 
7.  (C) Comment:  Despite our efforts to draw him out, 
Casajuana was extremely reluctant to commit to any position 
on Spain's role in ISAF stage two.  He left us with the 
impression that it was very unlikely Spain would lead a PRT, 
and that the GOS remains very much undecided on what other 
role, if any, Spain will play in ISAF stage two.  One thing 
that can be said after this meeting:  The Zapatero 
government's primary concern in considering whether or not to 
increase its role in ISAF remains minimizing any risk that 
Spanish forces could suffer a casualty as a result of their 
participation. 
 
MANZANARES