US embassy cable - 04SANTODOMINGO6752

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DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: 2004 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT

Identifier: 04SANTODOMINGO6752
Wikileaks: View 04SANTODOMINGO6752 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Santo Domingo
Created: 2004-12-20 18:10:00
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Tags: PTER ASEC
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 SANTO DOMINGO 006752 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR S/CT JKINCANNON AND KMCCUTCHAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER, ASEC 
SUBJECT: DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: 2004 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT 
 
REF: A. STATE 245841 
     B. STATE 259427 
 
1.  (U)  SUMMARY.  There were no terrorist attacks or known 
terrorism related activities in the Dominican Republic during 
calendar year 2004.  The GODR continues to work closely with 
the USG and others in the fight on global terrorism.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
2.  (U)  The Dominican Republic was not covered in the 2003 
Patterns of Global Terrorism Report.  Per reftels, Embassy 
Santo Domingo submits the following responses to 
applicable/appropriate questions as keyed to paragraph 15 in 
reftel a. 
 
A) Support for the global coalition against terrorism, 
including bilateral and multilateral efforts.  This could 
include examples of effective coalition, joint, or 
coordinated activity, including donor coordination/provision 
of support that significantly enhanced CT capacity. 
 
-- The GODR,s most significant contribution to the global 
coalition against terrorism was its contribution of Dominican 
troops to the Coalition forces in Iraq.  From September 2003 
through May 2004, the GODR had approximately 300 soldiers 
stationed in Iraq as part of a Spanish led brigade.  The 
troops returned to the Dominican Republic two and a half 
months earlier than expected due to logistical and political 
pressures. 
 
-- Additionally, the GODR has fully cooperated with USG and 
UN requests to search their banks for assets held under the 
names of known terrorists.  No accounts of this type have 
been found.  The 
Superintendent of Banks has headed the GODR's effort to 
ensure that banks, searches are conducted in a timely manner. 
 
B) Host nation counterterrorism actions, including its 
cooperation with the US both bilaterally and with the global 
coalition against terrorism. Significant actions in any (and 
all) of the following areas should be addressed, as 
appropriate: diplomatic, law enforcement, intelligence, 
financial, public diplomacy, and military. A particular focus 
should be placed on instances where the US asked for CT 
cooperation aimed at preventing attacks and protecting US 
persons or interests or assistance in response to attacks 
against US persons or interests.  This should include the 
extent to which the government is cooperating with the USG in 
apprehending, convicting, and punishing the individual(s) 
responsible for such attacks and the extent to which the 
government is cooperating in preventing future acts of 
terrorism against US persons or interests.  Diplomatic 
efforts should include steps to ratify CT-related UN 
conventions.  Financial efforts should include the extent of 
the host country's ability and efforts to meet the 
requirements of UNSCRs on terrorist financing. 
 
-- There have been no specific instances in which the USG has 
asked the GODR for CT cooperation in preventing definitively 
known terrorist attacks and protecting US persons or 
interests in the Dominican Republic nor have there been any 
ongoing legal actions against alleged terrorist or terrorist 
organizations in the Dominican Republic.  General cooperation 
in law enforcement, diplomatic, financial, public diplomacy 
and military issues is strong.  Intelligence gathering by the 
GODR is weak; nevertheless, should the USG ask for assistance 
the GODR intelligence community would do its best to provide 
it. 
 
C) Host nation law enforcement, intelligence/security 
service, and military actions taken against Al-Qaida or other 
terrorist groups; actions to track, block or seize terrorist 
assets; enactment of new pertinent counterterrorism laws, 
executive orders or regulatory action; making notable 
contributions under UN or multilateral auspices; and/or 
giving information or other assistance to countries 
investigation terrorist incidents or bringing terrorists to 
justice.  Discuss any success with a rewards program aimed at 
bringing terrorists to justice. 
 
--  An anti-terrorism law is currently in committee in the 
Dominican Congress.  The expectation is that it will be 
passed and go into effect in late 2005.  When passed it will 
raise the severity of punishment for those convicted of 
terrorist related crimes. 
 
D)  Response of the judicial system to acts of international 
terrorism and/or significant acts of domestic terrorism 
during 2004, including any host government prosecutions 
relating to terrorism.  Did the host country extradite or 
request the extradition of suspected terrorists for 
prosecution during the year?  Particular attention should be 
given to host government responses to US requests for 
extradition or assistance in terrorist cases.  Describe any 
major impediments to host government prosecution and/or 
extradition of suspected terrorists. 
--  There are no pending cases relating to international or 
domestic terrorism in the Dominican judicial system.  The 
GODR did not extradite or request the extradition of 
suspected terrorists during 2004.  The GODR and the USG have 
a strong extradition relationship.  In 2004, more fugitives 
(26) were extradited to the United States than in any 
previous calendar year.  If the USG were to request the 
extradition of a fugitive charged with terrorism related 
crimes, the GODR would likely comply with the request. 
 
E) We are also interested in law enforcement capabilities. 
Specifically, does the jurisdiction have the authority to 
intercept wire, oral and electronic communications?  What are 
the limitations?  Can law enforcement authorities initiate 
surveillance and investigation of suspected 
terrorists/terrorist facilitators based on intelligence 
information?  Can such information be used as evidence in 
court?  Who has investigative and prosecutorial authority in 
CT cases?  Is there a special examining magistrate with 
special powers in the CT area?  If intelligence is not 
permitted as evidence in a court of law, are parallel 
investigations based on open-source research conducted with 
the assistance of intelligence officials?  If there are legal 
restrictions in this area, are there work-arounds, and are 
they exploited? How long and under what conditions may 
authorities hold suspected terrorists/terrorist facilitators 
prior to/after being charged?  Pending and during trial?  Is 
all access to the suspected terrorist recorded by enforcement 
agencies?  Do they have access to telephones or e-mail?  Do 
they have weekend passes to leave jail?  Are foreign 
government service de-briefings permitted?  Are photographs, 
fingerprints, DNA samples collected by the detaining 
authority? 
 
-- The GODR does permit wiretaps with court approval.  It 
often lacks the equipment or manpower to use such law 
enforcement tools.  Law enforcement authorities may initiate 
surveillance and investigation of suspected 
terrorists/terrorist facilitators based on intelligence 
information and with a legally enforceable court order.  If 
evidence is collected in this manner, it can be used in 
court.  Primary investigative and prosecutorial authority in 
CT cases lies with the Attorney General,s office.  There is 
no special magistrate assigned to CT cases as there have been 
no CT cases to date in the Dominican Republic. 
 
-- Because there have been no CT investigations or 
prosecutions, it is uncertain what type of CT evidence the 
Dominican courts would accept.  Additionally, the Dominican 
Republic has recently enacted a new criminal procedural code 
that has yet to be tested thoroughly in the courts.  It is 
likely that the GODR would cooperate with USG CT requests to 
the best of its ability.  The GODR is hampered by a weak 
judicial system. 
 
F)  Host government efforts to investigate terrorist 
incidents or assist with international terrorism 
investigations, to reduce the ability of terrorists to cross 
national borders, including improving border control and 
reducing the availability of fraudulent documents. 
 
--  The GODR has not investigated terrorist incidents neither 
has it assisted with international terrorism investigations. 
Recent efforts to increase the professionalism of airport and 
port security officials have been met with guarded 
enthusiasm.  A new GODR administration has a strong migration 
and law enforcement cabinet level team. 
 
--  In May 2004, the GODR introduced a photodigitized, 
machine-readable passport which has good security features. 
It is being phased in gradually over the next several years. 
The older version passport is still being issued and, on 
occasion, sold by counterfeiters to non-Dominicans.  Embassy 
Santo Domingo has encouraged the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
to adopt a photodigitized machine-readable visa.  Lack of 
funding has been an obstacle in the past.  The new 
administration is once again exploring this possibility. 
Emboffs delivered a note verbale on the Lost/Stolen Data 
Share Program as instructed by Washington.  The director of 
the Dominican passport office responded positively and also 
sends lost/stolen passport reports to the consular anti-fraud 
unit. 
 
G) Not applicable 
 
H) Developments in host nation CT efforts, including any new 
organizations or processes created, including 
counterterrorism units and/or efforts to upgrade border or 
maritime security. 
 
-- The GODR changed administrations on August 16, 2004.  With 
that change came new leadership of the armed forces.  The 
current Secretary of the Armed Forces recently increased the 
number of troops on the Dominican/Haitian border.  It is 
unknown how long the increased level of military border 
security will stay in effect.  The main concern is lack of 
funding for the military to sustain the increased number of 
troops on the border.  Maritime security is under the 
leadership of the new Secretary of the Navy; it is one of 
most exploitable areas in the Dominican Republic. 
 
I) Not applicable 
 
J) Identify where host government has deployed military or 
paramilitary forces for combat, counter insurgency or CT 
activities. 
 
-- The GODR deployed military troops to Iraq from September 
2003 to May 2004.  The troops were trained in CT but did not 
see combat and counter insurgency.  The troops were exposed 
to indirect fire. 
 
K) Describe major changes, positive or negative, in the host 
government's stance towards terrorism, international or 
domestic.  What is responsible for the change? 
 
-- A new GODR administration took office in August.  The new 
law enforcement cabinet level officials of this 
administration are cooperating closely with the USG. 
 
L) Constraints on CT performance, including lack of 
capacity or political will. Describe popular attitudes 
toward terrorism and CT efforts, if germane. 
 
-- There is insufficient training of the military forces in 
the Dominican Republic and especially in CT efforts.  The 
general public and government attitude is one of support for 
CT measures; unfortunately, it is difficult to translate this 
attitude into action due to lack of funding and training.  An 
economic crisis in the Dominican Republic has made funding 
for military and police training, including CT training, a 
low government priority.  Additionally, there appears to be a 
continuing general feeling among Dominican society that, 
"terrorism can't happen here."  This sentiment hinders 
training efforts and ensures that CT efforts do not rise in 
priority level. 
 
M)  Not applicable 
 
N)  Not applicable 
 
O)  Not applicable 
 
P)  Not applicable 
 
Q)  Not applicable 
 
R)  Not applicable 
KUBISKE 

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