US embassy cable - 04ANKARA7067

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 007067 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, IZ, ECON, TU 
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY ARMITAGE'S 
JANUARY 2-3 VISIT TO TURKEY 
 
 
(U) Classified by Charge d'Affaires a.i. Robert Deutsch, E.O. 
12958, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) You arrive at a time when Turkey, having secured a 
2005 start date for EU accession negotiations, will have 
begun to wake up warily to the enormous challenges entailed 
by harmonization.  You arrive as well in a Turkey where much 
of the public, fed massive, continuing disinformation by an 
antagonistic media -- stoked by ill-considered remarks by PM 
Erdogan, FM Gul and other ruling AKP figures -- emotionally 
views the U.S. operation in Iraq as against their interests, 
and broadly considers the U.S. a threat to world peace.  We 
will need to recalibrate our engagement with our ally Turkey 
occupying strategic geopolitical and societal spaces, in 
light of the experience of the past three years. 
 
2. (C) Despite the deep resentment and suspicion of AKP by a 
waning Kemalist elite, Erdogan appears unassailable: he has a 
two-thirds majority in parliament; he remains highly popular; 
his government continues to reform Turkey's political and 
social space -- at least on the books; and he has pursued an 
activist all-points foreign policy. 
 
3. (C) In this context Erdogan knows that maintaining good 
relations with the U.S. is important.  He has had his 
government take verbal steps to reaffirm the relationship, 
but he has demonstrated no vision how to re-energize and 
expand relations from Turkey's side.  FM Gul, at heart a 
Sunni Islamist despite his smile and seeming reasonable 
manner, is much more problematic.  President Sezer is a 
narrow-minded statist with a tin ear for politics in general 
and a demonstrated lack of enthusiasm for good relations with 
the U.S. in particular -- he maneuvered to prevent U.S. troop 
deployment through Turkey prior to OIF.  CHOD Ozkok is a 
solidly pro-Atlanticist senior commander; he has moved 
step-by-step to try to bring more modern thinkers into senior 
ranks, but nationalist, anti-Atlanticist sentiments are 
strong at lower ranks. 
 
Security relations 
------------------ 
 
4. (C)  Iraq is a major preoccupation of Turks in and out of 
government and will be first on your interlocutors, agenda 
with you.  The GOT shares our goals for Iraq -- a secure and 
stable, democratic country, united and territorially whole -- 
but our action in Iraq has always been unpopular in Turkey. 
Concerns about the ethnic balance in and future of Kirkuk, 
Kurdish desires for independence, our lack of action against 
the terrorist PKK/Kongra Gel camps in northern Iraq and 
perceived discrimination against Turkmen underpinned the 
irresponsible statements by AKP leaders and spreading 
anti-Americanism sparked by sensationalist and grossly 
distorted media reporting about the Fallujah operation and 
continued attacks on Turkish truck drivers. 
 
5. (C) While the government took a couple of measures to 
contain the damage to our relationship prior to the EU 
summit, perceptions persist that we caused massive civilian 
casualties, including in Fallujah; that we tolerate Kurdish 
designs to seize Kirkuk and break away; and that the US 
acquiescence to (or supports) the PKK,s presence in Iraq. 
All of this remains true despite continuing broad efforts by 
the Mission to hold the GOT and the media to a strict 
standard of fact in their statements.  Nonetheless, Turkey 
has provided valuable assistance and cooperation, for which 
you should express appreciation.  Ankara offered to send 
peacekeeping troops to Iraq in October 2003, approved the use 
of Incirlik Air Base for tankers to refuel aircraft on 
support missions for both Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) 
and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), authorized the transit of 
US troops from Iraq on rotation out, and permits the transit 
of supplies for our forces and humanitarian goods.  The GOT 
has reached out to all major Iraqi groups to encourage 
participation in elections on January 30.  Turkey is also 
active in reconstruction efforts, including providing 
electricity for Iraq, and training in Turkey of Iraqi 
diplomats and, as its contribution to the NATO training 
mission, Iraqi security forces. 
 
6. (C) Iraq impacts our entire bilateral security 
relationship.  Our senior-most military leaders have worked 
hard to repair the damage caused by Turkey,s failure to 
approve passage of the 4th ID in March 2003 and our arrest of 
Turkish Special Forces personnel in Suleymania on July 4 of 
that year.  Nonetheless, the relationship remains fragile. 
Recent requests to increase our use of Incirlik AB (e.g., 
establish a logistics air hub, increase training deployments) 
have been delayed as Turkish officials consider them part and 
parcel with the idea that we might move F-16s permanently to 
the base as part of the Defense Posture Review Initiative. 
You could inform your interlocutors that we understand that 
moving the F-16s to Turkey is a non-starter for the 
foreseeable future.  This could allow movement on the other 
proposals. 
 
7. (C) The public and official preoccupation with Iraq 
overshadows the positive cooperation we have in other aspects 
of the GWOT:  Since 9/11 and the November 2003 Istanbul 
attacks, our traditional intelligence and law enforcement 
cooperation has improved.  Our militaries coordinate 
assistance to Georgia and Azerbaijan, improving their 
abilities to protect important energy transportation routes. 
Turkey subscribes to every arms control arrangement it is 
eligible to join, including the Proliferation Security 
Initiative.  Ankara has been supportive of international 
efforts to press Iran to meet its commitments to the IAEA, 
although they are more inclined to persuasion than coercion. 
The Turkish military's Partnership for Peace Training Center 
provides counterterrorism and other training to personnel 
from PfP partner countries.  The military has recently 
established a NATO Center of Excellence for the Combat 
Against Terrorism that will provide more specialized training 
opportunities for both NATO partner nations and alliance 
members.  And Turkey will again assume the command of ISAF in 
Afghanistan in February for a six-month period during which 
they will significantly increase their contribution to this 
important NATO mission. 
 
Human Rights 
------------ 
 
8. (U) Over the past three years, Turkey has adopted eight 
wide-ranging packages of legal reforms and two sets of 
constitutional amendments aimed at meeting EU-related human 
rights standards.  The legal reforms are designed to crack 
down on torture, loosen restrictions on speech and assembly, 
reduce the political influence of the military, and expand 
religious freedom.  While the GOT has moved with impressive 
speed at the legislative level, real change has been much 
slower to take root.  Elements of the military, police, 
judiciary, and bureaucracy have criticized some of the 
reforms as threats to national security, and have resisted 
implementation.  In some cases, bureaucratic offices have 
drafted highly restrictive implementing legislation.  For 
example, Parliament lifted restrictions on Kurdish language 
broadcasting, but the subsequent Radio and Television Board 
regulation set strict time limits and restricted such 
broadcasts to state-owned media outlets. 
 
9. (SBU) Turkey faces a long, difficult path to full EU 
membership.  Many here do not recognize how wrenching the 
changes ahead will be.  The EU has made it clear that it 
expects accession talks with Turkey will take at least 10 
years, and a number of Turkish officials privately 
acknowledge the GOT will need that time to adopt the full EU 
acquis.  Turkey is expected to face difficulty in a number of 
areas, including environmental standards.  In addition to 
adopting new laws and regulations, EU contacts tell us that 
during the accession process Turkey will have to revise some 
of the recently adopted human rights legislation, which falls 
short of EU standards in some respects. 
 
10. (U) On trafficking in persons the Turkish authorities 
have been slow to respond to a chronic problem, but the 
opening of a TIP shelter (attended by Secretary Powell) and 
recent establishment of a victim hotline show that Turkey is 
beginning to make cohenrent progress. 
 
11. (C) Despite statements designed to encourage hope, 
Turkish authorities -- both governmental and in the State 
bureaucracy -- continue to refuse to reopen the Ecumenical 
Patriarchate's Halki Seminary, closed since 1971.  Using a 
false reading of the 1923 Lausanne Treaty, Turkish 
authorities also continue to refuse to acknowledge the 
ecumenical status of the Patriarchate.  Although Turkish 
authorities portray property restitution for the Greek and 
Armenian Orthodox communities as proceeding well, the 
communities report the process continues to be subject to 
bureaucratic delay and arbitrary rulings. 
 
Regional Issues 
--------------- 
 
12. (C) Under the influence of Gul, Turkey has sought to 
improve relations with Iran and with Arab neighbors, 
including Syria, over the past year.  Erdogan visited Iran in 
July 2004 and visits Syria December 22-23. 
 
13. (C) At the same time Turkey still views itself as a 
potential mediator between Israel and the Palestinians, but 
has so far failed to produce any results.  Turkish/Israeli 
relations cooled in 2004 when PM Erdogan referred to Israeli 
actions in Palestinian territory as "state terror" and as the 
Turkish General Staff became convinced that Israel is 
pursuing a pro-Kurdish policy in northern Iraq.  For now, 
economic relations and intel cooperation remain strong, and 
FM Gul is to visit Israel and the Palestinians the last week 
in December. 
 
14. (C) Turkey made a major policy shift on Cyprus to support 
the Annan Plan in spring 2004, but feels doubly aggrieved 
because little has been done to ease the economic isolation 
of the Turkish Cypriots and because the EU summit effort to 
obtain Turkish recognition of the Republic of Cyprus shows 
the Greek Cypriots will increasingly have an upper hand.  We 
expect Turkey to seek new UN initiatives to drive home the 
settlement in the new year. 
 
15. (C) Relations with Greece continue to warm, despite 
recent Greek complaints about Turkish air activity in the 
Aegean.  Greece gave firm public support to Turkey's EU 
candidacy. 
 
16. (C) Trade relations with Russia have ballooned in the 
past several years.  Turkey is strongly dependent on Russian 
natural gas; during his December visit Putin reminded the 
Turks of their energy dependence on Russia and proffered a 
strategic partnership alternative to Turkey's ties with the 
U.S. and EU. Turkey has strong ties to Azerbaijan and backs 
Azerbaijan in the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute.  Turkey will not 
open its border with Armenia or restore diplomatic relations 
absent Armenian recognition of the border with Turkey and 
concessions on occupied Azerbaijani territories.  The Turks 
publicly support Georgia's sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, but have not been forceful vis-a-vis Russian 
designs in Georgia. 
 
Economy 
------- 
 
17. (U) The Turkish economy has recovered strongly from the 
financial crisis of 2000-2001 and is growing at an annual 
pace of around 8-9 percent.  However, the recovery remains 
vulnerable due to a large current account deficit (about 5 
percent of GDP) and a large debt with a short maturity 
structure.  Unemployment and poverty remain high, and 
ordinary people have not felt much benefit yet from the 
overall macroeconomic improvement. Macroeconomic success has 
also bred a sense of complacency about the need to persist 
with difficult reforms, such as privatization, and reform of 
the banking, social security and tax systems.  These reforms 
are being addressed in the new three-year standby program 
which the IMF and GOT have just agreed to. 
 
18. (U) Due to historic economic/political volatility and 
opaque regulatory/judicial systems, Turkey has long received 
less foreign direct investment than other countries of 
similar size and potential.  Many in the Turkish elite are 
convinced that there will be a flood of foreign investment if 
the Turks get a date for EU accession negotiations later this 
month.  However, this is unlikely to materialize unless more 
is done in the area of structural reform.  In addition, there 
appears to be a lack of appreciation for the enormous 
challenges Turkey will shoulder in the accession 
negotiations, for the fact that EU accession will affect 
nearly aspect of their lives, and that it may in the end be 
quite costly for Turkey to comply with EU directives in 
environmental protection and other areas. 
DEUTSCH