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| Identifier: | 04ABUDHABI4660 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 04ABUDHABI4660 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Abu Dhabi |
| Created: | 2004-12-20 12:40:00 |
| Classification: | CONFIDENTIAL |
| Tags: | PHUM PREL TC |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
null
Diana T Fritz 12/19/2006 04:38:29 PM From DB/Inbox: Search Results
Cable
Text:
C O N F I D E N T I A L ABU DHABI 04660
SIPDIS
CXABU:
ACTION: POL
INFO: RSO CDA AMB DCM MEPI P/M ECON
DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG
APPROVED: CDA:RALBRIGHT
DRAFTED: POL:SKRADDANT
CLEARED: POL:JMAYBURY CG:JDAVIS
VZCZCADI720
PP RUEHC RUEHZM RUEHDS RUEHKA RUEHIL RUEHKH
RUEHDE
DE RUEHAD #4660/01 3551240
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 201240Z DEC 04
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7336
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0088
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 0199
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1309
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0009
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 4647
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ABU DHABI 004660 SIPDIS STATE FOR G/TIP, INL, DRL, NEA/RA, AND NEA/ARPI E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2014 TAGS: PHUM, PREL, TC SUBJECT: G/TIP DISCUSSIONS IN UAE ON CAMEL JOCKEYS: UAEG COMMITTED TO STOP TRAFFICKING; IMPLEMENTATION SLOW REF: (A) ABU DHABI 4418 (B) ABU DHABI 3742 1. (C) Summary: G/TIP NEA/SA Reports Officer Feleke Assefa visited the UAE December 10-13 to follow up allegations raised in the October 19 Home Box Office (HBO) program about the UAE,s continuing use of underage foreign boys as camel jockeys, despite a 2002 ban on the practice. Assefa met with officials from the Ministries of Interior, Foreign Affairs, and Health, and with police and prosecutors in Dubai and Abu Dhabi. He toured Abu Dhabi,s new camel jockey shelter with Pakistani human rights activist Ansar Burney, and discussed child rescue proposals with the IOM. During the visit, one source country embassy representative described how powerful trafficking networks and some corrupt officials defeat efforts to stop the trafficking of young boys. Assefa and Poloff witnessed at least 100 children, some of whom appeared to be as young as two years old, being used to train camels for races in Dubai. On hearing this from Assefa and Poloff, Dubai,s police chief pledged to take action. End Summary. ------------- UAEG MEETINGS ------------- 2. (C) Assefa met with Lt. Col. Nasser Al Noaimi, Office Director of the Minister of Interior, who reiterated the ministry,s commitment to combating all forms of trafficking. He stated that the Minister of Interior, Sheikh Saif bin Zayed, is fully aware that a serious problem exists, and has been working to eradicate the problem since before his appointment as Minister in November. He said that it would be easier for the ministry to rescue more boys after the draft anti-trafficking legislation becomes law, thereby giving ministry officials and police greater authority to investigate farms and race tracks and to make arrests. 3. (C) Al Noaimi also attended a meeting that the DCM, Assefa, and Poloff had with Sultan Al Rumaithy, Office Director for the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State for Foreign Affairs. Khadim Al Darei, Deputy Office Director, and MFA American Affairs desk officer Rowda Al Otaiba also joined in this meeting. Al Rumaithy confirmed the UAEG,s long-term engagement on the camel jockey issue, and emphasized that recent UAEG actions were not a reaction to the HBO report, but a result of long-standing UAEG commitment to address this problem. The UAEG was already taking steps to combat this form of trafficking, and would continue to do so with or without such publicity. He said that &top leadership8 decreed that a draft law to enforce the 2002 ban, which has been delayed in the cabinet for 1 1/2 years, would become law no later than April 2005. He also said that overall responsibility for the human trafficking portfolio transferred from the MFA to Interior (hence Al Noaimi,s presence). Al Rumaithy asked for USG assistance in applying pressure on source countries to stop child trafficking. He said that, while the UAEG does not deflect responsibility for the issue, official corruption in source countries remains a key factor in the continuation of the problem. Al Rumaithy said that Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Sheikh Hamdan bin Zayed has sent letters to source country foreign ministers asking them to crack down internally on trafficking. 4. (C) The Ministry of Health meeting included Dr. Hassan Al Alkeem (who left after a few minutes); Abdul Rahim Jaafar, Ministry Consultant; Dr. Abdul Ghaffar Abdul Ghaffour, Asst. U/S for Curative Medicine; and Dr. Mahmoud Fikri, Asst. U/S for Preventative Medicine. Ministry officials asserted that the ministry inspects all camel jockeys referred by the Camel Racing Federation for medical testing to prove their ages and fitness levels, a pre-condition for obtaining an identification card displayed at races. The officials said that there were no underage boys racing and challenged Assefa to &go to any race and check8 for himself. They also said that the kidnapping of children in source countries was no longer occurring, although Jaafar later asked for USG assistance in pressuring source countries to stop the trafficking of boys to the UAE. The officials confirmed that medical teams and ambulances were on standby at all races, and police were assigned to all hospitals, with instructions to report on any underage camel jockey who came to the hospital with a racing injury. They also said that the ministry,s medical committee tasked with inspecting the boys does not follow up at the racetracks or on farms. Once clearance is given, responsibility for enforcing the rules lies with the Camel Racing Federation. ------------------------------------- UNDERAGE CAMEL JOCKEYS IN PLAIN SIGHT ------------------------------------- 5. (C) On December 12, Assefa and Poloff met Ansar Burney, a Pakistani human rights activist and chairman of the NGO Ansar Burney Welfare Trust International, and his wife Shaheen, at the Nad Al Sheba Camel Racetrack located just outside of Dubai. (Note: This is the racetrack prominently featured in the HBO special. End note.) Assefa and Poloff witnessed at least 100 young boys, ages estimated as young as two years old, in racing gear, on camels, and clearly training to race. Many of the boys claimed to be from Pakistan or Bangladesh. However, some of the smallest said they were from Sudan, Ethiopia, and Somalia, confirming rumors of an emerging trend in East African countries supplying camel jockeys. ---------------------- THE POLICE PERSPECTIVE ---------------------- 6. (C) Assefa also toured the new camel jockey shelter and rehabilitation center in Shahama, opened on the Zayed Military City Army base 1 1/2 weeks prior (ref. A). Col. Fahdal, Director of the Abu Dhabi Police Department,s Anti-Infiltration Unit and supervisor of the center, said an anti-trafficking law would put the police on firmer legal ground when rescuing these kids. Fahdal said that police have already been forced to return five rescued boys to their parents, even though the parents were living in the UAE and were likely complicit in the trafficking and abuse, since they had no legal grounds to retain custody of the children or prosecute the parents. Fahdal complained that source countries were corrupt and not doing enough to stop the exploitation of their own citizens. He also accused some source country missions in the UAE of being complicit in the trafficking. He showed Assefa and Poloff numerous copies of passports with clear discrepancies between the photographs and ages claimed. He said he sees the names of the same officials, some abroad and some in the UAE, in many of the passports. (Note: See ref. B and paragraph 12 for confirmation of this allegation. End note.) 7. (U) After the meeting, Fahdal took Assefa on a tour of the shelter, along with Ansar and Shaheen Burney. Assefa was impressed with the facility, and had an opportunity to interact with the 19 former camel jockeys living there. (Note: Since Assefa,s visit, eight more boys have been rescued and placed in the shelter. End note.) 8. (C) Police in Dubai did not appear to be aware of the magnitude of the camel jockey problem there, but showed readiness to take action when informed that large numbers of underage jockeys had been seen at the Nad Al Sheba Race Track the previous day. The Director of the Human Rights Care Department, Lt. Col. Mohammed Abdullah Al Murr, and the Director of the Human Rights Care and Social Services Section of the Bur Dubai Police Station, Capt. Fahad Abdullah Al Awadhi, said a few young boys may still be occasionally used to train camels, but it was no longer possible to use underage camel jockeys during races. Neither had seen the HBO special. After Assefa relayed our experience at Nad Al Sheba racetrack the previous day, both men appeared genuinely shocked. They assured Assefa that they would immediately investigate the problem. 9. (C) Lt. Gen. Dhahi Khalfan Tamim, Commandant General of the Dubai Police Force, also said at first that the use of underage boys as camel jockeys was no longer a pervasive problem in Dubai. Like Fahdal, Tamim said police were having a difficult time charging traffickers and camel farm owners with crimes, since they were given very little enforcement authority under the 2002 ban. 10. (C) When told about Assefa,s Nad Al Sheba experience the previous day, Tamim jumped into action. First, he put an incoming call from the director of Dubai Immigration on the speaker and asked how this could have happened. The director explained that the order from Dubai Crown Prince and UAE Minister of Defense Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum (MbR) was to stop all incoming camel jockeys first, followed by rescuing underage jockeys already here. He stated that, since last year, no new visas had been given to camel jockeys in Dubai. After that call concluded, an agitated Tamim, after complaining that the Camel Racing Federation was not doing its job, called its director to ask him point blank (again, on speaker phone) how this could have happened. The stunned director explained that, to his understanding, the ban was only against racing, not against training. After hanging up, Tamim rejected this excuse, saying that the real problem was that the Bedouins responsible for continuing the camel racing tradition were not obeying MbR,s order to stop using children as camel jockeys. He said that, four weeks ago, he personally heard MbR tell several Bedouin camel owners that he would stop all camel racing in the emirate if they did not cease using children as jockeys. (Note: Abu Dhabi Crown Prince and UAE Armed Forces Chief of Staff Mohammed bin Zayed has reportedly made the same threat to Abu Dhabi emirate camel owners. End note.) Tamim promised that, within the next few days, MbR would take action on this situation. (Note: Two days after this meeting, CG Dubai noted that, in a marked change from the situation a week earlier, there were no underage camel jockeys in evidence in the Nad Al Sheba area. End note.) He also guaranteed that the problem would be completely resolved by the end of 2005. -------------------------------- PUBLIC PROSECUTION ECHOES POLICE -------------------------------- 11. (SBU) Hassan Khamees, a senior official at Dubai Public Prosecution, also acknowledged the need to adopt an anti-trafficking law. Khamees said that he was instructed to begin taking cases affected by the ban in October 2003. In cases of death and injury, prosecution against the responsible party was compulsory. The problem was that the charges brought had to fall under broader existing laws, such as murder, assault, sexual assault, kidnapping, etc. He cited one case in 2002 in which a mother was prosecuted for selling her son to a camel farm owner, and two other cases against Sudanese nationals in 2003. But due to the nature of the crimes and the difficulty in collecting evidence against the perpetrators, Khamees said it was extremely difficult to prove cases in court without legislation better tailored to these types of crimes. ------------------------------------- CORRUPTION IN SOURCE COUNTRY MISSIONS ------------------------------------- 12. (C) Assefa met with Embassy of Pakistan Second Secretary Imran Haider (please protect), who is responsible for the camel jockey portfolio. Haider had spoken to Post in the past (ref. B) about internal pressures at the highest levels, both in his mission and in Pakistan, to continue the flow of young boys to the UAE to work as camel jockeys. He said that, although he knows he is ruining his career and perhaps endangering his safety because of the consular assistance he gives his young compatriots, he will not stop. Haider and Burney have worked together to rescue and repatriate over 160 children in 2004. They also agree that roughly 5,000 to 6,000 children may still be working in the UAE as camel jockeys. Haider alleges that, although his own county contributes to the continuing camel jockey problem, the UAEG,s talk of changes is just that ) all talk. He explained the problem in terms of tribal affiliation, both here and in Pakistan. Those who profit from racing generally are from politically established families positioned in influential government jobs. When a problem arises, one phone call to a family member at the appropriate ministry or police department takes care of it. Haider said he has 78 trafficking cases he is trying to pursue, and each time he asks for assistance he is refused by UAEG officials at different ministries. During the meeting, Haider introduced Assefa to two young boys, aged about five and eight, whom he had just rescued. ------------------ IOM TRYING TO HELP ------------------ 13. (C) Assefa met on December 11 with Mohammed Al Nassery, Chief of Mission of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) office in Kuwait. Also attending the meeting were Michael Burke, Director of the Iraqi Out-of-Country Voting office in the UAE, and Khalid Qadir (please protect), who is working in Dubai without UAEG knowledge on IOM-related issues. (Note: Qadir and Al Nassery have been lobbying the UAEG hard for more than a year to open an IOM branch in Dubai. In the meantime, Qadir is familiarizing himself with Dubai and quietly working some IOM issues, pending anticipated approval. End note.) They discussed a proposed IOM-funded program to assist the return and reintegration of about 70 Bangladeshi children working here as camel jockeys. The USD 1.7 million project, if approved, would be implemented over five years. Assefa expressed his support of the project, but recommended that the IOM shift its focus from a one-time rescue of a limited number of boys to capacity building both in Bangladesh and the UAE, and to improving ties between political and law enforcement officials in both countries. ------- COMMENT ------- 14. (C) Overall, the G/TIP visit was useful. The UAEG said all the right things and showed evidence that it is starting to do the right things, while Assefa was able to see first-hand the magnitude of the existing problem. While it is clear that enforcement is uneven across the country, the process to eliminate this form of trafficking is well underway. However, the process will take time and closer coordination between police, immigration, and health officials, and increased cooperation with source country governments. Despite statements from the MFA, we believe that the HBO program has indeed jolted the UAE leadership into addressing the problem more forcefully and rapidly. We will continue to raise the issue with UAEG interlocutors to encourage effective action. MINIMIZED CONSIDERED. ALBRIGHT
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