US embassy cable - 04ABUDHABI4660

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G/TIP DISCUSSIONS IN UAE ON CAMEL JOCKEYS: UAEG COMMITTED TO STOP TRAFFICKING; IMPLEMENTATION SLOW

Identifier: 04ABUDHABI4660
Wikileaks: View 04ABUDHABI4660 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Abu Dhabi
Created: 2004-12-20 12:40:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PHUM PREL TC
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
null
Diana T Fritz  12/19/2006 04:38:29 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Search Results

Cable 
Text:                                                                      
                                                                           
      
C O N F I D E N T I A L        ABU DHABI 04660

SIPDIS
CXABU:
    ACTION: POL
    INFO:   RSO CDA AMB DCM MEPI P/M ECON

DISSEMINATION: POL
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: CDA:RALBRIGHT
DRAFTED: POL:SKRADDANT
CLEARED: POL:JMAYBURY CG:JDAVIS

VZCZCADI720
PP RUEHC RUEHZM RUEHDS RUEHKA RUEHIL RUEHKH
RUEHDE
DE RUEHAD #4660/01 3551240
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 201240Z DEC 04
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7336
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 0088
RUEHKA/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 0199
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 1309
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0009
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 4647
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ABU DHABI 004660 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR G/TIP, INL, DRL, NEA/RA, AND NEA/ARPI 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2014 
TAGS: PHUM, PREL, TC 
SUBJECT: G/TIP DISCUSSIONS IN UAE ON CAMEL JOCKEYS: UAEG 
COMMITTED TO STOP TRAFFICKING; IMPLEMENTATION SLOW 
 
REF: (A) ABU DHABI 4418 (B) ABU DHABI 3742 
 
1. (C) Summary:  G/TIP NEA/SA Reports Officer Feleke Assefa 
visited the UAE December 10-13 to follow up allegations 
raised in the October 19 Home Box Office (HBO) program about 
the UAE,s continuing use of underage foreign boys as camel 
jockeys, despite a 2002 ban on the practice.  Assefa met with 
officials from the Ministries of Interior, Foreign Affairs, 
and Health, and with police and prosecutors in Dubai and Abu 
Dhabi.  He toured Abu Dhabi,s new camel jockey shelter with 
Pakistani human rights activist Ansar Burney, and discussed 
child rescue proposals with the IOM.  During the visit, one 
source country embassy representative described how powerful 
trafficking networks and some corrupt officials defeat 
efforts to stop the trafficking of young boys.  Assefa and 
Poloff witnessed at least 100 children, some of whom appeared 
to be as young as two years old, being used to train camels 
for races in Dubai.  On hearing this from Assefa and Poloff, 
Dubai,s police chief pledged to take action.  End Summary. 
 
------------- 
UAEG MEETINGS 
------------- 
 
2. (C) Assefa met with Lt. Col. Nasser Al Noaimi, Office 
Director of the Minister of Interior, who reiterated the 
ministry,s commitment to combating all forms of trafficking. 
 He stated that the Minister of Interior, Sheikh Saif bin 
Zayed, is fully aware that a serious problem exists, and has 
been working to eradicate the problem since before his 
appointment as Minister in November. He said that it would be 
easier for the ministry to rescue more boys after the draft 
anti-trafficking legislation becomes law, thereby giving 
ministry officials and police greater authority to 
investigate farms and race tracks and to make arrests. 
 
3. (C) Al Noaimi also attended a meeting that the DCM, 
Assefa, and Poloff had with Sultan Al Rumaithy, Office 
Director for the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of State 
for Foreign Affairs.  Khadim Al Darei, Deputy Office 
Director, and MFA American Affairs desk officer Rowda Al 
Otaiba also joined in this meeting.  Al Rumaithy confirmed 
the UAEG,s long-term engagement on the camel jockey issue, 
and emphasized that recent UAEG actions were not a reaction 
to the HBO report, but a result of long-standing UAEG 
commitment to address this problem.  The UAEG was already 
taking steps to combat this form of trafficking, and would 
continue to do so with or without such publicity.  He said 
that &top leadership8 decreed that a draft law to enforce 
the 2002 ban, which has been delayed in the cabinet for 1 1/2 
years, would become law no later than April 2005.  He also 
said that overall responsibility for the human trafficking 
portfolio transferred from the MFA to Interior (hence Al 
Noaimi,s presence).  Al Rumaithy asked for USG assistance in 
applying pressure on source countries to stop child 
trafficking.  He said that, while the UAEG does not deflect 
responsibility for the issue, official corruption in source 
countries remains a key factor in the continuation of the 
problem.  Al Rumaithy said that Deputy Prime Minister and 
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Sheikh Hamdan bin Zayed 
has sent letters to source country foreign ministers asking 
them to crack down internally on trafficking. 
 
4. (C) The Ministry of Health meeting included Dr. Hassan Al 
Alkeem (who left after a few minutes); Abdul Rahim Jaafar, 
Ministry Consultant; Dr. Abdul Ghaffar Abdul Ghaffour, Asst. 
U/S for Curative Medicine; and Dr. Mahmoud Fikri, Asst. U/S 
for Preventative Medicine.  Ministry officials asserted that 
the ministry inspects all camel jockeys referred by the Camel 
Racing Federation for medical testing to prove their ages and 
fitness levels, a pre-condition for obtaining an 
identification card displayed at races.  The officials said 
that there were no underage boys racing and challenged Assefa 
to &go to any race and check8 for himself.  They also said 
that the kidnapping of children in source countries was no 
longer occurring, although Jaafar later asked for USG 
assistance in pressuring source countries to stop the 
trafficking of boys to the UAE.  The officials confirmed that 
medical teams and ambulances were on standby at all races, 
and police were assigned to all hospitals, with instructions 
to report on any underage camel jockey who came to the 
hospital with a racing injury.  They also said that the 
ministry,s medical committee tasked with inspecting the boys 
does not follow up at the racetracks or on farms.  Once 
clearance is given, responsibility for enforcing the rules 
lies with the Camel Racing Federation. 
 
------------------------------------- 
UNDERAGE CAMEL JOCKEYS IN PLAIN SIGHT 
------------------------------------- 
 
5. (C) On December 12, Assefa and Poloff met Ansar Burney, a 
Pakistani human rights activist and chairman of the NGO Ansar 
Burney Welfare Trust International, and his wife Shaheen, at 
the Nad Al Sheba Camel Racetrack located just outside of 
Dubai.  (Note: This is the racetrack prominently featured in 
the HBO special. End note.)  Assefa and Poloff witnessed at 
least 100 young boys, ages estimated as young as two years 
old, in racing gear, on camels, and clearly training to race. 
 Many of the boys claimed to be from Pakistan or Bangladesh. 
However, some of the smallest said they were from Sudan, 
Ethiopia, and Somalia, confirming rumors of an emerging trend 
in East African countries supplying camel jockeys. 
 
---------------------- 
THE POLICE PERSPECTIVE 
---------------------- 
 
6. (C) Assefa also toured the new camel jockey shelter and 
rehabilitation center in Shahama, opened on the Zayed 
Military City Army base 1 1/2 weeks prior (ref. A).  Col. 
Fahdal, Director of the Abu Dhabi Police Department,s 
Anti-Infiltration Unit and supervisor of the center, said an 
anti-trafficking law would put the police on firmer legal 
ground when rescuing these kids.  Fahdal said that police 
have already been forced to return five rescued boys to their 
parents, even though the parents were living in the UAE and 
were likely complicit in the trafficking and abuse, since 
they had no legal grounds to retain custody of the children 
or prosecute the parents.  Fahdal complained that source 
countries were corrupt and not doing enough to stop the 
exploitation of their own citizens.  He also accused some 
source country missions in the UAE of being complicit in the 
trafficking.  He showed Assefa and Poloff numerous copies of 
passports with clear discrepancies between the photographs 
and ages claimed.  He said he sees the names of the same 
officials, some abroad and some in the UAE, in many of the 
passports. (Note: See ref. B and paragraph 12 for 
confirmation of this allegation. End note.) 
 
7. (U) After the meeting, Fahdal took Assefa on a tour of the 
shelter, along with Ansar and Shaheen Burney.  Assefa was 
impressed with the facility, and had an opportunity to 
interact with the 19 former camel jockeys living there. 
(Note: Since Assefa,s visit, eight more boys have been 
rescued and placed in the shelter. End note.) 
 
8. (C) Police in Dubai did not appear to be aware of the 
magnitude of the camel jockey problem there, but showed 
readiness to take action when informed that large numbers of 
underage jockeys had been seen at the Nad Al Sheba Race Track 
the previous day.  The Director of the Human Rights Care 
Department, Lt. Col. Mohammed Abdullah Al Murr, and the 
Director of the Human Rights Care and Social Services Section 
of the Bur Dubai Police Station, Capt. Fahad Abdullah Al 
Awadhi, said a few young boys may still be occasionally used 
to train camels, but it was no longer possible to use 
underage camel jockeys during races.  Neither had seen the 
HBO special.  After Assefa relayed our experience at Nad Al 
Sheba racetrack the previous day, both men appeared genuinely 
shocked.  They assured Assefa that they would immediately 
investigate the problem. 
 
9. (C) Lt. Gen. Dhahi Khalfan Tamim, Commandant General of 
the Dubai Police Force, also said at first that the use of 
underage boys as camel jockeys was no longer a pervasive 
problem in Dubai.  Like Fahdal, Tamim said police were having 
a difficult time charging traffickers and camel farm owners 
with crimes, since they were given very little enforcement 
authority under the 2002 ban. 
 
10. (C) When told about Assefa,s Nad Al Sheba experience the 
previous day, Tamim jumped into action.  First, he put an 
incoming call from the director of Dubai Immigration on the 
speaker and asked how this could have happened.  The director 
explained that the order from Dubai Crown Prince and UAE 
Minister of Defense Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum (MbR) was 
to stop all incoming camel jockeys first, followed by 
rescuing underage jockeys already here.  He stated that, 
since last year, no new visas had been given to camel jockeys 
in Dubai.  After that call concluded, an agitated Tamim, 
after complaining that the Camel Racing Federation was not 
doing its job, called its director to ask him point blank 
(again, on speaker phone) how this could have happened.  The 
stunned director explained that, to his understanding, the 
ban was only against racing, not against training.  After 
hanging up, Tamim rejected this excuse, saying that the real 
problem was that the Bedouins responsible for continuing the 
camel racing tradition were not obeying MbR,s order to stop 
using children as camel jockeys.  He said that, four weeks 
ago, he personally heard MbR tell several Bedouin camel 
owners that he would stop all camel racing in the emirate if 
they did not cease using children as jockeys. (Note: Abu 
Dhabi Crown Prince and UAE Armed Forces Chief of Staff 
Mohammed bin Zayed has reportedly made the same threat to Abu 
Dhabi emirate camel owners. End note.)  Tamim promised that, 
within the next few days, MbR would take action on this 
situation. (Note: Two days after this meeting, CG Dubai noted 
that, in a marked change from the situation a week earlier, 
there were no underage camel jockeys in evidence in the Nad 
Al Sheba area. End note.)  He also guaranteed that the 
problem would be completely resolved by the end of 2005. 
 
 
-------------------------------- 
PUBLIC PROSECUTION ECHOES POLICE 
-------------------------------- 
 
11. (SBU)  Hassan Khamees, a senior official at Dubai Public 
Prosecution, also acknowledged the need to adopt an 
anti-trafficking law.  Khamees said that he was instructed to 
begin taking cases affected by the ban in October 2003.  In 
cases of death and injury, prosecution against the 
responsible party was compulsory.  The problem was that the 
charges brought had to fall under broader existing laws, such 
as murder, assault, sexual assault, kidnapping, etc.  He 
cited one case in 2002 in which a mother was prosecuted for 
selling her son to a camel farm owner, and two other cases 
against Sudanese nationals in 2003.  But due to the nature of 
the crimes and the difficulty in collecting evidence against 
the perpetrators, Khamees said it was extremely difficult to 
prove cases in court without legislation better tailored to 
these types of crimes. 
 
------------------------------------- 
CORRUPTION IN SOURCE COUNTRY MISSIONS 
------------------------------------- 
 
12. (C) Assefa met with Embassy of Pakistan Second Secretary 
Imran Haider (please protect), who is responsible for the 
camel jockey portfolio.  Haider had spoken to Post in the 
past (ref. B) about internal pressures at the highest levels, 
both in his mission and in Pakistan, to continue the flow of 
young boys to the UAE to work as camel jockeys.  He said 
that, although he knows he is ruining his career and perhaps 
endangering his safety because of the consular assistance he 
gives his young compatriots, he will not stop.  Haider and 
Burney have worked together to rescue and repatriate over 160 
children in 2004.  They also agree that roughly 5,000 to 
6,000 children may still be working in the UAE as camel 
jockeys.  Haider alleges that, although his own county 
contributes to the continuing camel jockey problem, the 
UAEG,s talk of changes is just that ) all talk.  He 
explained the problem in terms of tribal affiliation, both 
here and in Pakistan.  Those who profit from racing generally 
are from politically established families positioned in 
influential government jobs.  When a problem arises, one 
phone call to a family member at the appropriate ministry or 
police department takes care of it.  Haider said he has 78 
trafficking cases he is trying to pursue, and each time he 
asks for assistance he is refused by UAEG officials at 
different ministries.  During the meeting, Haider introduced 
Assefa to two young boys, aged about five and eight, whom he 
had just rescued. 
 
------------------ 
IOM TRYING TO HELP 
------------------ 
 
13. (C) Assefa met on December 11 with Mohammed Al Nassery, 
Chief of Mission of the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) office in Kuwait.  Also attending the meeting 
were Michael Burke, Director of the Iraqi Out-of-Country 
Voting office in the UAE, and Khalid Qadir (please protect), 
who is working in Dubai without UAEG knowledge on IOM-related 
issues.  (Note: Qadir and Al Nassery have been lobbying the 
UAEG hard for more than a year to open an IOM branch in 
Dubai.  In the meantime, Qadir is familiarizing himself with 
Dubai and quietly working some IOM issues, pending 
anticipated approval.  End note.)  They discussed a proposed 
IOM-funded program to assist the return and reintegration of 
about 70 Bangladeshi children working here as camel jockeys. 
The USD 1.7 million project, if approved, would be 
implemented over five years.  Assefa expressed his support of 
the project, but recommended that the IOM shift its focus 
from a one-time rescue of a limited number of boys to 
capacity building both in Bangladesh and the UAE, and to 
improving ties between political and law enforcement 
officials in both countries. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
14. (C) Overall, the G/TIP visit was useful.  The UAEG said 
all the right things and showed evidence that it is starting 
to do the right things, while Assefa was able to see 
first-hand the magnitude of the existing problem.  While it 
is clear that enforcement is uneven across the country, the 
process to eliminate this form of trafficking is well 
underway.  However, the process will take time and closer 
coordination between police, immigration, and health 
officials, and increased cooperation with source country 
governments.  Despite statements from the MFA, we believe 
that the HBO program has indeed jolted the UAE leadership 
into addressing the problem more forcefully and rapidly.  We 
will continue to raise the issue with UAEG interlocutors to 
encourage effective action. 
 
MINIMIZED CONSIDERED. 
 
ALBRIGHT 

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