US embassy cable - 04COLOMBO2018

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 002018 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PTER, CE, LTTE - Peace Process 
SUBJECT: SOLHEIM SEES NO PROGRESS TOWARDS TALKS BUT 
COMMITMENT TO MAINTAINING CEASE-FIRE; CO-CHAIR MEETING 
NEEDED 
 
REF: 12/17 CAMP/ENTWISTLE/BRENNIG TELCON 
 
Classified By:  AMBASSADOR JEFFREY J. LUNSTEAD FOR 
REASON 1.5(D) 
 
1.  (C)  Summary.  After making the rounds in Sri Lanka, 
Norwegian peace envoy Solheim sees little chance of a 
quick return to the peace table although "things could be 
worse."  He found both sides committed to the cease-fire 
and neither seeking a return to combat.  In the Norwegian 
view, the priority in the coming months must be 
maintenance of the cease-fire while efforts continue to 
jumpstart the next round of talks.  Solheim (and the 
Japanese and Dutch ambassadors) believe a co-chairs 
meeting early in the New Year would be valuable and ask 
that Washington propose dates and location.  We also do 
not see signs of an imminent return to fighting, but we 
think Tiger intentions are largely unknowable and we do 
see some troublesome signs of unease in the GSL.  End 
Summary. 
 
2.  (C)  Norwegian peace envoy Eric Solheim visited Sri 
Lanka December 13-17, met with GSL officials including 
President Kumaratunga and traveled to Kilinocchi to meet 
with LTTE political wing chief Tamilchelvam.  The 
Ambassador attended Solheim's meeting with donor 
embassies and IFI representatives December 14, the 
Ambassador and DCM met with Solheim on December 16 and 
the DCM represented the U.S. in a co-chair meeting with 
Solheim on December 17. 
 
Worried Upon Arrival 
--------------------------- 
 
3.  (C) In his initial meeting with donor embassies and 
IFI representatives (before he had seen either the GSL or 
the LTTE), Solheim said that Norway "has to consider what 
to do" in the current situation of a negative climate 
between the two main parties. He wanted international 
community input since Norway is, at least implicitly, 
acting on its behalf.  If the current trend continues, 
he said: (1) Sri Lanka will slide back into war and 
(2) the role of Norway (or any other third party) will 
become impossible. What more, he asked, can the 
international community do?  Solheim clarified that 
he was not predicting an imminent return to hostilities, 
but that for the first time since the cease-fire was 
signed, there was a chance of slipping back to war. 
Neither party has a strategy for war, but they are 
following tracks in that direction. Each side is 
irritating the other. The LTTE is pushing the 
government, Prabhakaran's speech was unhelpful. 
The government is also sending negative signals, 
the most recent being a ban on government helicopter 
flights over LTTE-controlled territory, ostensibly 
on the grounds of security. This, he said, had to 
be seen as a negative signal to Norway, which used 
those flights as part of its mission. Moreover, 
there was a deliberate campaign by parts of the 
government--the JVP and the EPDP--to attack the 
peace process, the ceasefire and the SLMM, and Norway. 
 
4.  (C)  The donors assured Solheim of continued support 
for Norwegian efforts and engaged in a general discussion 
of what the voice of the international community should 
be saying at present. However, there were few practical 
suggestions as to what the "something" might be.  The 
Ambassador commented that peace process was hostage to 
internal political considerations. As a result, it was 
useless to appeal to Sri Lankan leaders on the basis of 
the national interest or the greater good. It was fine 
to say the international community's "voice" must be 
heard, but the real question was: "What would that 
voice say"? Several donors suggested that Norway might 
consider doing again what it had done in November 2003 
when CBK took over three key ministries: announce that 
it was going home and would stay there until the parties 
came up with something positive. 
 
5.  (C) There was some discussion of assistance and 
the link in the Tokyo Declaration between assistance 
and progress in the peace process. The general view 
around the table was that interest in Sri Lanka was 
diminishing because of stalemate and associated 
assistance was likely to also diminish. However, it 
was also felt that the government and the LTTE would 
not be swayed significantly by funding or lack thereof. 
Solheim proposed that the international community might 
wish to hold a conference around the third anniversary 
of the cease-fire (Feb 22) to look for a collective 
understanding which could lead to a strong unified 
position and statement. 
 
Gap Narrow but No Confidence 
-------------------------------------- 
 
6.  (C)  In his subsequent conversations with us and 
in the co-chair lunch, after his GSL and LTTE meetings, 
Solheim commented that the "gap is narrow" between the 
two sides and that it could be "easily bridged if there 
was confidence between them."  Unfortunately, that 
confidence is lacking.  In Solheim's view there had 
been an imminent return to the table in May/June but 
all movement since then has been backward.  The other 
obstacle besides the lack of confidence is President 
Kumaratunga's political dependency on the Janatha 
Vimukta Peramuna (JVP).  "If she were able to act 
on her own, talks would have started by now." 
Moreover, Solheim viewed as unhelpful an LTTE 
insistence that CBK publicly commit herself to 
negotiations on ISGA only.  She could probably go 
forward on ISGA only if the LTTE would not insist 
that she publicly expose that intention. 
 
Both Sides "Positive" 
-------------------------- 
 
7.  (C)  Solheim said that despite the lack of progress, 
he had found both sides to be "positive" in their talks 
with him.  CKB  had been in a "terrific, positive mood - 
at her best."  ("She didn't mention Ranil once!")  She 
had expressed concern about "new" LTTE "bases" near 
Trinco.  Solheim told the co-chairs this assertion is 
unproven.  There are "gray areas" around Trinco in which, 
based on the maps the GSL and the LTTE turned over to 
the SLMM at the beginning of the cease-fire, it is 
impossible to tell who was in control when the cease- 
fire started.  Solheim emphasized, however, that CBK 
made clear to him that she fully supports the cease- 
fire and is not looking to break it. 
 
8.  (C)  Solheim commented to co-chairs that CBK is 
clearly trying to find her way out of the "trap" in 
which her dependency on the JVP keeps her from getting 
back to the peace table which, the Norwegian believes, 
she genuinely wants to do.  Solheim said CBK "apologized" 
for the JVP anti-Norwegian campaign.  Solheim said that 
Kadirgamar referred to ongoing "negotiations" with the 
JVP apparently intended to work out a way they could 
support a return to the peace table. 
 
9.  (C)  Solheim said that, in Kilinochchi, he had 
found LTTE political chief Tamilchelvam "relaxed and 
confident."  Solheim said he had two main observations 
from the discussion.  First, Tamilchelvam made no 
threat about returning to war nor did he mention any 
sort of deadline for a return to talks, although he 
assured Solheim that Prabhakaran's Heroes' Day speech 
reference to "advancing the freedom struggle" should 
be taken seriously.  Second, however, Tamilchelvam 
did not show any flexibility in terms of seeking new 
ways to get back to the table.  Solheim said 
Tamilchelvam was "focused" on the JVP, stating that 
CBK needed to rein in the JVP or dump them and find 
an accommodation with the UNP.  Tamilchelvam commented 
to Solheim that CBK's priority seems to be "self- 
preservation."  Solheim commented that although the 
LTTE will not publicly "reaffirm its commitment to 
Oslo," it has done so repeatedly in various meetings 
with the Norwegians. 
 
"Could Be Worse;" Norway Undeterred 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
10.  (C)  Asked to summarize his observations at the 
end of the visit, Solheim told the co-chair reps that 
"things could be worse."  He predicted a "continued 
stalemate" with no imminent return to the peace table 
while the "political power play" in the south runs 
its course.  Solheim emphasized that, overall, the 
cease-fire is not under threat from either side and 
neither side wants a return to war.  He cautioned, 
however, that a cease-fire requires constant 
maintenance and attention from both sides and 
suggested that all concerned parties should make 
cease-fire maintenance their priority during the 
coming months of stasis. 
 
11.  (C)  Solheim stressed that Norway, plans to 
stay the course,  although the recent JVP anti- 
Norway smear campaign and other pressures (among 
them a "white powder" scare at the Norwegian 
embassy here this week) have been unpleasant. 
Solheim said he and his government were extremely 
appreciative of the "tripartite" U.S./EU/Japan 
demarche to CBK on Norway's behalf earlier in the 
week.  Solheim and/or Helgesen plan to return to 
Sri Lanka every 4-6 weeks to assess the situation 
and make the rounds.  He noted that Norway will 
also continue to work with both the GSL and the 
LTTE in the ongoing effort to produce a written 
agenda for the next round of talks palatable to 
both sides.  Solheim told the co-chairs that he 
had just received from GSL Peace Secretariat chief 
Jayantha Dhanapala "new language" for the agenda 
which he will carry to London and share with LTTE 
luminary Anton Balasingam (several of Solheim's 
colleagues around the co-chair lunch table rolled 
their eyes at the mention of the ongoing effort to 
find common GSL/LTTE language).   Solheim said he 
was encouraged by the GSL's decision to go back to 
its previous policy to use its helicopters to 
facilitate both Norwegian travel to Kilinocchi and 
LTTE travel in and out of the country. 
 
Co-Chair Meeting, International Conference 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
12.  (C)  DCM asked Solheim if Norway thought a co- 
chairs meeting early in the New Year would be useful. 
Solheim said he thought it absolutely essential.  He 
said two key agenda items ("off the top of my head") 
would be:  1) given that the peace process is clearly 
going to take much longer than originally thought in 
the "optimism of Tokyo," how should co-chairs "position 
themselves for the long haul?;"  2) given that no 
real peace talks are imminent, should co-chairs call 
attention of broader donor community to paragraph 18 
of Tokyo declaration which links aid to peace 
progress? 
 
13.  (C)  Japanese Ambassador Suda and Dutch Ambassador 
Blankhart said their governments (and in Blankhart's 
case, the European Union) thought a co-chairs meeting 
imperative.  They thought Solheim's agenda suggestions 
were valid although both (especially Suda) were 
uncomfortable with a "paragraph 18" discussion that 
was "only negative."  Suda said it was important 
that the promise of more aid be used as a carrot 
rather than using an implied aid cutback as a "stick." 
Suda also commented that a co-chair meeting should 
involve "real substance" rather than just having a 
meeting in order to issue a statement.  There was 
also general agreement that, depending on the co-chair 
meeting and events on the ground, it might be useful 
to have the larger "international donors conference" 
that Solheim had mentioned in his meeting with donors 
and IFIs earlier in the week later on in the first 
quarter of 2005, although there was no need to get 
into that until after the co-chairs meeting. 
 
14.  (C)  Solheim suggested (with the other co-chairs 
nodding) that it would be best, given the transition 
in Washington, if the U.S. could suggest dates and 
location which would accommodate Deputy Secretary 
Armitage's schedule.  DCM agreed to convey that 
suggestion back to Washington. 
 
Comment 
------------ 
 
15.  (C)  The Norwegians have taken their licks lately 
but plan to keep on keeping on.  Solheim clearly views 
this as a years-long process but one to which his 
government is firmly committed.  Obviously in this 
situation where it is so difficult to get talks 
underway, maintenance of the ceasefire is a priority. 
Solheim and his Norwegian colleagues tend to take an 
optimistic view on this issue, always stating that 
"neither side wants a return to war."  That is probably 
true, but needs some qualification. On the Tiger side, 
no one really knows what Prabhakaran is thinking. We 
remember that at the time of the Karuna breakaway, the 
Tigers assured the Norwegians that they would not take 
any dramatic action--and a few weeks later they 
commenced a military operation against Karuna. For its 
part, the GSL seems increasingly anxious. Our DATT will 
report separately on a "war planning" meeting held 
recently with service commanders and the President. 
We are certainly not predicting imminent war, but 
we do think the situation is more troublesome than 
the Norwegians want to admit. 
LUNSTEAD