US embassy cable - 04ANKARA7044

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 007044 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2014 
TAGS: PREL, MARR, MASS, TU, AJ, AM, GG, KZ, RS 
SUBJECT: DEC. 12 CAUCASUS WORKING GROUP MEETING IN ANKARA 
 
 
Classified By: PolMilCouns Timothy A. Betts for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
. 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (C) In policy discussions with the Turkish General Staff 
during the Dec. 12 meeting of the Caucasus Working Group, 
DASD James MacDougall urged Turkey to consider how we might 
change our approach to the Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) conflict. 
The TGS representatives believed the Minsk Group had failed 
and suggested maybe for NATO involvement in NK; MacDougall 
asked for Turkey's thoughts on proposing new co-chairs, 
perhaps to include Turkey.  MacDougall also asked Turkey to 
work with the Azeris to consider the alternate draft UNGA 
resolution on the conflict.  Both sides also discussed a 
possible role for a NATO Peace Support Operation (PSO) in an 
eventual settlement.  MacDougall recommended an expanded OSCE 
border monitoring mission between Russia and Georgia, to 
include the Roki Tunnel.  He also requested that Turkey look 
into assisting the Azeris and Georgians on pipeline security 
for the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan project.  Both sides also 
discussed NATO's role in the Caucasus and security 
cooperation in the Black and Caspian Seas.  In the afternoon, 
both sides briefed on security assistance to Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, and Kazakhstan and agreed to look into certain 
cooperative efforts during 2005.  End summary. 
 
2. (C) The Turkish General Staff (TGS) hosted the Dec. 12 
meeting of the Caucasus Working Group at its Ankara HQ.  The 
U.S. delegation was led by DASD James MacDougall, accompanied 
by EUCOM Deputy J5 VADM John Goodwin and 16 others 
representing DoD, the services, and the State Department. 
The Turkish HOD was BG Solmazturk, TGS J5 Chief for 
Disarmament and International Security Affairs.  (NOTE: 
Representation from the Turkish MFA was noticeably absent. 
END NOTE.)  Solmazturk very ably filled in for MG Cengiz 
Arslan, J5 Chief for Strategy, who was called overseas 
unexpectedly. 
 
Policy Discussion 
----------------- 
 
3. (U) For the morning session, MacDougall and Solmazturk led 
a wide-ranging policy discussion on the overall security 
environment in the region.  Among the key issues: 
 
Azerbaijan 
---------- 
 
4. (C) The Turkish delegation highlighted a number of 
challenges in Azerbaijan, chief among them a lack of 
democratic traditions, poverty, ethnic strife, and negative 
Russian pressure (especially related to energy issues). 
While the Turks believe Azeris want to further integrate into 
the West, the Azeris also believe that the West has abandoned 
them on the Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) issue.  According to the 
Turks, while the Azeris are enthusiastic players in PfP they 
also believe NATO must play a more active role in solving NK. 
 Many believe the West can solve NK, but does not want to. 
ODC Baku rep added that NK also retards Azeri defense reform. 
 Turkey believes the Minsk Group process has failed. 
 
5. (C) DASD MacDougall noted that it may be useful to explore 
new options for dealing with NK.  He noted that Azerbaijan is 
dissatisfied with the current co-chairs on the Minsk Group 
(U.S., Russia, France) since it sees the U.S. as neutral but 
France and Russia as siding with Armenia.  Perhaps the 
co-chairs could be changed.  Turkey might even take a direct 
role. 
 
6. (C) MacDougall noted that it would be useful to think 
about how NATO could contribute to a resolution of the NK 
conflict.  He noted that recently Armenia has shown greater 
interest in the Alliance, perhaps to balance its reliance on 
Russia.  By relying on Russia for security, the Armenians 
have sacrificed economic and political ties to the West. 
 
7. (C) The Turkish delegation added that NK interferes with 
Armenian-Azeri cooperation in PfP.  Solving the NK issue 
would break Russian influence over Armenia.  The Turks 
believe that the GOAM may be interested in pursuing a 
solution, but is hindered by the Armenian diaspora and its 
advocacy of the Armenian genocide issue.  BG Solmazturk said 
NK seems to be "a dead-end street," and expressed doubt 
whether jiggering the Minsk Group would succeed.  He added 
that the Minsk Group works for the OSCE CIO, and noted that 
the last CIO waited 10 months before visiting the region. 
 
8. (C) MacDougall responded that there are useful things we 
can do together on the margins.  First, he reported that the 
Azeris have submitted a new draft UNGA Resolution on NK.  He 
asked the Turks to work with the Azeris to consider the 
alternate draft, but also one that calls for a UN 
fact-finding team to go to the region to investigate claims 
that the Armenians are sending settlers there to change the 
population dynamics on the ground.  (NOTE: The Turks said 
that they believe 6000 such settlers have moved into the 
region.  END NOTE.)  Second, he asked the Turks to think 
along with us about ways that NATO could get more involved in 
the region, perhaps even considering a NATO PSO in the event 
of an eventual political settlement. 
 
Georgia 
------- 
 
9. (C) The U.S. DATT in Tbilisi noted that both the press and 
politicians in Georgia were uniformly pro-Western, and deeply 
appreciative of both U.S. and Turkish security assistance 
initiatives.  Both sides agreed that the South Ossetia and 
Abkhazia conflicts threatened Georgia's territorial integrity 
and were destabilizing.  The Turks noted their special 
interest in the Abkhazia problem, as more Abkhazians live in 
the Turkey than in Abkhazia itself.  The Turks added that in 
their view the embargo on Abkhazia tends to support Russia's 
interests. 
 
10. (C) DASD MacDougall noted that the Russians are lobbying 
to cut back on the OSCE monitoring mission on the 
Georgia-Russia border.  He asked for the Turks' assistance in 
assuring that the mission is not only maintained, but 
expanded to include the Roki Tunnel on the border between 
South Ossetia and Russia, which is now controlled on both 
sides solely by the Russians.  This would give us an 
independent view of what is going on along that border. 
 
Kazakhstan 
---------- 
 
11. (C) At DoD's request, both sides added Kazakhstan back to 
the CWG discussions this year.  SAO Almaty reported that the 
GOK and the Kazakh press are generally in favor of western 
security assistance efforts, but added that the press is 
generally government-controlled.  Nonetheless, he believes 
public support is genuine, though perhaps less so in the more 
ethnically Russian north of the country.  The Kazakhs look to 
the U.S. and NATO to counter Russian domination of the energy 
sector.  The Turkish delegation responded that Kazakhstan and 
other Central Asian states are generally favorable toward 
Turkey and see Turkey as offering a western orientation and 
democratic values.  The Turks concede that their presence is 
hardly enough to overcome Russian, Chinese, and Iranian 
influence. 
 
NATO and the Caucasus 
--------------------- 
 
12. (C) Turkey reported that NATO interoperability and lack 
of deployable forces remain a significant challenge in the 
region.  BG Solmazturk complained that NATO's Partnership 
Coordination Cell has not successfully integrated the many 
different PfP and Alliance programs for Partners.  He claimed 
that the proliferation of NATO training centers and 
activities has led to too many activities going on at once; 
"the process has turned into one big mumbo-jumbo," he said. 
 
13. (C) Solmazturk requested that the U.S. side and Turkish 
side compile separate reports evaluating the success of PfP 
in the Caucasus to date, and recommending what to focus on in 
the future.  Both sides agreed to exchange these reports NLT 
March 15, 2005.  Additionally, the U.S. side noted that NATO 
is assigning a liaison officer soon to Tbilisi with regional 
responsibility for the Caucasus.  Both sides agreed to invite 
this LNO to future CWG meetings. 
 
Black Sea Security 
------------------ 
 
14. (C) Turkey briefed that its initiative, BLACKSEAFOR, has 
been instrumental to increasing security cooperation in the 
Black Sea.  BLACKSEAFOR has helped the littoral states tackle 
drug and human trafficking, WMD, and terrorism.  Turkey also 
noted that its unilateral Black Sea Harmony has strengthened 
NATO's Operation Active Endeavor by identifying over 8000 
vessels in the Black Sea and passing on information to the 
Alliance on ships passing through the Bosphorus to the 
Mediterranean.  The Turks encouraged the U.S. to use our 
political weight with the other littorals to continue to 
contribute to BLACKSEAFOR.  They added that in the future 
international security cooperation in the Black Sea beyond 
the six littorals will become a reality.  DASD MacDougall 
responded that the U.S. could use its influence with Georgia, 
Ukraine, Bulgaria, and Romania, but added that Turkey would 
likely have more influence with the Russians on this issue. 
 
Caspian Sea Security 
-------------------- 
 
15. (C) Turkey believes the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) 
pipeline and future trans-Caspian projects are a significant 
counterbalance to Russian aims to control routes for Central 
Asian petroleum products to the West.  The Turks believe that 
the Central Asian states have not reached consensus on 
security in the Caspian and that this policy vacuum 
contributes to instability.  Turkey supports the Caspian 
Guard initiative. 
 
16. (C) DASD MacDougall added that in the Caspian we see 
terrorism, narcotics, and WMD proliferation as major 
concerns, and we are working closely with Azerbaijan and 
Kazakhstan to counter these threats.  When these countries 
have the resources to counter these threats, they will also 
have the means to secure their hydrocarbon resources. 
MacDougall noted that Azerbaijan has a duplicative navy and 
coast guard structure, which hinders both services' 
effectiveness. 
 
17. (C) Finally, DASD MacDougall urged the Turks to consider 
helping Georgia and Azerbaijan with pipeline security for the 
BTC.  He noted that as the terminus for BTC is in Turkey, 
Turkey has a special interest in assuring its security along 
the entire route.  Turkey agreed to look into this issue. 
 
Practical Cooperation 
-------------------- 
 
18. (C) Both the U.S. and Turkey briefed comprehensively on 
past, present, and potential future security cooperation 
efforts in Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan.  Both sides 
agreed on the necessity of such briefings in order to 
deconflict the efforts of both sides.  Both sides also agreed 
to hold monthly defense attache meetings in Tbilisi, Baku, 
and Almaty to further enhance information flow.  In addition, 
Turkey agreed to look into certain SC areas.  Specifics below: 
 
Georgia 
------- 
 
--As Ministry of Interior troops devolve into professional 
military services, Turkey will monitor this process and 
provide training support.  Turkey is not currently prepared 
to provide infrastructure (read: construction) support (it 
has done so in Georgia in the past), but will examine it for 
the future. 
 
Azerbaijan 
---------- 
 
--Turkey will discuss joint cooperation with U.S. on 
interface between Azeri Navy and maritime border guard 
interface/overlap. 
 
--Turkey will also discuss joint cooperation with U.S. on 
upgrading the Azeri navy. 
 
Kazakhstan 
---------- 
 
--After gathering further information, Turkey will consider 
participating in the Steppe Eagle exercise in summer 2005. 
 
19. (U) DASD MacDougall cleared this cable. 
DEUTSCH