US embassy cable - 04ABUDHABI4624

Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.

MTAG: IMMINENT MISSILE-RELATED TRANSFER BY A UAE FIRM TO IRAN (C)

Identifier: 04ABUDHABI4624
Wikileaks: View 04ABUDHABI4624 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Abu Dhabi
Created: 2004-12-18 12:36:00
Classification: SECRET
Tags: PARM MTCRE ETTC PREL MNUC IR TC
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
null
Diana T Fritz  12/19/2006 04:39:38 PM  From  DB/Inbox:  Search Results

Cable 
Text:                                                                      
                                                                           
      
S E C R E T        ABU DHABI 04624

SIPDIS
CXABU:
    ACTION: ECON
    INFO:   ICE FCS P/M DCM POL AMB

DISSEMINATION: ECON
CHARGE: PROG

APPROVED: CDA:RALBRIGHT
DRAFTED: ECON:OJOHN
CLEARED: NONE

VZCZCADI637
OO RUEHC
DE RUEHAD #4624 3531236
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 181236Z DEC 04
FM AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7309
S E C R E T ABU DHABI 004624 
 
SIPDIS 
 
INFO MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME PRIORITY 
AMCONSUL DUBAI PRIORITY 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR NP/CBM, NEA/ARP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2014 
TAGS: PARM, MTCRE, ETTC, PREL, MNUC, IR, TC 
SUBJECT: MTAG: IMMINENT MISSILE-RELATED TRANSFER BY A UAE 
FIRM TO IRAN (C) 
 
REF: A. DECEMBER 18 E-MAIL THORNE-ALBRIGHT 
     B. STATE 267982 
     C. ABU DHABI 3642 
 
 
(U) Classified by CDA Richard Albright for reasons 1.4 (b), 
(d), and (h). 
 
1. (S) Charge delivered reftel points on a missile related 
transfer to MFA U/S Abdullah Rashid Al-Noaimi on December 18. 
 Charge stressed the concern that this equipment would be 
used to support Iran's ballistic missile program.  He 
explained that the Embassy had already passed on the relevant 
information to the Dubai State Security Organization, which 
would be inspecting the container on December 18. Charge 
added that, if our suspicions about the item proved accurate, 
we would work with the government of the country of origin to 
determine whether the export violated its export control law. 
 If so, we would expect that government to request return of 
the item from the UAEG. 
 
2. (S) Al-Noaimi thanked Charge for the information, saying 
the UAEG was comfortable proceeding on this basis, as it had 
on another case involving China.  He asked whether the 
Western Continent General Trading was on the list of 
companies that the UAE had passed on as part of its "watch 
list."  (ref C)  Charge replied that it was not, but noted 
that the managing director of this company had a history of 
diversion.  (Note: Western Continent is not on the UAE's list 
of companies, however, another company with the same managing 
director, "Noor Al-Fath General Trading Company" is on the 
list.  Noor Al-Fath is under Department of Commerce 
investigation for diversion of licensed police items to 
Iran.) 
 
3. (S) Al-Noaimi said that he would check to see whether 
Dubai Customs would require additional authorization to hold 
the shipment for longer than "a normal transshipment time." 
He explained that the UAEG could hold the item for a while to 
investigate the shipment based on this demarche, but would 
eventually need "an official request" from the country of 
origin requesting the UAEG to continue to hold or to return 
the item. 
ALBRIGHT 

Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04