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| Identifier: | 04SANAA3105 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 04SANAA3105 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | Embassy Sanaa |
| Created: | 2004-12-18 12:20:00 |
| Classification: | UNCLASSIFIED |
| Tags: | PTER ASEC KCRM EFIN KHLS KPAO YM COUNTER TERRORISM |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 SANAA 003105 SIPDIS PLEASE PASS TO TTIC WASHINGTON DC E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PTER, ASEC, KCRM, EFIN, KHLS, KPAO, YM, COUNTER TERRORISM SUBJECT: YEMEN: 2004 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT REF: STATE 245841 1. Below is Embassy Sanaa's submission to the 2004 Patterns of Global Terrorism Report. 2004 Addendum sent septel. The text and the addendum have also been forwarded to S/CT POC via e-mail. 2. Begin text. Terrorist Attacks and Prosecutions ---------------------------------- There were no reported terrorist attacks against Westerners in Yemen in 2004. An economically motivated kidnapping of five oil workers, including one western national occurred on August 31 in the Ma'rib Governorate. The incident was resolved in a matter of hours without injuries or deaths, following intervention by the local authorities. All indications point toward this kidnapping being economically motivated and not a terrorist incident. The hostages were employees of the Omani oil drilling company that had previously employed members of the tribe responsible for the kidnapping. The Republic of Yemen Government continued to cooperate with U.S. law enforcement and took action against al-Qaida and local extremists in 2004 by arresting several individuals suspected of having al-Qaida ties. Most notable, however, was the government's prosecution of the perpetrators of several terrorist acts. Two terrorism-related prosecutions were conducted in 2004. On August 28 the Sanaa Primary Court convicted 14 al-Qaida associates in one trial for various terrorism related charges. Convictions were handed down for the following crimes: the October 2002 attack on the French tanker the V/M Limburg; the murder of a Ministry of Interior officer during the November 2002 attack on an oil company helicopter, a plot to attack the Civil Aviation and Meteorology Authority; a plot to attack four foreign embassies in Sanaa and to kill the U.S. Ambassador; and, for forging documents for the purpose of carrying out terrorism. Two defendants received death sentences, one in absentia. The other defendants were sentenced to prison terms ranging from three to ten years. Under Yemeni law, both defendants and the prosecution have the right to appeal rulings. The defendants have all appealed their sentences, as has the prosecution. The latter arguing that some of the sentences were too light. The appeals process is expected to conclude in early 2005. On September 10 the Sanaa Primary Court concluded the trial of five defendants for the October 12, 2000 attack on the USS COLE in Aden that killed 17 U.S. sailors and injured 35. On September 29, the court issued two death sentences for the ringleaders of the bombing. Three others were convicted and sentenced to prison terms ranging from five to ten years for their roles in the attack. This case is also currently under appeal. In both terrorism trials, the USG was able to assist in the prosecution by assuming the victims, families, right under Yemeni law to participate on behalf of the families. The Yemeni Attorney General,s office cooperated extensively with the USG under this provision of the law and ensured that adequate evidence was collected against all the defendants. The Yemeni Supreme Court heard appeals on the death sentences of Abed Abdulrazak al-Kamel and Ali Ahmed Mohamed Jarallah for the December 30, 2002 shootings of three American citizens in Jibla. No final decision has been issued on al-Kamel,s case. Court officials expect that the conviction will be upheld and passed to President Saleh, who they believe is likely to sign the order to carry out the sentence. Post representatives attended al-Kamel,s trial and appeal proceedings, which were relatively transparent and openly reported in the local media. Security and CT Cooperation --------------------------- Yemen publicly expresses its support for the global war on terrorism. In meetings with senior U.S. officials, President Saleh underscores Yemen,s determination to be an active counterterrorism partner. Work remains to be done to improve Yemen's counterterrorism capabilities and to increase border security. Yemen attended the IISS Gulf Security Dialogue Conference in Bahrain in December 2004 during which the participants agreed to increase regional counter terrorism cooperation. Over the past year, Yemen has increased its maritime security capabilities. The USG provided extensive training and eight boats to the Yemeni Coast Guard, which is now a visible patrolling force along the coastline and may well become a model for other Horn of Africa nations. The Coast Guard is a long way from having the skill, technology, equipment and training to maintain a continuous patrolling presence along the entire maritime border, or even to continually cover potential hot spots. Yemen has expressed a willingness to fight international terrorists by denying them the use of its territorial seas and ports. It is expanding Coast Guard operations to stem the use of Yemen as a &way station8 for smuggling of persons, drugs, weapons and explosives. This effort remains constrained by a lack of capacity, capability, and financial support. Land border security along Yemen's extensive frontier with Saudi Arabia remains a major concern. In February, Yemen and Saudi Arabia agreed to bolster cooperation in order to combat cross border arms and persons smuggling. The two countries also agreed to establish joint patrols and increase monitoring. In November 2004, Yemen and Saudi Arabia began looking at joint military exercises and ways to expand border checkpoints, but this cooperation is still in the discussion stage and much work remains to be done to expand the relationship. The Ministry of Defense is exploring the possibility of extending command control and communications links to the Saudi border. In 2003, in keeping with a bilateral security agreement, Sanaa and Riyadh exchanged prisoners and terror suspects, including the handing over by Yemen of an individual on the Saudi's most-wanted list. Although there are reports that the two governments are arranging another prisoner exchange, this has not occurred as of December 2004. The Yemeni Central Security Force-Counter Terrorism Unit (CSF-CTU) has greatly improved its CT capabilities as a direct result of US assistance and training. Yemen also continues to cooperate with the USG under its Terrorist Interdiction Program, designed to ensure cooperation between ministries to strengthen military capabilities and tighten border posts and checkpoints in tribal and border areas. The program is currently enjoying limited success as a result of U.S. aid. In 2004, the government's capacity for stemming terrorism financing remained limited. In February, the United Nations Sanctions Committee designated prominent Yemeni Sheikh and opposition Islah party leader Abdul Majid al-Zindani as a person who provides material support to al-Qaida. Despite repeated requests, the Yemeni government has taken no action to freeze his assets in compliance with their UN obligations. Zindani continues to appear prominently at public events. There were no reported arrests by Yemeni authorities of any high-profile al-Qaida associates in 2004. In November 2003 authorities arrested Muhammad Hamdi al-Ahdal (a.k.a. Abu Asim al-Makki) who supported mujahedin and terrorist operations throughout the Middle East and in Chechnya. He remains in custody. In 2003 authorities arrested al-Qaida operative Fawaz al-Rabi'ea (a.k.a. Furqan) and al-Qaida associate Hadi Dulqum. Al-Rabi'ea was sentenced to ten years in the M/V Limburg trial for plotting to attack the Civil Aviation and Meteorology Authority. Hadi Dulqum remains in detention. In 2003 the Yemeni government also apprehended suspected al-Qaida associate Jabber al-Banna who has an outstanding Federal indictment as well as an Interpol warrant for providing &material support8 to terrorism related to the &Lackawana Six8 terrorist cell in Buffalo, New York. He also remains in custody. In March 10 Yemeni authorities apprehended USS Cole bombing suspects who had escaped from an Aden prison in April 2003. Of those that were recaptured, Jamal al-Badawi and Fahad al-Quso have both been tried convicted, their cases are currently on appeal. In August 2002 Yemen formed the Islamic Dialogue Committee headed by a leading judge. In 2004 the committee continued its dialogue with detainees arrested for connection to terrorist groups and extremist elements, including many Yemeni returnees from Afghanistan. According to the Ministry of Interior, before detainees are released they are screened by Yemen,s Political Security Organization, and make commitments to uphold the Yemeni constitution and laws, the rights of non-Muslims, and the inviolability of foreign interests. In a 2004 Ramadan Amnesty the government released over one hundred security detainees claiming they had been rehabilitated. In June, the Ministry of Vice and Religious Guidance sponsored the first "Guidance Conference," bringing together more than 270 Muslim clerics from across the Middle East to promote moderate and tolerant aspects of Islam. The conference dealt with several issues including the differentiation between terrorism and legitimate struggle. The conference concluded with five primary recommendations to combat extremism in Islam. Several terrorist organizations continued to maintain a presence in Yemen throughout 2004. HAMAS and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) are recognized as legal organizations and HAMAS maintains offices in Yemen. Neither organization has engaged in any known terrorist activities in Yemen, and PIJ does not have any known operational presence. HAMAS conducts extensive fundraising through mosques and other charitable organizations throughout the country. While al-Qaida operational structure in Yemen has been weakened and dispersed, concerns remain about attempts to reconstitute operational cells in Yemen Other international terrorist groups with a presence in Yemen include remnants of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and al-Gama,a al-Islamiyya. Despite a major offensive by the Yemen government in 2003, the Aden Abyan Islamic Army also maintains a presence in the country. Yemen is a party to eight of the 12 international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism. KRAJESKI
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