US embassy cable - 04ANKARA7041

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 007041 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2014 
TAGS: ELAB, ETRD, IZ, PREL, PTER, TU 
SUBJECT: TURKISH TRUCKERS' STRIKE DRAGS ON -- CONCERNS 
RAISED ABOUT SOMO'S ROLE 
 
 
Classified By: DCM Robert Deutsch for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1.  (C) Striking Turkish truckers continue to block fuel 
deliveries to Iraq, and after 10 days, there is no indication 
that the shipping contractors and striking truckers have 
begun talks to settle the strike.  The lead Turkish 
contractor, Petrol Ofisi, told us that they and the other 
Turkish contractors working for SOMO have found it difficult 
to communicate with SOMO and have not received authorization 
to proceed with talks.  The contractors think that the strike 
is controlled by a few influential leaders/clans and enforced 
with threats.  They think that many strikers will want to 
return to work in the next few days.  Embassy Ankara will 
continue to monitor the situation but will not attempt to get 
involved in strike negotiations, and we have not asked 
Turkish authorities to intervene.  Embassy would appreciate a 
read-out from SOMO on their thinking regarding the strike and 
a broader analysis of the impact the suspension of fuel 
supplies will have on our troops and the Iraqi public.  End 
Summary. 
 
And the Strike Goes On 
 
2.  (C) Observers at the Iraq-Turkey border, at loading 
depots in Iskenderun and Mersin, as well as officials from 
the largest Turkish contractor Petrol Ofisi and DESC confirm 
that the strike continues and is effective in stopping 
deliveries of all fuel to Iraq, with the exception has been 
JP-8 deliveries.  (See para 5.)  Petrol Ofisi told us that 
they have had a difficult time communicating with SOMO.  The 
contractors are skeptical that SOMO will increase the 
contracts to cover higher payments to truckers needed to 
negotiate a settlement, so they are content, for the time 
being, to wait.  MFA Iraq desk director Botsali told us Dec. 
17 that many of the truckers were getting desperate for 
income and would quit the strike in a matter of days. 
 
3.  (C) The contractors are convinced that the strike was 
engineered and enforced by a small number of powerful leaders 
who head relatively large clan-based trucking companies.  It 
is likely that these are the same clans that engineered the 
short -- and for truckers lucrative  -- strike in November 
2003.  Adana Consul visited the loading depot in Iskenderun 
and ran into trucker representatives, who were desperate to 
have someone to negotiate with.  Petrol Ofisi officials 
believe that many truckers will begin defecting from the 
strike in a few days.  Most of the truckers are poor, have no 
other employment options and many may be making payments on 
new equipment purchases, according to Petrol Ofisi officials. 
 
 
More Complaints About SOMO 
 
4.  (C) DCM met with newly appointed MFA Deputy U/S for 
Economic Affairs Arat, who complained that it takes SOMO two 
months to pay for fuel shipments from Turkey.  He implied 
that the complex approval process and two-month payment delay 
contributed to the strike because they made it harder for 
SOMO's Turkish contractors to pay more to truckers.  We urged 
Arat to share the complaints with the IIG.  (Embassy will 
e-mail non-paper to EUR/SE and Embassy Baghdad.) 
 
JP-8 
 
5.  (C) Until a few days ago, the strike had not affected 
JP-8 deliveries to Iraq.  JP-8 is loaded at Coco, about 10 KM 
from Incirlik, through a spur off the Mersin NATO fuel line. 
Petrol Ofisi uses a small number of truckers from a company 
in Konya for the JP-8 deliveries.  (Note:  most of the 
drivers delivering to Iraq are Kurds from southeast Turkey.) 
The strike leaders may not be aware of the separate JP-8 
facility.  However, JP-8 deliveries have begun to be 
affected.  Strike enforcers reportedly positioned along the 
road near the Iraq border crossing reportedly stopped and 
threatened JP-8 truckers in Cizre.  Petrol Ofisi told their 
drivers not to continue their deliveries.  In addition, 
Petrol Ofisi has been forced to reduce its loading rate from 
60/day to 40/day recently because so many of its JP-8 trucks 
are tied up in long lines at the border waiting to get back. 
Neither DESC or PO wants to take the risk of trying to 
supplement the existing shortfall in drivers by going to the 
wider, potentially wildcat strike-sympathetic driver pool and 
more widely advertise Coco's location. 
 
6.  (C) Comment and Action Request:  Embassy continues to 
closely monitor the situation.  However, we are also taking 
care to keep an arms length distance from contract details or 
strike negotiations.  And aside from asking local police in 
the southeast about reports of violence, we have not asked 
government officials to intervene.  The Turkish contractors 
seem confident about their reading of the truckers' staying 
power.  The unknown is the extent to which the strike leaders 
might go beyond threats to violence to enforce solidarity 
among the truckers.  Embassy would appreciate Embassy 
Baghdad's read-out on SOMO's awareness of and concern about 
the strike.  We would also appreciate an evaluation of the 
impact a continuing suspension of fuel shipments to Iraq will 
have on supplies for our troops and for the Iraqi population. 
 End Comment and Action Request. 
 
7.  (U) Baghdad Minimize Considered. 
 
EDELMAN