US embassy cable - 04HARARE2052

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HARARE 002052 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/S 
USDOC FOR ROBERT TELCHIN 
TREASURY FOR OREN WYCHE-SHAW 
PASS USTR FLORIZELLE LISER 
STATE PASS USAID FOR MARJORIE COPSON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, EFIN, ECON, ETRD, EINV, ZI, U.S.-Zimbabwe Bilateral Relations 
SUBJECT: GIDEON GONO: ZIMBABWE,S WOULD-BE KINGMAKER? 
 
Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Christopher 
W. Dell under Section 1.5 b/d 
 
1. (C) Reserve Bank (RBZ) Governor Gideon Gono, claiming to 
be speaking on behalf of President Mugabe, told the 
Ambassador that Mugabe wanted better relations with the U.S. 
The Ambassador responded that the U.S. welcomed these 
overtures, but that we needed to see real changes that 
matched the rhetoric.  On the economy, Gono shared a copy of 
the letter the GOZ had sent to the IMF (faxed to AF/S) and 
implored the U.S. to support another six-month reprieve when 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF),s Executive Directors 
vote on Zimbabwe,s compulsory withdrawal in late-January. 
The Ambassador responded that the GOZ would again need to 
demonstrate real commitment to improved economic management 
and as a first step should make an authoritative public 
statement along the lines of the letter.  Gono also took 
credit for the demise of Information and Publicity Minister 
Jonathan Moyo and claimed that due to his influence with 
Mugabe, Justice Minister Patrick Chinamasa might also soon be 
fired.  End summary. 
 
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Mugabe's Messenger 
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2. (C)   In a 90-minute session with the Ambassador, Gono 
claimed to have been sent to see the Ambassador as 
"messenger" from Mugabe.  He insisted Mugabe sought 
rapprochement with the U.S.   The Ambassador responded that 
we were open to better relations but that the GOZ needed to 
first move beyond rhetoric and take concrete steps that 
demonstrated real change was underway.  As specific areas 
where the GOZ could take immediate action, the Ambassador 
cited allowing the banned Daily News to resume publication, 
revoking - or at least not enforcing - the NGO law and 
inviting impartial international observers to oversee 
March,s parliamentary elections. 
 
3. (C) Gono admitted he had failed to convince Mugabe to kill 
the NGO legislation, which the RBZ had estimated could cost 
the economy 10,000 jobs and several hundred million U.S. 
dollars of inflows.  He said Mugabe had been very upset by 
U.S. criticism of the bill and now felt he had no choice but 
to sign it since to do otherwise would be seen to be caving 
in to external pressure.  The Ambassador responded that 
Mugabe could always return it to Parliament on a technicality 
and then, if it were true that its author Chinamasa was in 
trouble and possibly losing both his job and his place with 
the Politburo, use it as a reason to fire Chinamasa thus 
disposing of two problems at one time.  While not responding 
directly, Gono showed marked interest in this idea. 
 
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Gono pleads for another six months at IMF 
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4. (C) Gono urged the U.S. to support a further six-month 
deferral on Zimbabwe,s compulsory withdrawal from the IMF 
when it comes before the Executive Directors in late-January. 
 He dismissed as &misunderstandings8 the IMF,s and GOZ,s 
widely conflicting 2005 forecasts for the economy.  In that 
regard, he gave the Ambassador a Dec. 10 letter from acting 
Finance Minister Herbert Murerwa to IMF Managing Director 
Rodrigo Rato assuring more assertive action to repair the 
economy.  Reaching well beyond Gono,s Oct. 28 monetary 
statement and Murerwa,s Nov. 25 budget speech, the letter 
promises to reduce broad money (M3) growth from 220 to 80 
percent by Dec 2005, eliminate the Z$824:US$ exchange rate 
(largely a surrender requirement for exporters) and raise 
quarterly IMF arrears payments to US$5 to 9 million in March. 
 In addition, Gono said he would also prevent a proposed 270 
percent pay increase for civil servants and partly liberalize 
currency auctions. 
 
5. (C) The Ambassador responded that the U.S. was still 
considering its stance on compulsory withdrawal, but said 
Zimbabwe,s case would be strengthened if it took decisive 
and unequivocal steps to begin implementing the commitments 
in the letter.  In view of the short time available before 
the January board meeting, a possible first might be for the 
GOZ to commit itself publicly at an authoritative level to 
the sort of sound economic policies it had referenced in the 
letter. 
 
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Conspiring against the conspirators 
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6. (C) Gono told the Ambassador that Mugabe had complained 
that a banker close to Gono had acted disloyally and 
bankrolled the Tsholotsho meeting.   Gono responded that the 
unnamed banker had mistakenly believed that Mugabe's close 
assocations with Mnangagwa and Moyo meant that the President 
supported their plans at Tsholotsho.   In this manner, Gono 
said he told Mugabe that these politicians had taken 
advantage of the President,s perceived support.  &You are 
not aware of the credibility that comes with association,8 
Gono said he told Mugabe.  By having spent four hours at the 
wedding of Mnangagwa,s child, Mugabe conveyed the false 
impression to the ZANU-PF faithful that the Speaker was his 
&heir apparent.8  Likewise, Information Minister Moyo,s 
frequent visits to the President had conveyed the false 
impression that he was speaking on behalf of Mugabe, 
including when he organized the Tsholotsho meeting.   Gono 
predicted Mugabe would not include Moyo in the new Politburo, 
which he expected the President to announce this Friday. 
Without a Politburo seat, Gono speculated that Moyo could not 
plausibly continue as the GOZ,s official spokesman.  Gono 
confirmed that many in ZANU-PF were &fed up with Jonathan 
and his approach,8 and supported his ouster.   GOZ moderates 
were increasingly supporting the Daily and Sunday Mirror, 
which Gono claimed was open to all viewpoints (N.B.  and in 
which Gono reportedly has a large financial stake). 
 
7. (C) Gono also postulated that Chinamasa,s influence was 
waning and that Mugabe might exclude the Justice Minister 
from the new Politburo, in part a result of Gono,s own 
efforts to undermine Chinimasa.  The RBZ Governor explained 
he had &no sympathy8 for Chinamasa after he turned down the 
UN Development Program,s election assistance offer.  The 
Ambassador noted that he had sought a meeting with Chinimasa 
for several months and just last week, suddenly, had received 
the meeting.  Gono responded that it was sometimes a good 
thing to see people like Chinimasa get &wounded.8  He added 
that Mugabe also expressed displeasure with Local Governments 
Minister Chombo and Foreign Minister Mudenge, and that both 
of them could be on their way out as well. 
 
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Comment 
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8. (C)  Gono's considerable ego and ambition sometimes make 
it difficult to distinguish the degree to which he is 
speaking for Mugabe from the self-serving spin he puts on 
events.  Nonetheless, this is the latest and perhaps 
strongest indication to date of the GOZ's growing interest in 
rapprochement with the United States and the Ambassador used 
it to lay down a strong marker that we expect the GOZ to take 
the first steps.  With respect to Gono, he clearly has 
designs on still higher office.  The bulk of the conversation 
was about politics regardless of the fact that as RBZ 
Governor, Gono,s writ is confined largely to economics.  In 
fact, he works to protray himself as having a much larger 
role and great sway over Mugabe, albeit on an informal basis. 
 It is hard to say just how far Gono,s ambitions go but he 
certainly aims as far as Prime Minister should that position 
be recreated. 
DELL