US embassy cable - 04THEHAGUE3285

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 003285 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR AND WHA/CCA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, NL, CU, EUN 
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/EU/CUBA: DUTCH PREVENT INVITATIONS TO CUBAN 
OFFICIALS SUPERSEDING  DISSIDENTS 
 
 
Classified By: POL Counselor Andrew Schofer for Reasons 1.4 (b) 
and (d) 
 
1. (C) Summary: The Dutch confirmed on December 15 that the EU 
COLAT  Working  Group agreed on December 14 to recommend a 
temporary suspension of  the June  2003 measures for increased 
engagement with the Cuban  opposition.  A Dutch MFA  contact 
described the COLAT's recommendation as  intended to increase 
opportunities for the EU to engage the Government of  Cuba with 
regard to Human  Rights.  According to the COLAT agreement, EU 
Embassies in Havana will in the  future issue National Day 
invitations only  to the diplomatic corps and local  nationals, 
not to Cuban dissidents or  government officials (although 
neither  group would be excluded from  attending if they 
desired.)  The EU hopes this  arrangement will allow the  Cuban 
regime to unfreeze diplomatic relations with  the EU; the EU will 
then re-engage "on condition" that meetings specifically  include 
discussion of human rights concerns.  The suspension of the June 
2003   measures would continue until June 2005 "at the latest," 
at which point a   subsequent COLAT will review the suspension 
and its results.  Prior to  taking  effect, this recommendation 
must still be approved at the  Minister-level, most  likely at 
the at the GAERC meeting scheduled for late  January 2005.  End 
summary. 
 
COLAT Working Group Recommends EU Temporarily Suspend June 2003 
Measures 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
2. (C) Dutch MFA advisor for Cuba policy Jan Jaap Groenemeijer told 
poloff   December 15 that the December 14 EU working party 
meeting on Latin America   (COLAT) had agreed to recommend a 
"temporary suspension" of June 2003  measures.   The suspension 
would allow high-level official meetings "on  condition" that 
each meeting include discussion of human rights concerns.   The 
suspension  includes a "special formula" for national day 
receptions  whereby invitations would be issued only to the local 
national community  and to the diplomatic corps.  Groenemeijer 
noted that while dissidents and  the Cuban officials would not be 
specifically invited, they "would not be  forbidden" either.  The 
measures would be suspended until June 2005 "at  the latest," at 
which point a  subsequent COLAT meeting will evaluate the 
effectiveness of the suspension. 
 
3. (C) The COLAT also agreed that EU Heads of Mission in Havana would 
recommend  concrete ways in which to "intensify engagement with the 
opposition." Groenemeijer said this would include "more intensive and 
visible" engagement.   Some measures mentioned included more 
meetings with  dissidents, providing  support to families of 
dissidents, and visitation of  prisoners. 
 
4. (C) Groenemeijer noted that the objective of the suspension is to 
provoke a "positive reaction" from Cuba, to include a reinitiation of 
dialogue and  ultimately the release of the 75 political 
prisoners taken in  March 2003.   Groenemeijer emphasized that 
the temporary nature of the  suspension means that  the 
suspension could be reversed and measures could  be reinstated, 
or even more  restrictive measures could be imposed if the 
desired results are not achieved. 
 
EU Seeks Greater Engagement with Both Dissidents and Officials 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
5. (C) Groenemeijer stressed that the recommendation to suspend the 
June  2003  measures was made in the context of seeking to 
increase engagement  with Cuban  authorities, dissidents, and 
civil society representatives in  order to help  prepare for a a 
post-Castro democratic Cuba.  He argued that  the EU intended to 
keep the pressure on the Cuban government to improve  its human 
rights record  but found the current lack of meaningful 
engagement counterproductive to this  effort. 
 
6. (C) Groenemeijer was particularly exercised about what he saw 
as misrepresentation in the press and abroad that the EU had 
frozen relations  with  Cuba following the introduction of the 
June 2003 measures, when it  was actually  the other way around. 
The EU had been dismayed at the time  by the Cuban  government's 
decision to freeze relations, which had  prevented the EU from 
promoting positive changes within the Cuban  government.   Noting 
that "the EU  does not have sanctions on Cuba like the  U.S.," 
Groenemeijer said the EU feels  engagement with the Government of 
Cuba is necessary to promote human rights and  to encourage 
reform. 
 
7. (C) According to Groenemeijer, a majority of EU members at the 
COLAT  agreed  with Spain that the policy of inviting dissidents 
to national days,  while  appreciated by the dissidents, was 
ineffective in producing change  or  cultivating civil society in 
advance of a post-Castro Cuba.  "Only two  or  three" members, 
according to Groenemeijer, were unwilling to go along  with the 
Spanish proposal to cease inviting dissidents to national day 
receptions.  In  their national capacity, the Dutch argued at the 
COLAT  that inviting Cuban  officials without inviting dissidents 
was  "unacceptable;"  as EU president, the  Dutch then proposed 
the compromise  position to invite neither group, which was 
ultimately accepted.  Since  Cuban officials had previously 
indicated to the EU  that the GOC would lift  its diplomatic 
freeze when the EU stops inviting  dissidents to national  days, 
he argued that "it is logical to expect that Cuba  will respond" 
to  this development by unfreezing relations. 
 
Next Steps 
---------- 
8. (C) The proposed suspension must be approved at the Minister- 
level  before  taking effect.  Groenemeijer suggested that the 
next meeting at  which Foreign  Ministers could approve the 
recommendation would be the late  January GAERC.  In  the 
intervening time, Groenemeijer said the Dutch will  be drafting 
in  discussion with other EU members the language for the 
Council Conclusions which  will explain details of the suspension 
and also  discuss benchmark-style demands  to be met by the 
Government of Cuba (which  Groenemeijer did not believe would  be 
included in Council conclusions).   Groenemeijer said the EU has 
not yet  created language clarifying whether  another GAERC 
decision would be necessary  to continue the suspension after 
June 2005, and whether the earlier measures  would automatically 
return to  force if there is no progress on the Cuban side.   He 
believed that the EU  would set certain "benchmarks" or "demands" 
that Cuba  would have to meet  in order for the suspension to 
stay in place.  According to  Groenemeijer,  these might include: 
not hindering contact between EU and  opposition  members; 
releasing the 75 prisoners; and stopping harassment of 
dissidents. 
 
Comment: Dutch and EU Wary of US Reaction 
----------------------------------------- 
9. (C) Groenemeijer reported that COLAT participants were 
concerned about  the  potential U.S. reaction to a suspension of 
the June 2003 measures, and  had  agreed that the U.S. should be 
"very correctly informed about the  decision" to  avoid 
"puzzlement."  Groenemeijer took great pains to  articulate the 
COLAT  recommendation and the background to the  recommendation, 
and indicated that  U.S. comment and reaction would be 
appreciated to avoid miscommunication.   Groenemeijer appeared 
convinced  that the COLAT recommendations, if enacted,  would 
ultimately help the EU  engage with the Cuban opposition in 
preparing for  a post-Castro Cuba, but  he acknowledged that 
other member states have a larger  basket of  motivations, and 
that the Cuban government's reaction to the EU's   initiative 
will also be a major factor in determining whether it succeeds 
in  this stated objective. 
RUSSEL