US embassy cable - 04THEHAGUE3284

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NETHERLANDS: 2004 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT

Identifier: 04THEHAGUE3284
Wikileaks: View 04THEHAGUE3284 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy The Hague
Created: 2004-12-16 16:32:00
Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Tags: PTER NL AEC
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 THE HAGUE 003284 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR S/CT, TTIC EUR, EUR/UBI, INL 
JUSTICE FOR OIA - JFRIEDMAN 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PTER, NL, AEC 
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS: 2004 ANNUAL TERRORISM REPORT 
 
REF: (A) STATE 245841 (B) THE HAGUE 3044 (C) THE HAGUE 3025 
 
(D) THE HAGUE 2995 (E) THE HAGUE 2929 (F) THE HAGUE 2864 (G) 
THE HAGUE 2308 (H) THE HAGUE 1595 
 
1.  The 2004 terrorism report for the Netherlands follows. 
Responses are keyed as much as possible to reftel A's 
requirements. 
 
A. SUPPORT TO GLOBAL COALITION AGAINST TERRORISM 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
2.  The Dutch have responded to the global terrorist threat 
with leadership and energy in the areas of border and 
shipping security, terrorist financing, and Alliance efforts 
in Afghanistan and Iraq.  In 2004, the Netherlands took over 
leadership of a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in 
Baghlan province, Afghanistan as part of the NATO ISAF 
Mission.  In addition, the Netherlands contributed six F-16s 
fighters and a K/DC-10 tanker/transport aircraft to provide 
air support during the Afghan presidential election as well 
as a frigate to participate in Operation Enduring Freedom. 
Dutch reconstruction and humanitarian assistance to 
Afghanistan in 2004 totaled 51.3 million euros.  The 
Netherlands provided naval assets to the NATO-led naval 
antiterrorism campaign, Operation Active Endeavor, in the 
Mediterranean.  The Dutch have approximately 1,400 personnel 
in Iraq, which are due to remain until March 2005.  In 
addition, the Dutch have committed to providing personnel 
for the NATO Training Mission in Iraq.  The Dutch have 
pledged 21 million euros for Iraqi reconstruction. 
 
B.  BILATERAL COOPERATION 
------------------------- 
3.  The Government made CT a priority issue for its EU 
presidency during the second half of 2004.  Many high level 
meetings on CT and law enforcement issues occurred during 
Dutch presidency.  At the invitation of the Dutch, DHS Sec. 
Ridge met with the US/EU JHA Troika in mid September to 
highlight US/EU cooperation on CT issues, and Attorney 
General Ashcroft and Homeland Security Under Secretary 
Hutchinson attended the informal Justice and Home Affairs 
(JHA) Ministerial in The Hague on September 29/30.  The 
Dutch also invited US participation in EU meetings on 
biometrics and terrorist financing.  In 2004, the 
Netherlands continued its commitment to shipping and port 
security by increasing cooperation with the United States. 
Under the DOE Megaport/Second Line of Defense Initiative, 
four radiological monitors (provided by DOE) became 
operational in the port of Rotterdam in Feb. 2004.  An 
estimated 31 additional monitors (funded by the Dutch) will 
be installed by the end of 2006.  Improved CSI targeting and 
operations at the port resulted from bilateral discussions. 
The Dutch Port Security Act became effective on July 9, 
2004, complying with the IMO's ISPS Code, and all Dutch 
seaports have security plans as required by the ISPS.  In 
July 2004, the Government approved an experiment with air 
marshals on certain KLM and Martinair flights.  The Dutch 
also permitted U.S. CBP Immigration Liaison Officers to 
return to Schiphol airport to assist with US-bound passenger 
screening (the program is now known as the Immigration 
Assistance Program). 
 
4.  The Netherlands has signed and ratified all 12 
international conventions and protocols relating to 
terrorism. 
 
C.  LAW ENFORCEMENT 
------------------- 
5.  In June 2004, the Dutch for the first time successfully 
convicted two individuals of terrorist activity (ref H). 
The Hague Appeal Court reversed the December 2002 Rotterdam 
lower court's acquittal of Jerome Courtailler and 
Abedelghani Rabia, suspected of plotting to bomb the U.S. 
Embassy in Paris, and sentenced them to six and four-year 
jail terms, respectively.  The appeal court convicted them 
for their involvement in an international criminal 
organization that was planning an attack, and for their role 
in trading forged passports.   The appeals court ruled that 
information by the AIVD intelligence service served as a 
good base for starting criminal investigations, thereby 
allowing use of intelligence of the General Intelligence and 
Security Service (AIVD) as evidence.  Meanwhile, Justice 
Minister Donner submitted legislation codifying the court's 
ruling to allow the use of intelligence information in 
criminal proceedings.  The bill is still awaiting 
parliamentary action. 
 
6.  Dutch officials remain committed to establishing 
financial protocols to combat terrorism and have cooperated 
with the United States in freezing the assets of known 
terrorist organizations.  Using national authority to 
identify, freeze and seize terrorist finance assets, the 
Dutch blocked the accounts and financial transactions of a 
HAMAS fundraiser, the al-Aqsa Foundation, and al-Qaida- 
affiliated Benevolence International Nederland.  In July 
2004, the Netherlands froze all financial assets of the 
Dutch branch of Al-Haramain.  Although neither the Dutch nor 
their EU partners have designated Lebanese Hizballah as a 
terrorist group, Dutch Foreign Affairs Minister Bot informed 
the Second Chamber on November 11 of the Dutch Government's 
intention to support a EU designation of Hizballah.  The 
Dutch Financial Expertise Center (FEC) announced in November 
a selection of 3,500 religious foundations, both Christian 
and Islamic, was being screened for possible financial ties 
with terrorist networks. 
 
D.  EXTRADITIONS 
---------------- 
7.  On November 8, 2004, the Supreme Court denied 
extradition to Turkey of PKK official Nuriye Kesbir, because 
of insufficient guarantees about her safety.  Minister 
Donner decided to appeal to the verdict. 
 
E.  LAW ENFORCEMENT CAPABILITIES 
-------------------------------- 
8.  Law enforcement authorities have the authority to 
intercept wire, oral and electronic communications.  They 
can initiate surveillance and investigation of suspected 
terrorists or their facilitators.  Intelligence information 
can be used in courts (see para 5). 
 
F.  TERRORIST INCIDENT 
---------------------- 
9.  On November 3, the Netherlands was rocked by the murder 
of prominent Dutch film director Theo van Gogh by Dutch 
Moroccan Mohammed Bouyeri.  Letters pinned to Van Gogh's 
dead body confirmed the assassin had acted out of radical 
Islamic convictions and, in coordination with others, 
planned similar attacks on two politicians and other 
"enemies" of Islam.  Immediately following the assassin's 
arrest, about a dozen other Islamic radicals were arrested. 
Bouyeri has been linked to the fundamentalist Takfir Wal 
Hijra group.  Another member of this group appears to be a 
Syrian, known as Abu Khaled, who reportedly is being sought 
by Dutch authorities, who believe he played a crucial role 
in the murder of Van Gogh, threats made against a Dutch MP, 
and preparations for attacks on the Second Chamber, Schiphol 
Airport and the Borssele nuclear plant.  18 year-old 
Amsterdammer Samir Azzouz was arrested in June 2004 as a 
suspect in those possible attacks.  His arrest was the 
reason for a major state of alarm in the Netherlands.  Abu 
Khaled reportedly had been Koran teacher of the group of 
radicals, in which Mohammed Bouyeri and Azzouz participated. 
 
10.  There were no international terrorist attacks in the 
Netherlands in 2004. 
 
G.  DUTCH COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS 
---------------------------------- 
11.  The following counter-terrorism legislation was 
enacted/proposed in 2004: 
 
- The Act on Terrorist Crimes, implementing the 2002 EU 
framework decision on combating terrorism, became effective 
in August 2004.  The Act makes recruitment for the Jihad and 
conspiracy with the aim of committing a serious terrorist 
crime separate criminal offenses.  The maximum prison 
sentences for crimes such as homicide, gross maltreatment, 
hijacking or kidnapping will be higher if committed with a 
"terrorist purpose." 
 
- On December 7, the Government approved a bill submitted by 
the Justice and Foreign Affairs Ministers banning 
organizations appearing on the EU terror list.  The Cabinet 
also wants to penalize participation in these organizations' 
activities.  The ban will apply to organizations such as 
PKK, Hamas, Al-Aqsa Netherlands, Al-Takfir and the New 
Peoples Army.  The ban doesn't mean the terror organization 
must be dissolved, but continuation of its activities within 
the country could be penalized with a one-year prison term. 
The bill also makes it possible to act against foreign 
organizations not appearing on the EU terror list, but whose 
activities are considered illegal in the Netherlands.  A 
civil court makes the determination at the request of a 
public prosecutor.  The sanction is also a one-year prison 
term.  Under current legislation, only bank accounts of 
organizations on the EU terror list can be frozen.  The bill 
has been submitted to the Second Chamber for consideration 
 
- In September 2004, Justice Minister Donner and Interior 
Minister Remkes submitted a plan to Parliament streamlining 
Dutch CT policies (ref G).  The plan, drawn up by CT 
Coordinator Joustra, establishes an office of the National 
CT Coordinator (NCTb) by January 1, 2005, under the joint 
authority of the two Ministers.  Under the plan, the Justice 
Minister has been given primary responsibility in handling 
situations of "acute" threat, while the Interior Minister 
will be in charge of crisis control operations.  Further 
legislative proposals include lowering the threshold for 
granting use of special investigation methods, such phone 
taps, infiltration and surveillance, extended custody of 
suspects, increased opportunities for preventive search of 
persons, cars and packages, and expanded power for 
prosecutors to request data from private organizations.  On 
November 11, Minister Donner circulated a proposed bill 
implementing Joustra's plan to various organizations for 
their review. 
 
- In the aftermath of the Van Gogh murder, the Cabinet 
proposed additional CT measures, which received wide 
parliamentary support on November 11 (ref B).  They include: 
- doubling AIVD's budget; 
- having the AIVD intelligence service share its information 
more widely; 
- providing more resources to protect public persons and 
property; 
- setting up a special terrorism unit within the National 
Crime Squad; 
- expanding the circle of people under surveillance; 
- requesting the court to ban and dissolve mosques acting 
contrary to the public order; and 
- improving employment and anti-discrimination programs for 
young Muslims. 
 
- On November 26, the Government adopted a proposal by 
Immigration Minister Verdonk enabling authorities to rescind 
the Dutch nationality of individuals possessing dual 
nationality who pose a threat to the vital interests of the 
State.  The proposal was sent to the Council of State for 
recommendation, after which it will be submitted to the 
Second Chamber of Parliament. 
 
-  During a Second Chamber CT debate on December 8, Interior 
Minister Remkes and Justice Minister Donner promised tougher 
measures  on the approximately 10 to 25 radical  mosques  in 
the  Netherlands.   Remkes told Parliament  if  the  mosques 
could  not be prosecuted on criminal charges, other options, 
such  as  stopping  their state subsidy or expelling  Imans, 
would  be  used.   He noted the Cabinet would  not  tolerate 
sermons  identifying the West as the big enemy of Islam  and 
in   which  the  authority  of  the  Dutch  government   was 
questioned.  The Second Chamber asked the Government to take 
action   against  Muslim  websites  which  provoke   hatred. 
According  to  the  Chamber, the AIVD  intelligence  service 
should cooperate with other countries, "including the  U.S." 
to  close such sites.  The Cabinet considered setting  up  a 
national  notification point for hate  mails.   Remkes  also 
said  the  AIVD  would  be given more authority  to  counter 
violence,   for  instance  by  preventing  actions   through 
infiltration.  After a Chamber majority demanded the results 
of  the  government's  fight against terrorism,  Donner  and 
Remkes promised a survey of all CT measures. 
 
H. NEW CT ORGANIZATION 
---------------------- 
12.  As stated above, the Government proposed to merge the 
CT activities of the Justice and Interior Ministries into 
one organization, the NCTb, led by the National CT 
Coordinator (currently Tjibbe Joustra).  In addition to its 
main task of preventing terrorist attacks, the NCTb will 
also act as "process director" in areas indirectly related 
to CT, such as critical infrastructure protection and 
alerting projects, and in areas where other departments have 
primary responsibility, such terrorist financing and NBC 
terrorism.  An expertise and analysis center will be created 
within the NCTb, in which the AIVD (general) and MIVD 
(military) intelligence services, the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (IND), the Kmar military police, the 
fiscal and economic control services (FIOD/ECD), Customs and 
Foreign Affairs will participate.  The NCTb, which should be 
operational in early 2005, will also be responsible for 
communicating information to the public.  A color-coded 
alerting system is being developed and expected to be in 
place in 2005. 
 
K.  GOVERNMENTAL ATTITUDE 
------------------------- 
13.  The attack on Van Gogh has had an enormous impact on 
the Netherlands, particularly because of the irreversible 
conclusion that some individuals in Dutch society have 
become extremely radicalized, and the implications this has 
on the interrelationships between different groups of the 
population.  The murder has forced the Government to face 
the reality the Dutch tradition of tolerance does not make 
society immune from Islamic extremist violence.  The events 
have prompted the Government to announce additional measures 
to combat radicalization (Ref E and F). 
 
L.  CONSTRAINTS ON CT PERFORMANCE 
--------------------------------- 
14.  An important impediment to Dutch CT operation is the 
cumbersome bureaucratic structure, particularly overlap and 
ambiguity between the Justice and Interior Ministry.  This 
was recently illustrated in a critical report about the 
AIVD's functioning (ref D).  The report particularly 
highlighted AIVD's reluctance to share information either 
with domestic or international partners.  Operations are 
expected to improve, however, through increased resources 
and the establishment of the national CT bureau (NCTb). 
 
M. SUPPORT FOR TERROR 
--------------------- 
15.  The Dutch Government does not support any terrorist 
groups, neither financially nor politically.  A number of 
foreign political groups, including Kurdish (PKK/KADEK), 
Filipino (New People's Army), Sri Lankan (LTTE/Tamil Tigers) 
and Sikh organizations have established offices in the 
Netherlands, but they are monitored by the police and 
intelligence services and tolerated as long as they do not 
commit terrorist acts or other crimes in the Netherlands. 
On November 12, 2004, the National Crime Squad raided a 
camping farm suspected of housing a PKK training center (ref 
C) arresting more than 20 persons.  The PKK, now called 
Kongre-Gel, is not banned in the Netherlands, although it 
has been put on the EU list of terrorist organizations. 
 
N. PUBLIC STATEMENTS IN SUPPORT OF TERRORISM 
-------------------------------------------- 
16.  The Dutch Government has issued no public statements in 
support of a terrorist-supporting country on terrorism 
issues. 
 
O. TERRORIST ACTIVITY 
--------------------- 
17.  The AIVD intelligence service repeatedly warned about 
an ongoing radicalization process among Muslims in the 
Netherlands and the threat of terrorism.  The national CT 
coordinator has set up a national data system, the "Contra 
Terrorism Infobox (CTI), containing information on a core 
group of about 170 radical Muslims who have been put under 
24-hour surveillance.  Although Van Gogh's assassin Mohammed 
Bouyeri did not belong to this core group, he was related to 
the so-called Hofstad group, a network of individuals mainly 
residing in Amsterdam.  Samir Azzouz (see para 9 above) was 
part of this network.  The Dutch press reported in September 
confidential AIVD information about the group had been 
 
SIPDIS 
leaked to a suspect.  The national criminal investigation 
service is still investigating the case, in which an AIVD 
employee was arrested.  The press also reported the Spanish 
police was investigating possible ties between Bouyeri and 
the radical Muslim group suspected of preparing new attacks 
in Madrid.  The link appeared to be the fundamentalist 
Takfir wal Hijra movement.  On November 10, The Hague police 
arrested two other members of the "Hofstad" group, Jason W. 
and Ismail A., on suspicion of planning attacks on two 
parliamentarians, Amsterdam Mayor Cohen and Amsterdam 
Alderman Aboutaleb.  The National Prosecutor's Office in 
Rotterdam reported on December 3, 2004, that 12 people were 
being detained on suspicion of belonging to a terrorist 
organization, including six of Bouyeri's co-suspects. 
 
SOBEL 

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