US embassy cable - 04OTTAWA3374

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 OTTAWA 003374 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ASEC, PTER, MCAP, CA, EIAR, Border Patrol 
SUBJECT:  CANADIAN SENATE RELEASES REPORT OUTLINING DEFENCE 
AND SECURITY PROBLEMS 
 
 
1. (U)  Summary:  The Canadian Senate's Standing Committee 
on National Security and Defence released a report, "The 
Canadian Security Guidebook:  An Update of Security Problems 
in Search of Solutions" on December 8.  In the report, the 
committee cites eighty-six problems in the following areas: 
Border Crossings, Coasts, Canadian Forces, Structure and 
Coordination of Government, Ports, Airports, and Emergency 
Preparedness.  Among the primary recommendations of the 
Senate Committee are:  the Canadian Defence Budget requires 
an increase of $3.2 Billion USD per year, a judicial inquiry 
is required to examine the presence of organized crime in 
Canada's ports, mail and cargo should be scanned at 
airports, and all airport staff should be given complete 
background checks.  End summary. 
 
2. (U)  The Canadian Senate's Standing Committee on National 
Security and Defence released a report, "The Canadian 
Security Guidebook:  An Update of Security Problems in 
Search of Solutions" on December 8.  The report is the 
result of a three-year study of border security and defence 
issues that began in January 2001.  It is widely accepted 
that Senate Committee reports maintain a higher standard 
than those of the House of Commons for the following 
reasons:  1) Senators are considered very capable and 
experienced, 2) investigations are non-partisan, 3) Senate 
investigations are not over-exposed in the media, 4) 
Senators are free to invest time in research and analysis, 
and 5) Senators can work on a topic for years without 
election or reassignment. 
 
3. (U)  The Senators identified the following problems and 
made recommendations to address the issues. 
 
A.  Border Crossings 
 
 
-- Poor Threat Identification at the Border.  The committee 
recommends that the government invest in training and give 
access to police databanks to border personnel. 
 
-- Long CSIS Processing Times.  The committee recommends 
that CSIS be given more resources for screening refugee 
claimants. 
 
-- Undertrained Part-Time Customs Staff.  The committee 
recommends that all staff be trained to same standard, 
including part-time and summer students. 
 
-- Unsafe Border Posts.  The committee recommends that 
government not allow border posts to be manned by single 
officers. 
 
-- Arm Customs Officials.  The committee recommends that 
more evidence be collected for better debate on whether or 
not to arm border guards. 
 
B.  Coasts 
 
-- Canada's Vulnerable Coasts.  The committee recommends 
that the government turn its stated goals on maritime 
security into action. 
 
-- Coastal Radar - Off the Government's radar?  The 
committee recommends that the Canadian Forces be given the 
resources to expand its High Frequency Surface Radar 
Project. 
 
-- Inadequate Short-Range Coastal Patrols. The committee 
recommends that UAVs be deployed to regularly patrol the 
coastline. 
 
-- Inadequate Long-Range Coastal Patrols.  The committee 
recommends that government study the possibility of 
deploying UAVs to long range, extended time surveillance, 
including the Arctic. 
 
-- Canada's Toothless Coast Guard.  The committee recommends 
that the mandate of the coast guard be expanded and that it 
becomes an independent agency, not a branch of Fisheries and 
Oceans. 
 
-- No Notification Prior to Arrival.  The committee 
recommends that all ships should notify port authorities 48 
hours prior to arrival. 
 
-- Taking Incoming Vessels at Their Word.  The committee 
recommends that ships be compelled to report their port of 
departure and estimated time of arrival in Canada. 
 
-- Need Network for Maritime Warnings.  The committee 
recommends that Canada trade information on commercial 
shipping traffic with other, like-minded states. 
 
-- Unannounced Vessels.  The committee recommends that ships 
entering Canadian waters must have transponders to allow 
comparisons of declared and actual routes. 
 
-- Transponders for Smaller Vessels.  The committee 
recommends that all ships over 15 tonnes should be equipped 
with transponders. 
 
-- Dangerous Containers.  The committee recommends that CSIS 
officers be deployed to foreign ports to gather information 
on container shipping. 
 
-- Lack of Border Officials Abroad.  The committee 
recommends that Canadian Border Officials be moved from 
Newark and Tacoma, U.S.A. to world ports that are more 
likely to be the origin of a terrorist attack. 
 
-- Great Lakes Surveillance.  The committee recommends that 
the same standards set for high-seas shipping be applied to 
Great Lakes traffic. 
 
-- Surveillance of Coasts, Lakes and Rivers.  The committee 
recommends that the RCMP be given the resources to create a 
Marine Division to police major ocean inlets and the St. 
Lawrence Seaway. 
 
-- Training Delays.  The committee recommends that the 
government ensure sufficient resources to train staff to use 
high-tech equipment at Canada's ports. 
 
C.  Canadian Forces 
 
-- Budget Cuts.  The committee recommends a minimum defence 
budget increase of $4 billion CDN ($3.2b USD) 
 
-- Capital Acquisitions Falling Behind.  The committee 
recommends that budget increases be purpose driven in 
respect to capital procurement, and adjusted for inflation. 
 
-- Overheated Operational Tempo.  The committee recommends 
that the Canadian Forces be withdrawn from overseas duty for 
24 months. 
 
-- Too Few Personnel - Too High Tempo.  The committee 
recommends an increase in CF personnel to 75 000. 
 
-- Overdue Defence Policy Review.  The committee recommends 
that the government stop talking and complete its defence 
review. 
 
-- Lack of Large-Scale Training Exercises.  The committee 
recommends the return of regular battalion level exercises 
for the Canadian Forces. 
 
-- The Slow Move to Wainwright.  The committee recommends 
that the Canadian Maneuver Training Centre at Wainwright, 
Alberta be made operational as soon as possible. 
 
D.  Structure and Coordination of Government 
 
-- Need for Muscle at the Top.  The committee recommended 
the position of Deputy Prime Minister be made permanent and 
be attached to the Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness 
portfolio. 
 
-- Need for A Strong Team.  The committee recommends a 
resources increase for the Deputy Prime Minister to allow 
the position to absorb increased responsibility. 
 
-- Coordination at the Top.  The committee recommends the 
creation of a cabinet committee to address public safety. 
(completed) 
 
-- The Missing National Security Policy.  The committee 
recommended that the government adopt a national security 
policy. (completed) 
 
-- Need for Crisis Command Centres.  The committee 
recommends the creation of an emergency operations centre. 
(completed) 
 
 
-- Need for Canada-U.S. Coordination.  The committee 
recommended the creation of a Canada-U.S. planning group. 
(completed) 
 
-- Slow Progress at Information-Sharing. The committee 
recommends the rapid implementation of the Maritime 
Information Management & Date Exchange Study. 
 
-- Lack of Surveillance Coordination.  The committee 
recommends the establishment of surveillance and information 
coordination centres. 
 
-- Intelligence Community Understaffed.  The committee 
recommends increased resources for hiring intelligence 
analysts. 
 
-- Weak Overseas Intelligence.  The committee recommends 
that CSIS be mandated to upgrade overseas intelligence 
gathering. 
 
-- Information Fusion Failures.  The committee recommends 
that information-sharing centres be taken off the drawing 
board and made operational as soon as possible. 
-- Lack of Oversight.  The committee recommends that the 
government review whether or not organizations aside from 
CSIS or CSE require oversight. 
 
 
-- Coordination Lacking In Coastal Defence.  The committee 
recommends the creation of maritime surveillance centres. 
(pending) 
 
-- Allocations of Proceeds of Crime.  The committee 
recommends that confiscated goods be sold and the proceeds 
be directed back into border policing capabilities. 
 
-- Canada Too Inward Looking.  The committee recommends that 
the government study how other countries are upgrading their 
port security. 
 
E.  Ports 
 
--  Vulnerable Ports.  The committee recommends a public 
inquiry to investigate organized crime and how port police 
are recruited and trained. 
 
-- Organized Crime in Ports.  The committee recommends a 
compulsory background check for all port staff. 
 
-- Port Perimeters.  The committee recommends a review of 
all port perimeter security, including fencing and access 
points. 
 
-- Insufficient Police at Ports.  The committee recommends 
that the RCMP be given primary duty for ports and airports, 
with a resource increase to reflect the responsibility. 
 
 
-- Inadequate Container Screening.  The committee recommends 
that the Canadian Border Services Agency study requirements 
for x-ray and similar detectors and be given the resources 
to implement the recommendations. 
 
-- Inadequate Container Supervision.  The committee 
recommends that the government implement container security. 
The Flynn Method. 
 
-- Fragile Ferries.  The committee recommends that ferry 
traffic to Canada be required to provide passenger 
manifests. 
 
F.  Airports 
 
-- Screening Checked Baggage.  The committee recommends that 
all airports be equipped to scan all baggage for weapons and 
explosives. 
 
-- Inadequate Background Checks.  The committee recommends 
that all airport staff be given complete background checks. 
 
-- No Leadership on Airside Passes.  The committee 
recommends the establishment of a national pass system for 
accessing high-security areas in airports. 
 
-- Unprepared Air Crews.  The committee recommends that all 
aircrews be briefed and trained to help in terrorist 
situations. 
 
-- Armed Pilots?  The committee recommends that pilots in 
Canada not be armed. 
 
-- Alerting Air Crews.  The committee recommends that all 
flight crew be informed when an armed Aircraft Protection 
Officer is on the plane. 
 
-- Role of Aircraft Protection Officer.  The committee 
recommends that Aircraft Protection Officers have their 
powers increased to intervene in all problem situations on 
airplanes, including air rage. 
 
-- Vulnerable Cockpit Doors.  The committee recommends that 
all aircraft be equipped with double doors. 
 
-- Security Training for Maintenance Workers.  The committee 
recommends that ground crews be given training to assist in 
identifying problem situations. 
 
-- Responsibility for Airport Security Needs Clarifying - 
Who's in Charge?  The committee recommends that a single 
government agency be placed in charge of airport security, 
and that the agency should report to the RCMP. 
 
-- Known Shipper Makes Aircraft Insecure.  The committee 
recommends that the `Known Shipper' pass system be abolished 
and the same security requirements be made of all cargo 
companies. 
 
-- Lack of Security at Fixed-Base Operations.  The committee 
recommends that private aircraft be subject to the same 
security requirements as the major airlines. 
 
-- Small Airports are Weak Links in the Aviation Security. 
The committee recommends that passengers arriving from 
small, under equipped airports be subject to passenger 
screening. 
 
-- Access to Restricted Areas.  The committee recommends 
that that Canadian Air Transport Security Authority be given 
the mandate to search people and vehicles entering 
restricted areas. 
 
-- Airmail and Cargo Goes Unchecked.  The committee 
recommends that mail and cargo traffic be scanned. 
 
-- The Canadian Air Transport Authority Intelligence Gap. 
The committee recommends that the Canadian Air Transport 
Authority be given the resources to develop an intelligence 
branch. 
 
-- Airport Policing is Inadequate.  The committee recommends 
that all policing responsibility be placed in the hands of 
the RCMP (who can contract work to the Canadian Air 
Transport Authority). 
 
-- Lack of Transparency for Security Improvements.  The 
committee recommends that the Canadian Air Transport 
Authority should make a complete, annual report on its 
activities and expenditures. 
 
-- Air Travellers' Security Charge.  The committee 
recommends that the government completely account for the 
$12 CDN Air Travellers Security Charge. 
 
-- Unnecessary Secrecy.  The committee recommends that 
Transport Canada be transparent and no longer use secrecy as 
a blanket means to avoid scrutiny. 
 
-- Lack of Financial Transparency.  The committee recommends 
that the Auditor General be given the authority to examine 
airport authorities. 
 
G.  Emergency Preparedness 
 
-- Lack of Emergency Management.  The committee recommends 
that the government examine the ability of all government 
departments and agencies to function in an emergency. 
 
 
-- Emergency Ad Hockery.  The committee recommends that 
Health Canada present a report on its ability to respond to 
a disease outbreak. 
 
-- Inability to Deploy Police in an Emergency.  The 
committee recommends that the federal government negotiate 
with the provinces for the rapid transfer of police across 
the country in response to an emergency. 
 
-- No Role for Reserves.  The committee recommends that the 
Canadian Forces improve its ability to act as a first 
responder by more efficiently preparing the reserves for 
such a role. 
 
-- No Domestic Role for the DART.  The committee recommends 
that the CF Disaster Assistant Response Team be given a 
domestic role. 
 
-- Emergency Caches Mismanaged.  The committee recommends 
that Health Canada make information on emergency storage 
caches available to first responders and local authorities. 
 
-- Lack of Equipment for First Responders.  The committee 
recommends that the federal government should provide 
resources to purchase chemical, biological, radiological and 
nuclear response training and equipment. 
 
-- Institutional "Lessons Learned" Memory Bank.  The 
committee recommends that the Department of Public Safety 
and Emergency Preparedness act to keep its lessons learned 
files up to date, and that the information be completely 
shared with first responders across the country. 
 
-- Lack of Centralized Health Protection.  The committee 
recommends the establishment of a Health Protection and 
Promotion Agency to prepare for and manage events like the 
SARS crisis. 
 
-- Poor Collaboration.  The committee recommends that the 
government negotiate jurisdiction management agreements with 
Provinces and Municipalities. 
 
-- Emergency Public Communications.  The committee 
recommends that the government prepare a system for 
emergency communication with the public. 
 
-- Poor Communications Equipment.  The committee recommends 
that first responders across Canada be given uniform 
communications equipment. 
 
 
-- First Responders Out of Loop.  The committee recommends 
that local first responders be included in core planning. 
 
-- Weak Central Knowledge Base on Critical Infrastructure. 
The committee recommends that the government cooperate with 
provinces and municipalities to create a list of vital 
infrastructure. 
 
-- Lack of Leadership on Best Practices.  The committee 
recommends that the Minister of Public Safety and Emergency 
Preparedness take on a role of leadership across 
jurisdictions and provincial and municipal borders. 
 
-- Large Cities Should Be Helping Regions.  The committee 
recommends that additional resources be given to urban 
centres that is tied to their willingness to support rural 
areas in the event of a crisis. 
 
3. (U)  The government has started to act on some of the 
report's recommendations and the introduction outlines some 
of the successes of Paul Martin's Liberal Government.  These 
are:  the creation of the office of the Deputy Prime 
Minister Responsible for Public Safety and Emergency 
Preparedness, the release of the National Security Policy, 
the new maritime surveillance operations centres, and the 
acknowledgement that the Canadian Forces have been 
overstretched and that both resource increases and a period 
of rest are required. 
 
4. (SBU)  Note:  Canadian Senators are patronage appointees 
who hold their positions until retirement.  Calls for Senate 
reform are common.  However, it is the responsibility of 
Senate Committees to monitor, investigate and report on 
issues of interest to their mandate.  Senate committees 
strive to maintain their role as relevant investigators and 
reporters.  End note. 
 
5. (U)  The online version of the report can be found at the 
following hyperlink, 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/38/1/parlbus/commbus/se nate/com-e/defe- 
e/rep-e/rep03nov04-e.htm 
A PDF print version is located at, 
http://www.parl.gc.ca/38/1/parlbus/commbus/se nate/com-e/defe- 
e/rep-e/rep03nov04-e.pdf. 
 
CELLUCCI