US embassy cable - 04TELAVIV6387

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TEL AVIV 006387 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2014 
TAGS: PREL, OREP, PTER, KPAL, IS, ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS, GOI EXTERNAL 
SUBJECT: SHARON AND CODEL HAGEL/BIDEN: COMMITMENT TO 
WORKING WITH NEW PALESTINIAN LEADERSHIP 
 
Classified By: DCM Gene A. Cretz for reason 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary:  Prime Minister Sharon told Codel Hagel/Biden 
that he was fully committed to making peace with the 
post-Arafat Palestinian leadership, but that there would be 
no compromise on holding the the new leadership accountable 
for actions to combat the terrorist infrastructure.  While 
recognizing that Syria, Iran, and Hizbollah could undermine 
the new leadership, Sharon nonetheless offered little by way 
of understanding or sympathy toward the leadership's 
challenge.  Some in the Codel challenged Sharon to seize this 
unique opportunity to help Israel (and the international 
community) combat a major cause of international terrorism 
(the Israeli-Palestinian dispute) and rising anti-Semitism. 
Sharon reiterated concerns about Iran, thought Egypt could do 
more against smuggling, lauded the bilateral relationship 
with Jordan and argued that the USG should ratchet up 
pressure against Syria to stop its support for Iran and 
Hizbollah.  The Prime Minister said that Israel was prepared 
to take positive steps toward the new Palestinian leadership 
after the elections and believed that Europe and others also 
had important roles to play on the economic support front. 
End Summary. 
 
2. (C) Prime Minister Sharon led off his November 30 meeting 
with Codel Hagel/Biden (accompanied by Charge) by asserting 
that bilateral ties with the U.S. had never been stronger, 
reflected best in close strategic cooperation.  Acknowledging 
he faced challenges on the internal political front, Sharon 
nonetheless pledged that Israel was prepared to make genuine 
compromises for real peace with the new Palestinian 
leadership if that new order put a stop to terror.  He was 
fully committed to making peace despite major domestic 
struggles characterized by a "left" which has no power and a 
"right" which was totally opposed to his initiative.  The PM 
saw the current timeframe as a window of opportunity and 
reiterated Israeli acceptance of all of President Bush's 
initiatives and bilateral agreements over the past few years 
regarding the future of the region.  He noted that Israel had 
not openly interfered with the process of choosing 
presumptive Palestinian leaders and that secret contacts 
continued.  He asserted that Israel was prepared to help the 
Palestinians through the elections and that open talks would 
occur soon after.  Sharon had no "personal" problems with Abu 
Mazen or Abu Ala'a; everything depended on the steps they 
would take against terror.  As he did throughout the 
discussion, Sharon noted the dangers presented "from the 
outside" by the Iran/Syria/Hizbollah nexus and the impact it 
could have on the future, despite the best of Palestinian 
intentions and potential actions. 
 
3. (C) In response to a Codel member's comment that progress 
towards Israeli-Palestinian peace would have a dramatic 
impact on ending regional and international terrorism, Sharon 
quickly stated that Israel should not be held responsible for 
terrorism, asserting that it was the target of terror even 
prior to June 1967.  It was not correct to believe that 
terror would disappear if the Israeli-Palestinian dispute 
were solved.  The only thing that Israel was "responsible" 
for, he maintained, was defending its people.  Sharon went on 
to defend Israel's actions saying that there would have been 
more progress on the roadmap had there been a Palestinian 
partner.  Now, with Arafat's passing, a new opportunity had 
arisen to implement the alternative Gaza disengagement with 
cooperation with the Palestinian Authority.  Sharon could now 
envision cooperation between the security services against 
terror and cooperation to ensure that the Israeli population 
move from the West Bank settlements and Gaza did not take 
place under fire.  Sharon asserted that with the tens of 
thousands of armed people under the Palestinian Authority, 
they should be able to do what they need to do to oppose the 
terrorism in their midst.  Israel, in any case, will not bow 
or give in to pressure.  Subsequent to a successful Gaza 
disengagement, the roadmap could be implemented in stages. 
 
4. (C) On Iran, Sharon said the GOI watched the situation 
closely and was in close touch with the EU and USG.  Israel 
did not have to lead the effort, it should be an 
international one culminating in the UNSC.  While monitoring 
of Iranian nuclear facilities might postpone the timing of 
weaponization, the Iranians continued "to work" and Tehran 
had no desire to stop.  While praising the efforts of the UK, 
Germany, and France to craft the agreement with Iran, the PM 
believed the matter needed to be brought to the UNSC.   While 
moderate Iranians may exist, the religious element was 
overwhelming and the goal of the Iranian regime remained the 
elimination of Israel and the destruction of the Jewish 
people. 
 
5. (C) Sharon warned of the continuing dangers posed by 
Syria, Iran, and Hizbollah.  A Hizbollah armed with 13,000 
rockets, bolstered by a recalcitrant Syrian regime continuing 
to support Iran and refusing to expel Hamas and PIJ 
leaderships, made for a dangerous situation to which USG 
pressure needed to be brought to bear. Sharon asserted that 
most of the terrorism in the Palestinian territories was 
carried out by the Tanzim on orders from Damascus or 
Hizbollah.  The situation has quieted down because Israel has 
become more efficient, he said, but the danger continues. 
 
6. (C) Regarding Egypt, Sharon said that Cairo could do more 
to stop the smuggling of arms into Gaza, including anti-tank 
rockets allegedly coming into the Sinai via Lebanon.  The 
Egyptians were doing more than before on that score but they 
neglected the situation for so many years that the 
well-developed smuggling routes went on.  Neither Egypt nor 
the Europeans had a role now to help in furthering 
negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians.  If 
"balance" were needed the U.S. would provide it. 
 
7. (C) Relations with Jordan were close, even strategic, said 
Sharon.  The Jordanians are active in acting against terror. 
The bilateral cooperation was a direct result of how peace 
had changed the situation. 
 
8. (C) Senator Biden agreed that Sharon was now in a unique 
position of leadership vis-a-vis his own government to help 
Abu Mazen who faced two major problems: he lacked a natural 
constituency and, by Sharon's own admission, he faced 
external forces not of his doing that could undermine his 
authority.  Biden asserted that Sharon was well-placed to 
help on the electoral process and on cooperation on Gaza 
disengagement at a minimum to enhance Abu Mazen's 
credibility.  Biden also asked what the U.S. could do to 
help.  Sharon believed that Washington could help in 
minimizing the external challenges to Abu Mazen by warning 
Syria, Iran and Hizbollah to stop any actions that undermine 
Abu Mazen.  Damascus was feeling pressure already on Lebanon 
and Iraq; that needed to be ratcheted up significantly to 
make sure Assad got the point.  Sharon also thought that the 
international community should do its part by helping Abu 
Mazen and Fayyad through infrastructure projects, not just 
the provision of cash, which would "disappear."  For its 
part, Israel would help by continuing to be discreet in steps 
it took in support of Abu Mazen before the election.  Once 
that election took place, Israel was ready to help on the 
humanitarian side by lifting roadblocks and checkpoints (as 
long as steps were taken against the movement of terrorists) 
and in other cooperative agreements such as the one reached 
between the two tourism ministers on cooperating for the 
upcoming holiday season. 
 
9. (C) Senator Feinstein told Sharon that he now had the 
partner he had been seeking and needed to deal positively and 
proactively with the new Palestinian leadership not only for 
Israel's security sake, but to combat the rise of virulent 
anti-Semitism in Europe.  She also expressed the hope that 
the USG should also be playing a more active role in pushing 
the sides toward a solution.  Sharon replied by asserting 
that anti-Semitism attributed to Israeli actions is mere 
cover and convenience.  He noted that one easy step the 
Palestinians could take now even before tackling the more 
difficult task of dismantling the terrorist infrastructure 
would be to stop the incitement against Israel. 
 
10. (U) Codel staff cleared this message. 
 
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