US embassy cable - 04DJIBOUTI1596

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DJIBOUTI: SECURITY CONCERNS AT POST

Identifier: 04DJIBOUTI1596
Wikileaks: View 04DJIBOUTI1596 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Djibouti
Created: 2004-12-16 08:35:00
Classification: SECRET//NOFORN
Tags: PTER ASEC ABLD DJ
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T DJIBOUTI 001596 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
DEPT FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR DIPLOMATIC SECURITY 
FRANCIS X. TAYLOR FROM AMBASSADOR 
ALSO FOR, DS/DSS, DS/DSS/IP, DS/IP/AF, AF/EX, AF/E, OBO/NEC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2014 
TAGS: PTER, ASEC, ABLD, DJ 
SUBJECT: DJIBOUTI: SECURITY CONCERNS AT POST 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR MARGUERITA RAGSDALE, 
for reason 1.4 (D) and (G) 
 
1. (U) THIS IS AN ACTION MESSAGE, SEE PARAGRAPH 7. 
 
2. (C) Since the inception of the U.S. Military's base (Camp 
Lemonier) in 2002,  Djibouti has gained international 
notoriety as a staunch supporter of the Global War on Terror. 
 Although the arrival of the U.S. Military has brought with 
it several tangential benefits, including increased economic 
assistance primarily for education, health and infrastructure 
development, it has also brought with it a greater threat of 
terrorism from trans-national terrorist groups such as Al 
Qaeda and Al Ittihad Al-Islami (AIAI.) 
 
3. (C) Embassy Djibouti has worked diligently to monitor, 
report and mitigate the constant threat stream from the 
region in an effort to prevent another Nairobi or Dar es 
Salaam, or more recently, a Jeddah incident.  Our efforts 
have resulted in improved physical security and procedural 
awareness for security purposes, but the reality remains that 
we are far from being well protected. 
 
4. (S/NF) RSO Djibouti continues to work closely with Host 
nation police and U.S. Military personnel to provide an 
adequate response mechanism for the Mission in a crisis 
situation.  Unfortunately, Host Nation Police are 
inadequately trained, poorly equipped and highly unmotivated 
for such a task.  RSO is consistently addressing issues of 
reliability and procedures with Police leadership, but 
complacency, cultural challenges and extreme weather 
conditions all result in an ineffective first line of 
defense.  Camp Lemonier is fifteen minutes away by road and a 
contingent of Marines stand ready to assist the Mission, but 
the measure will only be effective as a reaction to an 
already devastating event.  We firmly believe that if an 
incident should occur, with a method of operation similar or 
parallel to what took place at Consulate General, Jeddah, the 
Djibouti Mission would suffer greater American and LES 
casualties. 
 
5. (S/NF) Djibouti remains a critical threat Post for 
trans-national terrorism and continues to receive threat 
information on a daily basis.  The compilation of information 
indicates, unequivocally, the potential for an attack to be 
carried out against the Mission and/or Camp Lemonier.  This 
is an impending threat that cannot be ignored.  The Camp 
continues to harden its perimeter, security procedures and 
internal structures and although the Embassy has made several 
improvements, it remains the softer and more attractive 
target for terrorists. 
 
6. (S/NF) Our Mission has tripled in personnel since 2002. 
Existing postage-stamp facilities on the Embassy compound are 
no longer adequate to provide a secure work place for 
American USG Officers and Locally Engaged Staff (LES) 
commensurate with the threat environment.  Office spaces, for 
Americans and LES, are spread throughout the compound over 
four buildings outside the Chancery the majority of which do 
not meet Forced Entry Ballistic Resistant Standards (FEBR.) 
Security features on these buildings have been improved, but 
can easily be defeated by a well trained and equipped 
terrorist or terrorist group. 
 
7. (C) A solution to the security dilemma we face is 
certainly to expedite development of the New Embassy Compound 
(NEC) destined to break ground in 2007 with an estimated 
completion date of 2010.  A purchase agreement for a NEC site 
was signed November 24, 2004 with the government of Djibouti. 
 The NEC will provide adequate and secure facilities needed 
to protect personnel in accordance with USG standards.  In 
the interim, I request that the Department deploy a team 
urgently to Djibouti to assess construction needs and cost 
for necessary and essential security upgrades for Embassy 
Djibouti with a view toward implementing these upgrades on an 
urgent basis.  Post's last technical and physical security 
upgrade was completed almost 5 years ago and many of the 
systems in place are now deficient or obsolete.  Post cannot 
handle any field expedient upgrades that are mandated given 
our limited budget and lack of technical expertise. 
 
 
8. (U) I am confident that you will provide a positive and 
quick response to this request. 
 
9. (U) My POC, for security, is RSO Marc Ramos at 
253-35-39-95 or 253-35-26-73 (secure). 
RAGSDALE 

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