US embassy cable - 04MANAMA1890

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAMA 001890 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR HADLEY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/11/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, KDEM, MARR, MOPS, PTER, UK, IR, IZ, BA 
SUBJECT: DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR HADLEY'S DECEMBER 
4 MEETING WITH UK FOREIGN POLICY ADVISOR SIR NIGEL SHEINWALD 
 
 
Classified by A/DCM Hallie H. Hahn for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
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Summary 
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1.  (C) Deputy National Security Advisor Hadley met with UK 
Foreign Policy Advisor to the Prime Minister Sir Nigel 
Sheinwald December 4 on the margins of the IISS Gulf Security 
Dialogue conference in Manama.  Sheinwald said that the UK 
government had solidified around the January 30 date for 
Iraqi elections.  He thought that PM Blair could accept a two 
to three week extension if the Iraqis could deliver something 
substantive in return, such as the participation of a major 
Sunni bloc.  Sheinwald expressed concern about being forced 
to make a public statement about the future of the coalition 
deployment in Iraq, and wondered if the coalition should get 
out in front and make a statement willingly.  DNSA Hadley 
thought that a statement would have to be very nuanced, and 
we stood by our position of staying as long as necessary and 
not one day more.  Any statement of a drawdown of forces 
should be evidence of success, not an exit.  Sheinwald 
requested USG information that would bolster the Dutch case 
to have the EU list Hizballah as a terrorist organization, 
and commented that the Iranians were already saying unhelpful 
things regarding the nuclear program negotiations.  End 
Summary. 
 
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Stick with January 30 
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2.  (C) UK Foreign Policy Advisor to the Prime Minister Sir 
Nigel Sheinwald told Deputy National Security Advisor Hadley 
December 4 that the UK government had solidified around the 
January 30 date for Iraqi elections.  In mid-December, the 
Iraqis would have to make a final decision about the timing, 
and Sheinwald wondered if it was worth giving them a few more 
weeks.  DNSA Hadley replied that pressure would come at two 
separate times:  first in mid-December, when the election 
lists are due, and second in late January, in the final 
run-up to the elections.  We can anticipate PM Allawi saying 
that he would need a few more months to convince some 
particular group of Sunnis to participate in the elections. 
This would put the IIG into a bind because a delay could win 
some Sunnis but lose a lot of Shia.  We would consider 
postponing the elections only if Allawi makes the request, he 
can deliver a major group of Sunnis before the election, and 
doing so will not alienate the Shia and Kurds.  But the 
President and PM Blair, added DNSA Hadley, will want to stick 
with January 30.  Sheinwald responded that Blair would accept 
a two to three week "once-and-for-all" extension if the 
Iraqis could deliver something substantive in return. 
However, a six month delay would "drive him crazy." 
 
3.  (C) Sheinwald raised the idea of a conference aimed at 
getting out the Sunni vote.  The latest he had heard was that 
if a conference took place, it would have to be inside Iraq. 
Sheinwald suggested that the U.S. and UK should encourage 
holding a conference, whether inside or outside Iraq.  DNSA 
Hadley replied that the Jordanians, Saudis, and others 
continued to talk about delaying the elections, but they 
should be focusing on encouraging the Iraqi Sunnis to 
participate. 
 
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Shoring Up the Coalition 
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4.  (C) Sheinwald said that the UK was concerned with 
perceptions of the cohesion of the coalition in Iraq.  The 
Dutch are holding firmly to their decision to depart.  DNSA 
Hadley said that the U.S. is dealing with the issue of how to 
shore up the coalition.  The U.S. approached the Ukrainians 
about their deployment, but they begged off, saying it is a 
decision "for another day."  The United States has some funds 
available to assist our allies, if necessary.  While some 
participants in the coalition may decrease their troop levels 
or depart, others may increase their numbers or new countries 
may join.  The numbers are important, but the mix in type of 
deployments is also.  The election results could prompt some 
partners to reconsider earlier decisions. 
 
5.  (C) Sheinwald expressed his surprise that the coalition 
presence had not become an issue in the Iraqi election 
campaign.  The coalition might have to say something publicly 
and it would be better to do so willingly and not be forced 
into a statement.  DNSA Hadley said that the formulation of 
an announcement would have to be very nuanced.  We have 
always said that the U.S. would stay as long as necessary and 
not one day more.  He suggested that we might emphasize the 
second half of that commitment and tie the drawdown of 
coalition forces to the development of the Iraqi security 
services.  Any statement the coalition makes should be 
presented as evidence of success, not an exit.  Sheinwald 
affirmed that the UK does not envision drawing down its 
forces during 2005, a time when the number of Iraqi forces 
will be growing.  This would mean a net increase in troops on 
the ground.  DNSA Hadley noted that General Abizaid has said 
that the Iraqi security services should be in the cities, not 
the coalition.  But the challenge with the Iraqis is the lack 
of leadership and experience.  We have to "stiffen" them 
through training.  Sheinwald commented that the Iraqis have 
courage but are unable to feed or transport themselves. 
 
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Case Against Hizballah 
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6.  (C) DNSA Hadley stated that the Dutch are thinking about 
moving within the EU to have Hizballah listed as a terrorist 
organization.  The United States supports this; Iran and 
terror is on our agenda.  Sheinwald requested that the U.S. 
share with the Netherlands any information it could release 
to help make the case against Hizballah in the EU.  Regarding 
EU negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program, he said that 
the two sides will establish working groups by mid-December. 
He noted, however, that the Iranians are already saying 
unhelpful things about resolving the issue within six months. 
 
MONROE