US embassy cable - 04MANAMA1884

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAMA 001884 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR HADLEY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/2014 
TAGS: PREL, MARR, MOPS, PGOV, KDEM, IZ, IR, BA 
SUBJECT: DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR HADLEY'S DECEMBER 
4 MEETING WITH IRAQI NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR QASSEM DAOUD 
 
Classified by A/DCM Hallie H. Hahn for reasons 1.4 (b) and 
(d). 
 
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Summary 
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1.  (C) Deputy National Security Advisor Hadley met with 
Iraqi National Security Advisor Qassem Daoud December 4 on 
the margins of the IISS Gulf Security Dialogue conference in 
Manama.  Daoud said that Iraq faced a number of crises: 
obtaining weapons quickly; procuring helicopters and armored 
vehicles; improving the doctrine of Iraq's armed forces; and 
moving funds quickly to rebuild destroyed areas.  On the 
elections, the two officials agreed that Iraq should maintain 
the January 30 date for holding elections.  A delay could 
alienate Iraq's Shia community, and Daoud said that Ayatollah 
Sistani was losing patience.  Daoud stated that Iraq could 
"live with" Iran for the time being, but that we need a 
strong joint position against Syria.  Iraq is considering 
raising the issue of Syrian support for the insurgency to the 
UN Security Council.  End Summary. 
 
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Controlling Terrorism Top Challenge 
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2.  (C) Iraqi National Security Advisor Qassem Daoud told 
DNSA Hadley December 4 that the number one issue facing Iraq 
is how to control terrorism inside the country.  Iraqi forces 
need the tools to fight the insurgency, which is growing 
faster than expected.  There are times when three policemen 
have to share one machine gun.  MNF-I General Patraeus is 
doing a great job, Daoud said, but "we need ten Patraeuses" 
to accelerate the movement of arms to Iraqi security 
services.  Daoud said that the IIG is exploring the 
possibility of procuring arms from Russia and Ukraine, where 
the right types of weapons are readily available.  Purchasing 
weapons from the United States, he said, is a complicated 
process.  He added that Iraq also had an imminent need for 
helicopters and armored cars. 
 
3.  (C) Daoud stated that Iraq needed to accelerate the 
formation of effective military units.  Though Iraq requires 
a professional fighting force, its first priority is to focus 
on the right doctrine.  The military structure under former 
regime was created to serve an individual (Saddam) and the 
Baath Party.  The new organization must serve the state and 
the people.  Training focusing on this philosophy will enable 
to military forces to remain cohesive in the face of attacks. 
 In the long run, Iraq needs a sophisticated army capable of 
fully defending its borders. 
 
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Bureaucracy Slows Reconstruction Funds 
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4.  (C) Daoud continued that he was concerned about the way 
reconstruction funds were funneled through the bureaucracy, 
which slows things down.  He said that Najaf was hit for ten 
days in August, and the city's residents still have not 
received money to rebuild their homes.  In Fallujah, there is 
ten times the amount of damage, and Iraq needs a procedure to 
quickly compensate people in cash, which empowers citizens to 
make their own decisions about spending the funds.  This 
would also help win their sympathy if not their loyalty.  If 
the authorities decide to repair someone's roof, the owner 
can complain that what he really needs is new plumbing.  Cash 
allows the owner to do what he wants and should result in 
fewer complaints. 
 
5.  (C) DNSA Hadley agreed that moving the funds 
expeditiously would promote economic activity and boost 
employment, and asked whether the funds should move through 
ministries, provincial governments, or municipal councils. 
Daoud replied that the IIG had created a ministerial 
reconstruction board that would develop options.  He 
suggested the creation of a loan board that would disburse 
funds to people rebuilding their homes.  In response to DNSA 
Hadley's question, Daoud said that provincial and municipal 
governments were not very effective yet, and they were often 
"unreasonable - some want their own treaties with Iran." 
This idea would be something to explore following the 
formation of a national government.  In the meantime, the IIG 
wants to centralize the process. 
 
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No Right to Postpone Elections 
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6.  (C) DNSA Hadley noted that Daoud had spoken with 
conviction in his speech at the IISS conference about 
sticking to the January 30 date for the elections.  DNSA 
Hadley warned that pressure would build for the IIG to delay, 
both in mid-December when the candidate lists are due and in 
January in the run up to the elections.  In our view, the 
elections should take place on January 30.  This is what the 
Iraqi people and the election commission want.  In addition, 
a delay could disillusion the Shia community.  Daoud said 
that he regarded the coming period as a "holy timetable." 
The election date must be respected in a very firm way, and 
no authority has the right to postpone the election. 
 
7.  (C) DNSA Hadley noted that when people say the election 
should be delayed, we reply that all sectors of Iraqi society 
should participate, including the Sunnis, so they should 
hurry up and get ready.  We are encouraging all those with 
influence to reach out to the Sunnis to urge them to 
participate.  Daoud responded that Ayatollah Sistani was the 
most important factor in the equation.  He has asked for 
elections three times and did not get them.  Daoud said that 
he believes Sistani is losing patience, and a delay in the 
election could lead to huge problems in the south.  DNSA 
Hadley asked what the IIG could do to encourage Sunni 
participation, noting that Jordan and Bahrain had both 
offered to host conferences on the elections.  Daoud said the 
most important thing the IIG could do to ensure full 
participation is stabilize the security situation in the 
population centers.  He stated that he was working to 
establish a national list of candidates made up of Sunni and 
Shia.  IIG President Yawar, PM Allawi, other ministers, and 
he are all on the list.  He suggested that this list would 
attract a reasonable number of Sunni voters. 
 
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Bombs Come from Syria, Not Iran 
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8.  (C) DNSA Hadley asked Daoud his opinion of the Sharm El 
Sheikh conference.  Daoud said he was happy with the results 
because the participants had recognized Iraqi sovereignty. 
He warned, however, that Iraq had problems with "the naughty 
neighbors," Iran and Syria.  Iraq could "live with" Iran for 
the time being, though Iranian intelligence was working 
inside Iraq.  The PM had formed a committee to develop a 
strategy to deal with Iran.  Daoud believes that Iraq needs 
close relations with both Iran and Turkey to balance these 
two strong neighbors, hence a strategy was needed for Turkey 
as well.  "There should be equal treatment.  I checked this 
with the Kurds.  Jalal (Talabani) was easier than Masud 
(Barzani)."  Iraq benefits from Iranian religious tourism, 
which brings in $2.5 billion per year.  With Turkey, water is 
the most important issue, and Iraq wants to create deep 
economic links with Turkey.  Allawi plans to visit both 
countries by early January. 
 
9.  (C) Regarding Syria, Daoud asserted that Iraq must stake 
a strong position.  Car bombs come from Syria, not Iran.  The 
PM and Foreign Minister Zebari are talking about raising 
Syrian meddling inside Iraq to the UN Security Council.  Iraq 
has solid documentation showing that Syrian intelligence 
officials are in direct contact with leaders of the 
insurgency.  Syria only understand force.  When Syria faced 
strong action from Turkey, it kicked Ocalan and the rest of 
the PKK out of the country.  Iraq needs the support of the 
United States to use the same tactic now against Syria.  He 
said that if UNSC action does not improve Syria's behavior, 
the international community should threaten Syria with 
economic sanctions, under Chapter VII. 
 
10.  (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
 
11.  (C) The NSC cleared this message. 
 
 
MONROE