US embassy cable - 04MANAMA1882

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MANAMA 001882 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR HADLEY 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/07/2014 
TAGS: PREL, MARR, KDEM, PGOV, SA, IR, SY, IZ 
SUBJECT: DEPUTY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR HADLEY'S DECEMBER 
5 MEETING WITH SAUDI FOREIGN MINISTER SAUD AL FAISAL 
 
REF: MANAMA 1814 
 
Classified by A/DCM Hallie H. Hahn for reasons 1.4 (b) and 
(d). 
 
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Summary 
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1.  (C) Deputy National Security Advisor Hadley met with 
Saudi Foreign Minister Saud Al Faisal December 5 on the 
margins of the IISS Gulf Security Dialogue conference in 
Manama.  DNSA Hadley encouraged Saud to reach out to Iraqi 
Sunnis to participate in the January 30 elections.  The 
Foreign Minister said that the SAG had done so but questioned 
whether the elections would result in a stable and secure 
government and country.  He recommended that the Iraqis start 
with municipal elections and allow local political leaders to 
establish credibility and form the nucleus of political 
parties.  Saud doubted Syria would allow itself to become an 
assembly, training, and financing point for the Iraqi 
insurgency, saying this is "too obvious."  Iran is fully 
operational inside Iraq, spreading its influence and 
establishing cells.  Saudi Arabia wants to normalize its 
relations with the U.S. while carrying out its internal 
reform process at deliberate speed, keeping in mind the 
nature of Saudi society.  DNSA Hadley pointed out that Saudi 
Arabia could do more, and said that Saudi Arabia's failure to 
include women voters in municipal elections had gotten a lot 
of attention in the U.S.  End Summary. 
 
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Reaching Out to Iraqi Sunnis 
---------------------------- 
 
 
2. (C) DNSA Hadley opened the meeting by expressing the 
President's intention to reach out to friends and allies in 
order to reach global solutions to global problems.  He said 
the President plans to expend political capital on issues in 
the Middle East, particularly Israel/Palestine, where he sees 
an opportunity to achieve a breakthrough.  He also will focus 
on advancing the cause of liberty in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
In response to the Foreign Minister's question, DNSA Hadley 
replied that the U.S. is encouraging contact with Sunni 
opposition groups in Iraq, noting that he had delivered this 
message to each of his interlocutors at the IISS Gulf 
Dialogue conference.  Saud stated that the Sunnis had ruled 
Iraq for 50 years, and the IIG now faced a difficult 
diplomatic battle in getting the Sunnis to join the political 
process.  He said that the SAG had spoken with those Sunnis 
it knows inside Iraq and encouraged them to participate in 
the elections. 
 
3.  (C) DNSA Hadley noted that some say the IIG should delay 
the January 30 elections to buy more time for outreach to the 
Sunni community.  He said that while the U.S. agrees that 
outreach is important, we are very worried about letting the 
date slip.  There could be a negative reaction from the Shia 
in Iraq and the political process could lose momentum.  The 
ForMin stated that the elections are a means not an 
objective, and the important thing is the result, which 
should lead to a stable and secure government and country. 
Holding the elections that accomplish nothing could lead to 
people to say that the U.S. had tried elections, failed, and 
now was free to carry out a "full fledged occupation." 
 
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Start With Municipal Elections 
------------------------------ 
 
4.  (C) Saud continued that Saudi Arabia believes a system of 
gradual elections would be best, starting with municipal 
elections.  Elected local officials could assist people in 
rebuilding their lives in peace and security.  As a result of 
this process, political leaders would emerge who would form 
the nucleus of political parties.  Then ordinary citizens 
would not want to lose what they had gained and would turn 
away from the insurgents.  This would allow for conditions to 
improve from the ground up.  Pushing for elections and 
knowing they would be boycotted would be a tragic mistake.  A 
reasonable person could do more damage than good by trying to 
accomplish the impossible.  DNSA Hadley replied that the U.S. 
believes that both a good election and a good outcome are 
possible.  He emphasized that those who spend their time 
advocating for a delay could better devote their energies to 
encouraging Sunnis to participate. 
5.  (C) Saud suggested that greater attention should be 
devoted to security at the Iraq-Saudi border.  He is 
concerned about spillover from Iraq to Saudi Arabia, saying 
the SAG does not want jihadists from Iraq joining the fight 
inside Saudi Arabia.  He asserted that the SAG controlled 
movements across the border from Saudi Arabia into Iraq, and 
requested a strong effort to stop movement from Iraq into 
Saudi Arabia.  He said that inside Saudi Arabia, Al Qaida is 
almost completely destroyed, but there are signs of a new 
leadership entering the Kingdom from Iraq. 
 
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Pressure Points on Syria 
------------------------ 
 
6.  (C) In this regard, DNSA Hadley stated that the Syrian 
border concerns us the most.  Syria had become an assembly, 
training, and finance point for foreign fighters.  We are 
getting only symbolic cooperation at the border.  The ForMin 
said that the U.S. could use several pressure points with the 
Syrians:  the SARG badly wants a relationship with the U.S.; 
it does not want to be at the "tail end" of peace agreements 
with Israel; and the "silly" way Syria handles its 
relationship with Lebanon could be used to motivate Syria in 
the war against terror.  He doubted whether Syria was in fact 
a center for the leadership of the Iraqi resistance.  This 
was "too obvious;" Syria played a very careful game in 
dealing with Palestinian rejectionists.  DNSA Hadley 
disagreed, saying that the SARG tolerated Hamas and PIJ in 
Damascus. 
 
7.  (C) In response to the DNSA's question, Saud said that 
Iran is confused about its nuclear program.  You get 
different answers each day about whether the program is for 
power or fuel enrichment.  The government says one thing, the 
parliament something else, and influential people like 
Khamenei and Rafsanjani provide another view.  Iran is "fully 
operational" inside Iraq, with hundreds of thousands of 
people and enormous amounts of money.  Iran is quietly 
spreading its influence and creating cells inside Iraq while 
the U.S. is engaged with the Sunni insurgency. 
 
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Desire to Normalize Bilateral Relations 
--------------------------------------- 
 
8.  (C) With regard to bilateral issues, the ForMin said that 
there was much press commentary in the U.S. about issues of 
concern in the relationship.  Although the 9/11 commission 
"completely exonerated" Saudi Arabia, the SAG continues to 
hear the same accusations as before.  He stated that Saudi 
Arabia wants to normalize our bilateral relations and not be 
forced to respond to what is written and said in the American 
media. 
 
9.  (C) Saud said that Saudi Arabia had done a lot in the war 
on terror and terrorism financing, but this goes unrecognized 
in the U.S.  He stated that the Kingdom's reforms may not be 
theatrical, such as, hypothetically, appointing a woman as 
president of the Shura Council, but the country is moving in 
the right direction, at deliberate speed, keeping in mind the 
nature of Saudi society.  For example, the SAG did not say 
Yes or No to women participating in municipal council 
elections, but it permitted women to be elected to chambers 
of commerce, where they now work side by side with men.  The 
government does not force solutions on the people, but 
creates the environment for them to take their own decisions. 
 The government intends to open to debate all subjects that 
formerly were taboo.  He asserted that ten years ago, Saudi 
Sunnis believed that Shia inside the country "were devils." 
Now shaikhs from the two sects talk and eat dinner together. 
Saud cautioned that Saudi reforms would proceed at a 
sustainable, "deliberate" rate and that Saudi Arabia would 
never look like the West.  Moving faster on Shia rights was 
just too hard.  In a comment revealing much about how Saudi 
Arabia's Wahhabi heartland regards its Shia co-religionists, 
the ForMin said that forcing Nejdis to accept the validity of 
Shia Islam "would be like the President bringing Michael 
Jackson to the Midwest and insisting he be everyone's role 
model." 
 
10.  (C) The Foreign Minister said that Saudi Arabia's rate 
of population growth had declined to 2.2 percent, a normal 
rate of increase.  The expat workforce inside the country was 
down to six million.  Per capita income rose from $7,000 to 
$11,500, and the poverty that was talked about earlier is 
"not there."  Unemployment is down from millions to tens of 
thousands. 
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Do What is Workable 
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11.  (C) DNSA Hadley stated that from the U.S. perspective, 
the SAG had combated terrorism seriously since the May 2003 
Riyadh attacks.  We were less understanding about what Saudi 
Arabia had done to combat terrorism financing.  Saudi 
Arabia's failure to include women voters in municipal 
elections had gotten a lot of attention in the U.S.  Saud 
replied that the SAG would always choose to do what was 
workable.  The majority of Saudis do not want to change the 
role of women.  In addressing reform, Saudi Arabia must move 
with alacrity but carefully, without breaking social cohesion 
and maintaining societal consensus.  But when the time comes 
for real decisions, the SAG does the right thing.  For 
example, the government four years ago directed that males 
and females receive the same education, over the objection of 
the religious establishment.  The SAG has removed from the 
mosques those who preach hate.  But the government avoids 
taking symbolic steps with no real impact. 
 
12.  (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
 
13.  (C) The NSC cleared this message. 
 
MONROE