US embassy cable - 04COLOMBO1997

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 COLOMBO 001997 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR SA/INS 
PACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/15/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, PTER, CE, LTTE - Peace Process, Political Parties 
SUBJECT: CO-CHAIR AMBASSADORS ASK PRESIDENT TO REIN IN 
JVP'S ANTI-PEACE PROCESS CAMPAIGN 
 
REF: A. COLOMBO 1948 
 
     B. COLOMBO 1980 
     C. STATE 254578 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Jeffrey J. Lunstead.  Reason 1.4 (B, D). 
 
 1. (C) SUMMARY: Three Tokyo Co-chair Ambassadors (US, 
Japan and Netherlands) met President Kumaratunga December 
14 to raise anti-peace process and anti-Norway campaign 
of government coalition partner JVP and to ask President 
to take action against JVP. Kumaratunga agreed JVP 
behavior regarding Norwegians was unacceptable, but did 
not see them as a threat to the peace process. The 
problem was not the JVP, but the inflexible position of 
the LTTE. Ambassador said the JVP campaign was actively 
undermining the peace process and the Norwegian role, and 
government needed to counteract it. President said she 
personally was building support for the peace process. 
Kumaratunga predicted LTTE might unilaterally declare 
independence or an interim self-governing administration. 
END SUMMARY 
 
2. (C) As stated in reftels, three Tokyo Co-chair 
Ambassadors (US, Japan, and Netherlands) met with 
President Kumaratunga evening of December 14 to discuss 
the anti-Norway and anti-peace process campaign of the 
Janata Vimukta Peramuna (JVP), the second-largest 
component of the governing alliance. Fourth Co-chair 
Norway did not participate in the meeting since it would 
discuss in part Norway's role. Kumaratunga was 
accompanied by Foreign Minister Kadirgamar and Peace 
Secretariat head Jayantha Dhanapala. 
 
SIPDIS 
 
JVP Problem 
----------- 
 
3. (C) Japanese Ambassador Suda led off meeting by 
presenting points as stated in ref b, specifically, that: 
 
--The Co-chairs are grateful for the President's 
commitment to the peace process. 
 
--They are very disturbed by the JVP's actions, 
including 
 
Orchestrated campaign against the peace process. 
 
Actions in Trincomalee that led to increased 
tensions and violence. 
 
Attacks on Norway's role and threatening 
demonstrations against Norwegians. 
 
--At the same time no organized campaign by 
Government in support of peace process. 
 
--Urge President to address this issue. 
 
--Impression created is that peace process is being 
held up by internal Sri Lankan politics.  In such a 
situation, Co-chair interest will decrease, attention 
will 
shift elsewhere.  GSL should not assume Co-chairs and 
others will be ready to re-engage at some point in 
the future. 
 
--Co-chairs high-level officials may meet in mid- 
January.  It would be useful if there were some 
progress before then. 
 
Attacks on Norway Bad, but JVP Not Against Peace 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
4.  (C) Kumaratunga responded that the JVP attacks on 
Norway's role and demonstrations at Norwegian Embassy 
were unacceptable, and that she had told the JVP so. The 
Government, in the form of the Foreign Minister, had also 
defended the Norwegian role in Parliament. She stated, 
however, that the JVP was not against the peace process. 
They accepted it, but insisted that negotiations should 
not be resumed based solely on the LTTE's Interim Self- 
Governing Administration (ISGA) proposal. That position 
was no different from her government's.  Kumaratunga then 
discoursed at length on the various proposals to get the 
peace talks going, and complained that the LTTE had 
showed no flexibility at all. 
 
5.  (C) Kumaratunga detailed the various excesses which 
the LTTE had committed since the cease-fire agreement 
went into effect: construction of illegal camps 
around Trincomalee, abduction of child soldiers, and 
killings of political opponents. The "Norwegian-led" Sri 
Lankan Monitoring Mission (SLMM) was doing nothing about 
these violations, she said. Any self-respecting 
government, she continued, would insist that these 
problems be rectified before talks started. In Northern 
Ireland, she said, the IRA had been required to 
decommission its arms, but the LTTE had not given up a 
single weapon. Nonetheless, the Government was willing to 
go ahead with talks--but the LTTE had to show some 
flexibility. The Government might have a new proposal "in 
a week or two" to try to break the stalemate. Kumaratunga 
said that the LTTE used the JVP as an excuse not to come 
to talks. If that excuse disappeared, the LTTE would find 
another excuse. 
 
6.  (C) Ambassador interjected that we were under no 
illusions about the brutal nature and inflexible 
negotiating stance of the Tigers, and that we knew--and 
had stated publicly--that she had shown flexibility. The 
subject we had come to discuss, however, was not the 
LTTE, but the JVP and their negative effect on the peace 
process.  Our impression was that the JVP did not accept 
the process; in fact, it was working actively to 
undermine it. The JVP's attacks on the Norwegians did not 
just call into question the Norwegian role, but also the 
integrity of the process itself. We observed the JVP 
campaigning actively against the peace process around the 
country, but there did not seem to be a counter-campaign 
by the Government to build support for the peace process. 
 
7. (C) The President seemed a bit put out by this. She 
responded that she personally was building up the process 
wherever she spoke, but she had told the other Ministers 
not to discuss it. That was how things are done in Sri 
Lanka, she said. Ambassador noted the irony that US and 
other donors had active programs to build understanding 
of and support for peace process among civil society, but 
that the Government did not. 
 
LTTE Plans 
---------- 
 
8. (C) Japanese Ambassador asked President what she 
thought of Prabhakaran's Heroes Day Speech and 
specifically his comment that the LTTE would resume the 
freedom struggle if the ISGA was not implemented. 
Kumaratunga said she did not think the LTTE intended to 
resume the war. However, they might issue a "Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence" (UDI) or a "Unilateral 
Declaration of ISGA." They would then blockade the Sri 
Lankan military bases in the North and East, which would 
put the GSL in a difficult spot, and probably result in 
the resumption of hostilities. This could also happen 
even if the talks resumed. After several fruitless 
rounds, the LTTE would walk away and go for one of these 
options. 
 
9. (C) Ambassador thanked the President for seeing the 
group, and said that we remained convinced that the JVP 
did pose a threat to the peace process which needed to be 
dealt with. Foreign Minister Kadirgamar responded that 
the JVP issue was a "red herring," i.e., that the JVP was 
just an excuse for the LTTE, and the LTTE behavior was 
the problem. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
10. (C) The President and Kadirgamar accepted that JVP 
behavior and comments regarding the Norwegians had been 
unacceptable, but seemed to regard that as a past issue. 
The Government's lukewarm endorsement of the Norwegians 
does not really address this issue. Kumaratunga was not 
willing to acknowledge that the JVP's current behavior is 
a threat to the peace process. It is true that JVP 
actions may be an excuse for the LTTE. It is also true 
that JVP actions--and Government unwillingness to insist 
that the JVP stop them--can also convince the LTTE that 
the Government does not have a single agreed policy or, 
worse yet, that the President is allowing the JVP to 
carry on in order to sabotage the process. Moreover, the 
JVP campaign can have a negative effect in the South, 
raising doubts in the minds of Southerners about the 
peace process. If the President does want to get back to 
negotiations or put forward new proposals, she may find 
that the JVP has cut the ground out from under her. 
 
11. (U) As stated ref (B), Japanese Embassy issued 
following press release morning of Aug 15. We have posted 
it on our website with Tamil and Sinhala translations. 
 
 
BEGIN TEXT 
The representatives of three of the four Co-chairs 
of the Tokyo Donors Conference (Japan, EU and US) 
called on Her Excellency President Kumaratunga on 
December 14.  The Co-chair representatives 
reaffirmed their support for the President's efforts 
to resume peace talks.  They expressed deep concern 
about the ongoing JVP-led actions against the peace 
process in Sri Lanka and the Government of Norway's 
efforts as facilitator of that process.  The 
representatives expressed bewilderment that a member 
party of the UPFA could engage in such a campaign in 
absolute contradictions of the clearly stated 
position of the President and the Government that 
they endorse and support the Norwegian role. The 
representatives urged the President to address this 
problem.  The representatives reiterated to 
President Kumaratunga their full support for the 
peace process in Sri Lanka and Norway's efforts as a 
facilitator. 
 
ATMOSPHERICS 
------------ 
 
12. (C) It is difficult to convey the atmosphere of this 
meeting, but we will try. Originally set for 5 p.m., 
Ambassadors were told to wait and then to come at 7 p.m. 
President arrived at 8:15, apologizing that she was in an 
emergency meeting to deal with flooding in North and East 
which had left 120,000 people homeless. Meeting then 
lasted until 10:30, interrupted at various points by 
arrival of fresh-roasted cashews, glasses of wine 
(President Kumaratunga prefers red) and cheese toasts. 
This seemed to be the President's dinner. The President's 
golden retriever "Cookie" was not interested in either 
the cashews or the cheese toasts. Kumaratunga seemed 
content to chat all evening, but Ambassador broke the 
meeting up at 10:30. 
 
DISCUSSION WITH FOREIGN MINISTER 
-------------------------------- 
 
13. (C) Ambassador phoned Foreign Minister Kadirgamar 
following day, December 15, to reinforce points. 
Ambassador said that we did not consider the JVP behavior 
a "red herring". An outside observer would see the JVP 
make one statement on the peace process and the 
Norwegians and the Government make a contradictory 
statement. The result would be an impression that there 
is no consensus in the ruling coalition. Kadirgamar 
acknowledged this, but said that he had been working with 
the JVP on a common position on the peace process. This 
had almost been completed, but had been stalled when JVP 
elder statesman Somawansa Amarasinghe had emergency heart 
bypass surgery. 
LUNSTEAD