US embassy cable - 04RANGOON1587

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SPDC REMOVES ASSK'S PERSONAL BODYGUARDS FROM COMPOUND

Identifier: 04RANGOON1587
Wikileaks: View 04RANGOON1587 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Rangoon
Created: 2004-12-15 10:34:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PINS PREL KDEM BM ASSK Human Rights
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 RANGOON 001587 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, PINS, PREL, KDEM, BM, ASSK, Human Rights 
SUBJECT: SPDC REMOVES ASSK'S PERSONAL BODYGUARDS FROM 
COMPOUND 
 
REF: A. RANGOON 1530 
     B. RANGOON 1508 (NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
1. (C) Summary:  According to the NLD, in the pre-dawn hours 
of December 14 GOB police officials required the departure of 
ASSK's entire contingent of personal bodyguards from the 
compound where she resides under house arrest.  In recent 
weeks, the GOB has increasingly restricted access to ASSK and 
the NLD is concerned that it no longer has the ability to 
monitor her status on a daily basis.  The NLD plans to issue 
a statement holding the GOB fully responsible for ASSK's 
health and welfare.  We do not see any evidence that ASSK 
faces imminent danger, but the departure of her bodyguard is 
troubling and should the situation persist, appropriate 
Washington interventions and/or statements may be advisable. 
End Summary. 
 
2. (C) On December 14 NLD Spokesman U Lwin requested a 
meeting to inform us that the GOB had issued orders requiring 
the departure of Aung San Suu Kyi's entire personal bodyguard 
(a contingent of 13 young, loyal male supporters who are not 
NLD members) from the University Avenue compound where she is 
held under house arrest. 
 
3. (C) According to U Lwin, the Burmese Police Special Branch 
(SB) officers who recently joined military intelligence (MI) 
in overseeing the compound have become increasingly rigid 
toward ASSK and her supporters (ref B).  In late November, 
authorities limited ASSK's personal physician to thrice 
weekly visits, a reduction from the daily access he has had 
since she was placed under house arrest in September 2003 
(ref A).  In subsequent weeks, the physician has been subject 
to random searches and interrogation.  More recently (U Lwin 
did not specify when), SB officials informed ASSK that she 
would have to reduce her personal bodyguard from thirteen 
members to six.  ASSK refused because, U Lwin explained, the 
entire contingent is required to fill shifts for 24-hour 
coverage at the compound. 
 
4. (C) In the pre-dawn hours of December 14, SB officers 
demanded that the NLD send a mid-level party member to ASSK's 
house to escort the members of the bodyguard, who were 
present at the time, off the compound.  The NLD party member 
then drove the bodyguards to a Rangoon bus depot where most 
of them continued on to their hometowns (it is illegal to 
stay in Rangoon overnight at a private residence without 
registering with authorities).  GOB security personal, 
according to U Lwin, will henceforth prohibit access to the 
compound by any members of her personal bodyguard. 
 
5. (C) With the departure of the personal bodyguards, only 
two supporters remain inside the compound with ASSK: a 
trusted female NLD member who serves as a house manager and 
the NLD member's daughter who helps out with housekeeping.  A 
combination of SB and MI personnel continue to maintain a 
presence outside the compound, which sits on the edge of a 
small lake in central Rangoon. 
 
6. (C) According to U Lwin, the NLD is drafting a statement, 
which the party plans to issue o/a December 16, that 
expresses serious concern about the situation at ASSK's 
compound and holds the GOB fully responsible for her health 
and welfare.  The NLD is concerned that with the departure of 
ASSK's personal bodyguard, and the restrictions imposed on 
her physician, the party no longer has the ability to monitor 
her status on a daily basis.  In addition to informing the 
U.S. mission about the new development, NLD leaders have also 
spoken to several other Rangoon diplomats as well as U.N. 
Special Envoy Razali's local liaison. 
 
7. (C) Comment:  Emboffs have arranged to meet with NLD CEC 
members on December 16 for an update on the situation and, in 
the interim, we are seeking an opportunity to discuss with 
ICRC the need for that organization to press for regular 
access to ASSK (as far as we know, the ICRC has not been able 
to see ASSK for at least a year).  Furthermore, the COM has 
previously requested meetings with the Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs and Home Affairs, at which we had planned to raise a 
number of issues including once again our concerns about 
ASSK's prolonged detention.  We will renew our requests for 
those meetings and, should they materialize, we will also 
address the December 14 development at her compound.  At this 
point, the NLD CEC has not requested assistance or action 
from the USG.  We do not see any evidence that ASSK faces 
imminent danger, but the departure of her bodyguard is 
troubling and should the situation persist, we may recommend 
appropriate Washington interventions and/or statements.  End 
Comment. 
 
MARTINEZ 

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