US embassy cable - 04BANGKOK8464

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 008464 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/BCLTV, DRL; HQ USPACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, BM, TH, BURMA 
SUBJECT: THAI READOUT ON PM THAKSIN MEETING WITH SPDC 
CHAIRMAN THAN SHWE 
 
REF: A. RANGOON 1569 
     B. E-MAIL O/I EAP/BCLTV-EMBASSY BANGKOK 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Robert Clarke.  Reason:  1.4 (b) and 
 (d) 
 
1. (C) Summary.  In public remarks about his December 9 
meeting in Rangoon with SPDC Chairman Than Shwe and other 
Burmese leaders, PM Thaksin said that he found "reasonable 
and convincing" their assessment of the challenges they face 
from ethnic minorities, and seemed to imply that he also 
accepted their explanation of why they continue to keep NLD 
leader Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK) under house arrest.  MFA 
official Damrong Kraikruan, who took notes in the PM's 
meeting, told us that he doubted that Thaksin intended to 
leave such an impression about ASSK's continued detention. 
Damrong's readout of the Thaksin-Than Shwe discussion 
emphasized that Thaksin had raised ASSK's detention and was 
firm in delivering the international community's message that 
the SPDC must move towards dialogue and "real democracy." 
Thaksin reportedly engaged the Burmese in a general 
discussion about democracy, and was told that the SPDC would 
pursue its Road Map.  End Summary. 
 
THAKSIN'S RADIO ADDRESS ON HIS VISIT TO BURMA 
 
2. (SBU) PM Thaksin used part of his regular December 11 
radio address to comment on his meeting two days before in 
Rangoon with SPDC Chairman Than Shwe and other Burmese 
leaders (see para 10 below for text).  He spoke 
extemporaneously, recounting that he told the Burmese he did 
not want to interfere in their domestic affairs, but also 
stating that he had conveyed concerns of Western democratic 
countries about Burma's need to shift to a democratic path. 
After summarizing part of the Burmese response, Thaksin noted 
that he asked about ASSK's detention and then paraphrased 
responses by Than Shwe and Vice Chairman Maung Aye claiming 
that "chaos" had followed her previous releases and stressing 
that the SPDC faced dangerous threats to Burma's national 
unity from numerous "ethnic minorities."  Thaksin, claiming 
his own experience with "these movements," said he found the 
Burmese reasoning both "reasonable and convincing," a 
statement which many interpreted as "endorsing" the SPDC 
leadership's explanation of its decision to extend ASSK's 
house arrest.  That was certainly the interpretation put on 
Thaksin's remarks by the English-language Bangkok Post 
newspaper, which ran a December 12 front-page article 
claiming that Thaksin had said he "found Burma's reasons for 
keeping opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi under house arrest 
convincing."  (Note:  Thaksin did not make a direct statement 
along these lines in his remarks.  End Note.) 
 
MFA OFFICIAL PROVIDES CONFIDENTIAL READOUT ON THAKSIN-THAN 
SHWE MEETING 
 
3. (C) MFA official Damrong Kraikruan, the only Thai official 
besides PM Thaksin and FM Surakiart to sit in (as notetaker) 
on the Rangoon meeting with Than Shwe and other SPDC leaders, 
gave Polcouns a readout on December 13.  Asked about the 
Prime Minister's radio address and the Bangkok Post article, 
Damrong claimed that Thaksin had been roughly relating the 
assessment by both Than Shwe and Maung Aye of the dangers 
they felt they faced from ethnic minorities.  He said that 
Thaksin had indeed been impressed by the passion and 
sincerity with which both top SPDC leaders had repeatedly 
made this argument.  Damrong added that, in his view, the 
Prime Minister was endorsing only that part of the SPDC 
"reasoning" and that it was a misinterpretation of his 
remarks to claim that he was also agreeing that ASSK's 
continued house arrest was justified. 
 
4. (C) Asked for specifics on the exchanges, Damrong said 
that Thaksin had raised ASSK's detention and that Than Shwe, 
speaking in Burmese, had complained that ASSK never 
compromised and said that, as a politician, one should know 
that it was "impossible to work with her."  Damrong said that 
Than Shwe had then launched into an argument (reportedly 
repeated 3 times) -- and joined vigorously by Maung Aye -- 
that Burma was tired of the "chaos" that followed each of 
ASSK's previous releases as Burma's many ethnic minorities 
who want to "separate" from Burma tried to take advantage of 
opportunities presented.  Than Shwe and Maung Aye said, 
according to Damrong, that the SPDC had to keep Burma united 
and prevent it from being torn apart by the ethnic minorities. 
 
5. (C) Damrong said that PM Thaksin had also tried to engage 
Than Shwe on the need for democratization and, in a situation 
of "globalization," the need for Burma to listen to the rest 
of the world and to explain its actions, "or nobody will 
understand."  Damrong said that Thaksin spoke of the 
international community's call for genuine political dialogue 
and reconciliation, and said that it should not be ignored. 
He also told the Burmese that Thailand was ready to assist 
"if Myanmar (Burma) is open about the process."  Damrong said 
that a specific "Bangkok Process" meeting was not mentioned. 
 
6. (C) Damrong said that Thaksin had noted that, in order to 
obtain the confidence of the international community, Burma 
did not have to stick to a particular form of democracy as 
"democracy comes in many forms."  The Prime Minister had 
added, Damrong said, that the important thing was that the 
form was "really democratic."  Pressed on what Than Shwe and 
Maung Aye said in response, Damrong said they seemed to agree 
with the point but said they intended to move forward on 
their Road Map, including reconvening the National Convention 
in February, 2005.  They claimed to have invited ASSK and the 
National League for Democracy (NLD) to participate, despite 
her "denials."  (Note:  Per Embassy Rangoon, ASSK actually 
refused to participate in the May 2004 National Convention on 
SPDC terms, and has not been invited to the upcoming National 
Convention.  End Note.)  Damrong said that the Burmese 
leaders had even claimed they were "building democracy," 
although he noted that Than Shwe had twice used the term 
"guided democracy." 
 
7. (C) Asked for Thai conclusions about the results of the 
Thaksin-Than Shwe meeting, Damrong said that the Thai Prime 
Minister had "delivered the international community's 
message," but he (Damrong) felt that the main Burmese 
response was negative:  "(Rangoon) has no willingness to free 
ASSK."  They will go ahead with the Road Map.  He said that 
the discussion on bilateral issues was "mixed."  However, 
Maung Aye, who Damrong confirmed was "unusually talkative, 
perhaps reflecting a new status in the top leadership," had 
been enthusiastic about increasing tourism.  The Burmese had 
also agreed that constructing the road through Burma from 
Thailand to India should continue.  Thaksin, Damrong said, 
had sought tighter Burmese measures against drugs and had 
been pleased that Than Shwe and Maung Aye both said they were 
trying to be responsive to his request for arrest of two 
specific drug figures.  Damrong said that Thaksin had 
mentioned in passing to Than Shwe that Thailand hoped to see 
resumption of the SPDC-KNU negotiations, and had discussed 
this subject in more depth with PM Soe Win. 
 
8. (SBU) Damrong said that the Burmese side in this meeting 
had started out larger but was cut down to the "top five" 
SPDC leaders, including Than Shwe, Maung Aye, Soe Win, 
Secretary 1 Thein Sein, and General Thura Shwe Mann.  PM 
 
SIPDIS 
Thaksin had limited the Thai participants to three:  himself, 
FM Surakiart, and Damrong as notetaker. 
 
9. (C) Comment:  PM Thaksin and FM Surakiart, the architects 
of Thai policy towards Burma, continue to try to keep a 
balance between their "constructive engagement" approach to 
Rangoon -- which they see as the best means to resolve unique 
Thai-Burmese cross-border problems -- and their desire for 
credibility with the U.S. and other countries concerned about 
SPDC repression.  During Ambassador Johnson's December 8 
farewell call on FM Surakiart, the Foreign Minister went out 
of his way to preview that Thaksin would raise "hard issues" 
with Than Shwe, including the release of ASSK and political 
dialogue and democratization issues.  By all accounts, the 
Thais believe that Thaksin did, in Damrong's phrase, "deliver 
the international community's message."  But it also comes 
through in the accounts of Thai diplomats in Rangoon (Ref A) 
and that of Damrong that Thaksin's exchanges with the SPDC 
were not as forceful and we would have liked.  End Comment. 
 
TEXT OF PM THAKSIN'S BURMA COMMENTS IN HIS DECEMBER 11 RADIO 
ADDRESS 
 
10. (U)  Text source is a Thai language text provided by the 
Public Relations Department, Office of the Prime Minister, 
from a tape of the address.  Translation from the Thai 
language by Embassy Bangkok.  Begin Text: 
 
"On Thursday, December 9, I traveled to Myanmar (Burma) to 
attend the Fourth World Buddhist Summit in Rangoon.  The 
Laotian Prime Minister also attended.  I arrived there at 
0800 hours and departed at 1430 hours on the same day. 
 
I had discussions with Burmese leaders.  I met with Senior 
General Than Shwe, Chairman of the SPDC.  Vice Senior General 
Maung Aye was also present, together with Prime Minister Lt. 
General Soe Win, Lt. General Thein Sein, and other SPDC 
officials, who attended the meeting briefly. 
 
Foreign Minister Surakiart joined me in the talks.  Our 
discussion was a good, sincere, and straight-forward exchange 
on many issues. 
 
I opened the discussion by telling them that, since we 
(Thailand and Burma) are neighbors, and if you are confident 
in my sincerity toward the Burmese people and the Government 
of Burma over the past four years, I urge you to talk about 
all topics in a straight-forward manner.  I have the 
etiquette not to intervene in your domestic matters.  But I 
am expected by international community to push the Government 
of Burma for a shift to a path towards democracy at the 
soonest moment.  I thus have to do this properly.  While I 
will not interfere in your domestic matters, at the same time 
I must convey the concerns of Western democratic countries 
for you to hear, so that you will consider what you should or 
should not do. 
 
The subsequent exchange was sincere on many issues.  I am 
able to recount some of what was discussed, but not 
everything. 
 
The Burmese insist, first, that they will not retreat. 
Second, they said they are moving ahead on the seven 
proposals in their Road Map towards democracy, as they have 
outlined them.  They will hold the Second National Council 
Convention in February.  Moreover, they informed me that they 
had invited Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK) to participate, but ASSK 
subsequently denied having ever been invited.  (Embassy Note: 
 As in para 6 above, this appears to be a reference to ASSK's 
refusal to participate in the May 2004 National Convention on 
SPDC terms, and not to any invitation to the planned February 
National Council Convention.  PM Thaksin and the Thai MFA 
apparently did not catch the nuances.  End Note.) 
 
I then asked them about the continued detention of ASSK. 
They said ASSK was released three times.  But whenever she 
was released, the country fell into chaos.  They said that 
one should feel sympathy for Burma.  They said their country 
has over 130 minority groups, with some areas having as many 
as 33 ethnic groups living in them.  If order (i.e. security) 
is not properly set up in advance, they believe that the 
leaders of these many ethnic groups will declare themselves 
to be president or other title of leadership, leading to a 
breakup of Burma.  Burma, in their view, will be disorderly, 
with nothing left of unity.  Thus, their goal is to maintain 
respect for the integrity of Burma. 
 
This is their reasoning, which is reasonable and convincing 
(to me) since I am familiar with many aspects of these 
movements.  The Burmese have been making many efforts.  So, 
we (Thailand) try to push for the soonest reconciliation.  In 
our view, when our neighbor has peace and prosperity, 
Thailand will also have peace.  If they can't achieve it, 
Thailand is impacted by their problems. 
 
For example, we now have over one million Burmese migrant 
workers in Thailand, a matter on which Burma has cooperated 
well. 
 
I also talked over other issues in the bilateral 
relationship.  One topic was tourism, an area in which the 
Burmese are willing to welcome our investment and 
development.  A second was the highway connecting Thailand, 
Burma, and India, which they are willing to continue to work 
on.  Third is the Burmese workers in Thailand.  They are 
willing to send their officials here to prove the citizenship 
of those workers in order for issuance of legal documents for 
them, which would allow the workers to continue at their jobs 
for another period of time.  Eventually, a Burmese worker 
quota will be introduced. 
 
We also discussed narcotics suppression, an issue on which 
they have cooperated well over the past two years, and will 
continue to do so.  I asked them specifically about two bad 
men living in Burma named Bang Ron and Wei Sei Kang.  The 
Burmese said they have already ordered their regional 
commanders to look into this matter.  If the two men are 
found to be living in Burma, they will get them.  So these 
two guys have to find a new place to live. 
 
End text. 
 
11. (U) This message has been reviewed by Embassy Rangoon. 
JOHNSON