US embassy cable - 04ABUJA2060

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AU-LED TALKS ON DARFUR IN ABUJA ROCKED BY INTENSIFIED FIGHTING

Identifier: 04ABUJA2060
Wikileaks: View 04ABUJA2060 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Abuja
Created: 2004-12-14 12:10:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL PHUM EAID MARR SU DARFUR
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ABUJA 002060 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, EAID, MARR, SU, DARFUR 
SUBJECT: AU-LED TALKS ON DARFUR IN ABUJA ROCKED BY 
INTENSIFIED FIGHTING 
 
Classified By: AF SPECIAL ADVISOR BRUCE EHRNMAN FOR REASONS 1.5 (B) AND 
 (D) 
 
1.  (C) Summary.  African Union-led peace talks on Darfur hit 
a new snag on Monday, December 13, when rebel movements 
announced suspension of their participation until the 
Government of Sudan meets a series of demands, including a 
halt to the current GOS military offensive to "open the 
roads."  Movement leaders subsequently agreed to return to 
the table that evening, but Sudan Liberation Army/Movement 
(SLA/M) told the AU early December 14 that they would not 
return to the table until the current Government military 
offensive in Darfur has stopped, and GOS forces have returned 
to their previous positions.  Sharing concern for what it 
considers a very serious violation of the ceasefire and other 
agreements, the AU has told the GOS delegation that it will 
end this round of talks unless the Government can commit 
today to halt the offensive immediately.  The Joint 
Commission will hold an emergency session tomorrow, December 
15, to consider the situation on the ground in Darfur.  End 
Summary. 
 
2.  (C) The present round of AU-led talks on Darfur in Abuja, 
Nigeria, have been plagued by reports of increasing violence 
on the ground since they began December 10.  New levels of 
violence, in which large concentrations of GOS and Jingaweit 
forces have assembled to conduct operations to "open the 
roads," now have led the SLA/M to suspend their participation 
in the talks.  Reports from the CFC in Darfur state that the 
GOS has launched a major offensive, and that Jingaweit forces 
have attacked and burned at least four villages.  (Rebel 
leaders claim that twelve villages have been burnt.) 
 
3.  (C) Late December 13, SLA/M rep read a "joint SLA/M - JEM 
statement" announcing that the movements were suspending 
their participation in the talks unltil several key demands 
were met by the government and the international community. 
The statement also included a new set of negotiating 
objectives that would give the Darfur process equal standing 
with the Naivasha north - south negotiations and require any 
new Sudan constitution to be consistent with the outcome of 
the Darfur peace process.  Following strong statements by the 
AU, U.S., and other international participants, which 
included a challenge to use this opportunity to demonstrate 
that the parties can successfully address violence through 
the AU and the Abuja process, the movements appeared to have 
agreed to return to the session on the morning of December 
14.  However, Following new reports of intensified violence 
on the ground, the SLA/M informed the AU that it would not 
return to the table until the GOS had stopped the offensive 
and returned its forces to their original positions. 
 
4.  (C) In consultation with the international partners, the 
AU has refused to accept a suspension of the talks at this 
time, but is conducting separate discussions with each of the 
parties on December 14.  Based on confirmation from the CFC 
in Darfur that the government remains on the offensive 
despite remonstrations by the CFC/AMIS (Ceasefire 
Commission/African Union Mission in Sudan) and the 
international community, the AU has taken an unusually tough 
line with the GOS, telling delegation leader Magzoub 
al-Khalifa that unless he could assure the AU mediation that 
the GOS could and would halt the offensive immediately, the 
AU could not continue to conduct this round.  When al-Khalifa 
sought to deflect the question by castigating the SLA/M 
behavior, Mediation acting chairman Sam Ibok demanded a 
clear, specific answer.  Al-Khalifa said he would do whatever 
was necessary to facilitate the talks.  Ibok asked him to get 
a more specific answer from Khartoum. 
 
5.  (U) Consultations with the movements will take place 
later today.  In informal discussions with the US and other 
partners, the SLA/M states that its key requirement is an end 
to the offensive.  It disassociated itself with JEM's 
political objectives outlined in the joint statement, which 
seek to carve out a separate niche to gain greater status for 
the movement in a process JEM seeks to put at odds with 
Naivasha.  That said, even the SLA/M underscores that 
Naivasha does not meet their concept of a satisfactory 
comprehensive agreement.  We have stressed to both movements 
that they will have to work on the national level within the 
process that the Naivasha agreement will begin, taking 
advantage of opportunities provided by an increasingly open 
and democratic political structure.  Naivasha will not be 
reopened. 
 
6.  (C) Comment.  We have told all the parties that violence 
should not prevent talks, and that they should focus their 
efforts on using the available mechanisms to end the 
fighting.  We have also underscored that attacks on civilian 
transportation on Darfur's roads by the movements is 
unacceptable, but that the Government's pretext that it needs 
to protect free movement through a major military action is 
also unacceptable.  That said, the AU has taken an 
increasingly tough - and very welcome - stand with the GOS 
delegation, requiring it to drop standard pretenses that it 
bears no responsibility for any of the violence or conditions 
in Darfur.  Sam Ibok has been an able chair; the arrival 
December 14 of AU Special Representative for Sudan, Baba 
Kingabe, has further stiffened the mediation.  Ibok made 
clear to the GOS that if the talks collapse, he will focus 
responsibility on Government-inspired violence in Darfur, not 
on the movements.  No one wants the talks to fail; rather, 
there is strong hope that the GOS will pull back. We 
anticipate that the SLA/M will participate in the Joint 
Commission session on December 15. 
 
7.  (C) Comment continued:  The absence of the most senior 
SLA/M leaders, Abdulwahid Nur and Mini Minawi, has left the 
movement's delegation somewhat adrift and without 
flexibility.  Minawi has called U.S. reps several times with 
complaints about AU behavior and excuses for his absence.  We 
are told the SLA/M leadership crisis will be resolved in the 
next day or two, but we have heard this before.  Another 
reason for the SLA/M leadership's absence  may be preparation 
for the "all-Darfur" conference scheduled for Tripoli on 
December 25, which will include both movements, the GOS, and 
participants from Darfur's traditional leadership structures. 
 
 
8.  (U) Minimize considered. 
CAMPBELL 

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