US embassy cable - 04BRUSSELS5258

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EUROPEAN COUNCIL DEC. 16-17: HIGH STAKES, HIGH DRAMA

Identifier: 04BRUSSELS5258
Wikileaks: View 04BRUSSELS5258 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Brussels
Created: 2004-12-13 17:10:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL MASS EAID CK TU HR EUN USEU BRUSSELS
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 005258 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2014 
TAGS: PREL, MASS, EAID, CK, TU, HR, EUN, USEU BRUSSELS 
SUBJECT: EUROPEAN COUNCIL DEC. 16-17:  HIGH STAKES, HIGH 
DRAMA 
 
REF: USEU TODAY 12/10/2004 
 
Classified By: Rick Holtzapple, PolOff, Reasons 1.4 (B/D) 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1.  (C) As the EU heads into final preparations for its 
December 16-17 summit (European Council) meeting, a limited 
number of high stakes issues remain open for final agreement. 
 The main issue for heads of state and government will be 
Turkey, and possibly Croatia and the China arms embargo 
(although the latter two issues could be largely settled 
before the Summit begins).  Other less contentious issues 
include Bulgarian and Romanian accession, the Financial 
Framework for 2007-2013, combating terrorism, Ukraine, and 
the Middle East Peace Process, as well as transatlantic 
relations.  UN SYG Kofi Annan has also been invited to attend 
the Summit as a sign of the importance the EU places on the 
UN.  END SUMMARY. 
 
DEC. 16:  TURKEY AND OTHER ENLARGEMENT ISSUES 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
2. (C) A Dutch contact told us on December 10 that the 
Presidency does not intend to circulate proposed language for 
the key bracketed portions of the Turkey section of the 
Conclusions until Thursday, December 16.  But the Dutch then 
hope to reach a decision on the full Enlargement section of 
the Conclusions, including the Turkey text, at the leaders' 
restricted dinner session on December 16.  Based on initial 
readings of what EU FMs have agreed at the December 13 GAERC, 
it appears most other enlargement related issues are solved. 
Compromise language was reportedly reached today on Croatia 
stating that full cooperation with ICTY must be confirmed 
before negotiations begin, but not requiring such 
confirmation to come via another Council decision.  This 
means the only remaining decision is to set the actual date 
for beginning Croatia's negotiations.  Similarly, it appears 
the only issue to be settled for Romania and Bulgaria is the 
date on which they will sign their Accession Treaty 
(Romania's December 12 election results and opposition leader 
Basescu's surprise victory does not seem likely to cause any 
hiccups for Romania's accession.) 
 
DECEMBER 16: EU FMS' DINNER 
--------------------------- 
 
3. (C) While the Heads are in their dinner discussing 
enlargement, EU FMs will be in a separate dinner session 
where they are expected to finish up language on Declarations 
regarding Ukraine and the Middle East Peace Process.  We do 
not have all the details on these texts, but do not expect 
any major surprises.  FMs will also have a discussion of the 
implementation of the EU's Security Strategy (drafted by High 
Rep Solana's staff and endorsed by leaders last fall) and its 
implications for transatlantic relations.  We presume, but 
cannot yet confirm, that this discussion will lead to some 
Conclusions or Declaration being issued, but it may be no 
more than the very general language included in para 54 of 
the draft already circulating informally in Brussels (EUR/ERA 
has a copy). 
 
4. (C) All other texts on external relations (Iran, Iraq, 
Afghanistan, European Neighborhood, et al) appear to already 
have been completed and do not hold major surprises.  The 
Iran language will likely be amended to note that the EU-3 
FMs (Barnier, Straw and Fischer) accompanied by High Rep 
Solana, met on December 13 in Brussels with Iranian officials 
to discuss the negotiation of the EU's Trade and Cooperation 
Agreement with Iran.  The Conclusion's discussion of 
"effective multilateralism" could also be amended to reflect 
the decision to invite UN SYG Kofi Annan to join the EU 
leaders the morning of December 17 for a brief session (our 
Dutch contact expected between 30 minutes and one hour). 
 
CHINA ARMS EMBARGO 
------------------ 
 
5. (C) At COREPER on December 9, France unexpectedly tabled a 
draft Declaration for the European Council on lifting the 
China arms embargo (REF A).  At the same time, Paris withdrew 
its objections to a formula for strengthening the EU Code of 
Conduct on arms exports that had been agreed by the other 
member states in October.  Coming just one day after the 
EU-China summit, at which the EU gave China a "positive 
signal" on the arms embargo but refrained from lifting it, 
the French draft seems designed to demonstrate Chirac's 
pro-China credentials and to make further progress on the 
issue before the end of the year.  Our Council Secretariat 
and member state contacts describe general frustration with 
this 11th-hour French effort, and did not think Paris will 
succeed in getting the embargo lifted at the EU Summit on 
December 17. 
 
6. (C) Two hurdles stand in the way of a quick (i.e. this 
week) decision to lift the embargo.  First, public attention 
to China's human rights record is high following the EU-China 
summit.  While EU leaders have not formally linked the arms 
embargo issue to human rights concerns, European publics and 
parliaments have.  Unless China makes gestures this week on 
these issues, lifting the embargo just one week after the 
EU-China summit would damage EU credibility by making it look 
as if the EU was rolling over for China while paying nothing 
more than lip service to human rights.  Second, EU leaders 
will be sensitive to the President's planned February visit 
to Europe, and may want to avoid taking a decision with 
negative and public consequences for transatlantic relations. 
 They are aware that the US is "reaching out" to Europe, and 
some member states will be wary of slapping the outstretched 
hand at such a delicate moment. 
 
7. C) Based on sketchy preliminary readouts from today's 
GAERC discussions, we understand that the Code of Conduct was 
not adopted at today's meeting, and that Foreign Ministers 
resisted France's call to lift the embargo this week. 
Instead, the Luxembourg Presidency is likely to pick up this 
issue with an aim to completing it before the summer hand-off 
to the UK Presidency. That said, the French can still press 
to bring this issue back onto the agenda at the summit on 
Dec. 16-17, although the chance of pressing this through to 
conclusion at this week's session appears to be unlikely. 
 
MCKINLEY 

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