US embassy cable - 04MADRID4687

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MADRID 004687 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, PHUM, SP, American - Spanish Relations 
SUBJECT: DEPUTY FM LEON ON CUBA, IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN, 
BILATERAL RELATIONS 
 
Classified By: Charge Bob Manzanares; reasons 1.5 (B) and (D) 
 
1. (C) Summary.  Charge met with Deputy Foreign Minister 
Bernardino Leon on 12/9 to discuss GOS-USG differences on 
Cuba, overall bilateral relations, and Spanish participation 
in NATO missions in Iraq and Afghanistan.  Leon conveyed GOS 
displeasure with recent comments by WHA A/S Noriega 
criticizing GOS efforts to spur greater EU engagement with 
the Cuban Government.  He said the MFA Director General for 
Latin America would like to visit Washington to clarify the 
Spanish position, but that he could not do so without either 
gaining political cover for such a visit in the form of a 
neutral USG statement or waiting a suitable period to allow 
the episode to fade.  Leon underscored Spain's determination 
to press forward with its new Cuba policy.  On bilateral 
relations, Leon claimed that the opposition Popular Party 
(PP) is trying to foment USG-GOS tensions for internal 
political purposes.  He said the GOS genuinely wants good 
relations and will soon name a Special Envoy to the U.S. to 
promote better high-level relations.  Leon asserted that 
President Bush's November meeting with King Juan Carlos had 
revealed possible "misunderstandings" on the part of the USG 
with respect to the GOS, including the "misperception" that 
Zapatero represents the left wing of the Socialist Party.  On 
Iraq, Leon indicated that the January elections may represent 
an opportunity for the GOS to deepen its involvement, though 
participation in a NATO mission on the ground remains a 
sensitive issue.  The GOS is prepared to send forces to 
Afghanistan to help with the next round of elections, but 
remains non-commital on leading a PRT. 
 
2. (C) The GOS seems to understand the political liability of 
having poor relations with the USG and some, like Leon, are 
doing what they can to at least superficially improve ties. 
We expect they will keep asking us to "watch their actions 
rather than their words."  We will continue to press for both 
more favorable actions and more favorable words.  On Cuba, it 
is telling that the GOS felt sufficiently stung by A/S 
Noriega's comments to seek the public support of Chirac in a 
high-level meeting on 12/8.  If Sandomingo does visit the 
Department in the next few weeks, it is important that he 
understand the depth of USG skepticism with respect to 
Spain's efforts to weaken EU policy towards Cuba.  We will 
not shift Madrid's course from greater engagement with 
Castro, but a sense that the USG is determined to hold the 
line may discourage the GOS from pushing the EU towards even 
greater rapprochement with Havana.  End Summary. 
 
//CUBA DOMINATES THE DISCUSSION// 
 
3. (C) Leon began by saying that he primarily wanted to speak 
with Charge regarding the USG's views on Spanish policy 
towards Cuba, and in particular recent comments by WHA A/S 
Noriega to the effect that the GOS had been manipulated by 
Castro regime in pursuing its new policy of engagement.  What 
especially rankled the MFA about USG's comments was the 
implication that the GOS was somehow pro-Castro.   Leon 
insisted that President Zapatero and FM Moratinos had 
maintained a consistent policy of placing democratic reforms 
as a pre-condition for improved EU ties with Cuba.  He said 
that Spain had worked within the EU Common Position and 
merely wanted to modify the Restrictive Measures on Cuba, 
"which have proven ineffective," in order to develop a more 
sustainable EU-wide position.  Leon claimed the majority of 
EU countries wanted to change the policy and said that the 
Restrictive Measures had been undermined from the start by 
the refusal of some missions in  Havana (the Austrians, 
Belgians, Portuguese, and Greeks, he claimed) to invite 
dissidents to national day events.  He asserted that the UK 
had also changed tack in favor of greater engagement with 
Cuba because PM Blair was attempting to burnish his 
"progressive" credentials and said it was his understanding 
that the UK Embassy in Havana planned to join the above EU 
missions in finding a way around inviting dissidents to its 
national day.  The solution in his view was to replace the 
current measures with a broadly-supported policy of deeper 
engagement with the opposition, but at a level less visible 
than invitations to national day events. 
 
4. (C) In the interest of clarifying Spain's actions towards 
Cuba, Leon said he was eager to send DG for Latin America 
Javier Sandomingo to meet with A/S Noriega.  However, he said 
the GOS could not do so politically without seeming to be 
responding to a summons from Washington.  Leon said the 
problem was complicated by the presence of pro-PP diplomats 
in the Spanish Embassy in Washington who might leak slanted 
information to news services hostile to the Zapatero 
administration.  He suggested two possible courses of action: 
 
     -- That the Department make a neutral public statement 
regarding Spanish policy towards Cuba to the effect that each 
country had the right to determine its own best course for 
stimulating democratic reforms, immediately after which 
Sandomingo would travel to Washington; or, 
 
   -- If the USG could not make such a statement, then the 
GOS would wait a few days (more than a week) before sending 
Sandomingo in order to place an appropriate period of time 
between A/S Noriega's comments and Sandomingo's travel. 
 
5. (C) Charge replied that he would relay the suggestions to 
Washington, but that in either case it was important that 
Sandomingo travel to Washington to clarify Spain's view of 
how to move forward on Cuba.  Charge added that A/S Noriega's 
comments may have upset some in the GOS, but they accurately 
reflected USG skepticism of Spain's direction on Cuba.  In 
particular, the USG was concerned by Spain's decision to take 
the lead in bringing about the end of EU invitations to 
dissidents to EU national day events.  The negative symbolism 
and damage to the morale of the opposition - essentially 
telling them that they were not legitimate political actors - 
outweighed any advantage of renewed engagement. 
 
6. (C) Leon said that, far from distancing the EU from the 
opposition, the GOS proposed broader engagement, just in a 
different format than national day events.  "After eight 
years of Aznar's hard line towards Cuba, the EU has not 
advanced its objectives with respect to improved human 
rights.  We want to try a different approach."  Leon said 
that it is clear to the GOS that Castro will not be 
overthrown and that it is more important that Spain be in a 
position to influence the next set of leaders.  He said that 
it was in Spain (and the USG's) interest to promote a soft 
landing for the next Cuban leaders rather than an explosive 
transition leading, perhaps, to the need for USG 
intervention.  He said the GOS and the USG should work 
together to make their different approaches complement each 
other.  Charge reiterated that USG held reservations 
regarding the effectiveness of the Spanish approach.  Leon 
said that Spain and the EU can only make overtures to Castro 
- if he rejects them then the imposition of new EU 
restrictive measures would be possible. 
 
//U.S.-SPAIN RELATIONS// 
 
7. (C) Leon said that Spain is politically divided at the 
moment, as demonstrated by the PP's decision to adopt an 
aggressive posture towards the GOS in hopes of bringing down 
the government and forcing early elections.  He claimed that 
PP leaders, including former President Aznar and former FM 
Ana Palacio, were trying to use their contacts in Washington 
to shape USG opinion against Zapatero.  The PP's objective, 
he said, is to use bilateral friction between the USG and the 
GOS as part of its campaign to unseat FM Moratinos, and 
eventually Zapatero.  Leon said it was important for USG 
officials, such as A/S Noriega, to understand that even 
comments in seemingly innocuous settings can get picked up by 
the press and have an impact far beyond that intended by the 
speaker. 
 
8. (C) Charge noted that we had been sending an identical 
message to GOS officials, with mixed success.  For example, 
the visit of King Juan Carlos sent an excellent, positive 
message regarding the importance of our bilateral relations, 
but the positive effect had been negated by the simultaneous 
visit of Venezuelan President Chavez to Madrid.  All of the 
good news from the King's visit was drowned out by three days 
of Chavez' revolutionary rhetoric and tirades against the USG 
while standing next to Spanish officials. 
 
9. (C) Leon agreed that the Chavez visit had been a public 
relations failure, adding that the GOS only invited Chavez 
after months of requests from Chavez.  Turning to the King's 
meeting with President Bush, Leon said that there might be 
some "misunderstandings" on the part of the USG regarding the 
GOS.  He said that when King Juan Carlos had raised Spain's 
exclusion from November White House briefings on the Middle 
East to which other European (G-8) countries had been 
invited, President Bush, the King said, expressed surprise 
and reassured the King that Spain would be invited to future 
such meetings. 
10. (C) According to Leon, the King also commented on the 
importance of popular sentiment against Spanish deployment of 
troops to Iraq in Zapatero's decision to withdraw those 
forces.  However, Zapatero sent troops to Afghanistan as a 
gesture of solidarity with the USG in the fight against 
terrorism.  Leon said President Bush evinced surprise about 
the information on Spain's deployment to Afghanistan. 
Separately, Leon said he was surprised to hear that former 
President Bush had reportedly mused that President Zapatero 
might be further to the left politically than former 
President Felipe Gonzalez, with whom the USG had enjoyed good 
relations.  Leon insisted that Zapatero and Moratinos 
represented Spain's version of "New Labour" and that both 
leaders were well within the political mainstream. 
 
//SPECIAL ENVOY TO THE U.S.// 
 
11. (C) Leon said the GOS is fully cognizant of the 
importance of good relations with Washington and 
"confidentially" shared that Zapatero will soon name 
Socialist Parliamentarian Rafael Estrella as special envoy to 
the U.S.  Estrella, who is known for his pro-U.S. views, will 
travel frequently to the U.S. to promote strong high-level 
ties.  (COMMENT: This appointment could, and probably will 
be, interpreted as a further sign of the MFA's lack of 
confidence in their Embassy in Washington.  END COMMENT)  In 
a similar vein, Leon said the GOS plans to name pro-U.S. 
Socialists to head the "Real Instituto Elcano," Spain's 
premier think tank, which in the Spanish system is partly 
directed by the ruling political party. 
 
//MORE FLEXIBLE ON IRAQ?// 
 
12. (C) Charge drew Leon's attention to the importance of 
allowing Spanish forces assigned to NATO commands to 
participate in all NATO missions, including missions in Iraq. 
 Leon said that the issue remained very sensitive for the GOS 
and that there are different schools of thought both within 
the MFA and among Zapatero's advisers as to how to proceed. 
The GOS will look to the successful conclusion of the Iraqi 
elections as a benchmark that may allow Spanish forces to 
participate more fully.  Leon indicated much greater 
political support for providing Spanish training for Iraqi 
police forces outside of Iraq. 
 
//AFGHANISTAN PRT// 
 
13. (C) Charge urged Leon to support Spanish leadership of a 
PRT in Afghanistan.  Leon said that the GOS was prepared to 
provide additional forces immediately to support the next 
round of elections, and, if that went well, to participate in 
a PRT.  He did not indicate willingness to have Spain lead a 
PRT.  Leon noted that, due to new legislation, the GOS now 
requires Parliamentary approval of any deployment of Spanish 
forces overseas, making strong political support for any 
mission an even more critical component for the GOS. 
 
//USG SUPPORT FOR UNSYG ANNAN// 
 
14. (C) Charge raised local press reports indicating that 
President Zapatero and French President Chirac had voiced 
strong support for the continued UN leadership of UNSYG 
Annan.  The press reports implied that Zapatero and Chirac 
were countering USG efforts to undermine Annan.  Charge said 
this was not the case and shared copies of Department 
statements indicating strong USG support for Annan.  He said 
it was important that the GOS not misinterpret USG intentions 
with respect to the oil-for-food investigation.  (NOTE: 
During the Zapatero-Chirac meeting, Chirac also stated his 
support for Spain's efforts to weaken EU measures against 
Cuba and attacked USG criticism of Spain's overtures to 
Castro.  END NOTE.) 
 
//COMMENT// 
 
15. (C) The GOS seems to understand the political liability 
of having poor relations with the USG and some, like Leon, 
will do what they can to at least superficially heal the 
damage.  We expect they will keep asking us to "watch their 
actions rather than their words."  We will continue to press 
for both more favorable actions and more favorable words.  On 
Cuba, it is telling that the GOS felt sufficiently stung by 
A/S Noriega's comments to seek the public support of Chirac 
in a high-level meeting.  If Sandomingo does visit the 
Department in the next few weeks, it is important that he 
understand the depth of USG skepticism with respect to 
Spain's efforts to weaken EU policy towards Cuba.  We will 
not shift Madrid's course from greater engagement with 
Castro, but a sense that the USG is determined to hold the 
line may discourage the GOS from pushing the EU towards even 
greater rapprochement with Havana. 
MANZANARES