US embassy cable - 04BRATISLAVA1109

C O N F I D E N T I A L  BRATISLAVA 001109 
 
SIPDIS 
 
 
STATE FOR WHA/CCA CHRIS SIBILLA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2014 
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, LO, CU 
SUBJECT: SLOVAKIA ON CUBAN HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY 
 
REF: STATE 262206 
 
1. (C) Summary. In advance of reftel, poloffs had been 
discussing Cuba policy with a range of GOS and NGO 
interlocutors.  GOS Cuba policy centers on the "critical 
dialogue" approach: The GOS must have contact with Cuban 
government officials to be prepared for an inevitable 
democratic transition and to maintain economic and commercial 
ties.  GOS support for this approach has not changed despite 
frozen bilateral relations for over one year and a recent 
highly offensive letter from the Cuban Ambassador to the 
Slovak President of Parliament did much to fuel public 
opinion against the Castro regime.  MFA Interlocutors argued 
that parliamentary leaders and NGOs have greater flexibility 
to support Cuban dissidents more directly.  NGO activities 
include fund raising for the families of Cuban dissidents, 
awareness campaigns, and lobbying the GOS and Members of the 
European Parliament (MEPs).  Leaders in parliament have 
spoken out strongly on human rights conditions in Cuba. End 
Summary. 
 
2. (C) Slovaks in both government and the NGO sector have 
been actively promoting human rights and supporting 
dissidents in Cuba for years.  The U.S. can take some credit: 
the same activists that became "experts" on democracy through 
SEED funds are now exporting their experience to other 
countries that haven't yet made the dramatic leap to 
democracy and free market systems.  However, most of the 
motivation for Slovak policy towards Cuba comes from memories 
of what it was like to live in a repressive regime, and from 
what happens afterwards. 
 
The Government 
-------------- 
 
3. (C) The MFA is feeling pressure from some EU members to 
warm relations with the Castro regime.  On the one hand, the 
GOS wants to support dissidents and democratic transition. 
On the other hand, it knows that even when regimes topple 
overnight, institutions change slowly and bureaucrats remain 
in place.  Current party members may be future democratic 
leaders; take for example Foreign Minister Kukan who studied 
in Moscow and began his diplomatic career as a representative 
of communist Czechoslovakia.  Slovakia also wants to be 
competitive for commercial contracts in Cuba, and believes it 
has a better chance if it has good relations with the current 
regime. 
 
4. (C) Oldrich Hlavacek, Director General of the Fourth 
Territorial Department, and Denisa Juristova, Desk Officer 
for Latin America and the Caribbean, told poloffs December 3 
that the GOS cooperates with the GOC, while at the same time 
encouraging Slovak NGOs to engage Cuban dissidents.  Slovak 
diplomats in Havana and Slovak government officials in 
Bratislava above desk officer level have had no contact with 
the GOC (except through diplomatic notes) since Fall 2003 
when the Slovaks invited Cuban dissidents to an official 
reception.  Hlavacek credited the Spanish initiative to 
weaken the EU's restrictive measures on Cuba with prisoner 
releases and warmed Cuban-Spanish relations.  He said the GOS 
cannot leave a "black hole" in Cuba by ignoring political 
contacts in the country that will remain as part of the 
bureaucracy after a democratic transition.  A viable dialogue 
is critical to a smooth transition of power. 
 
5. (SBU) Juraj Kubla and Juraj Prituten of the MFA's Human 
Rights Department described Cuba policy as primarily driven 
by the common EU position.  Kubla said the GOS supports the 
Honduras resolution and cited President of Parliament Pavol 
Hrusovsky's support for the September 19 Cuba conference 
statement in Prague.  (NOTE: Hrusovsky also opened another 
conference on Cuban human rights the following week in 
Bratislava.) Kubla said the department preferred to focus on 
human rights concerns "closer to home," particularly in 
Ukraine and the western Balkans. 
 
6. (C) Hlavacek could not foresee his government lobbying on 
Cuba issues in the UN.  When asked about the influence the 
GOS will wield in 2006/2007 as a non-permanent member of the 
Security Council, Hlavacek replied that the GOS has defined 
the Balkans, Cyprus, the Middle East, and its neighboring 
countries as its priorities for the term. 
 
7. (C) The DCM recently hosted the MFA's "EU team" for lunch 
and engaged them on maintaining the EU's restrictive 
measures.  The EU countries were being handily manipulated by 
the GOC to decrease support for dissidents.  Acting Director 
for European Affairs Fratisek Ruzicka was sympathetic to U.S. 
arguments.  He mentioned that "playing nice" to the Castro 
regime has not resulted in any commercial benefits for 
 
Slovakia, and that potential trade should not be the 
motivation for policy in this case.  However, his view may 
not prevail in the MFA. 
 
Parliament: "Critical" Dialogue is A Two-Way Street 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
8. (C) President of Parliament Pavol Hrusovsky, also Chair of 
the Christian Democratic Movement and a long-time opponent of 
communism, has been one of the country's most outspoken 
public figures on human rights in Cuba (see para 5).  He 
recently sent a letter in support of political prisoner Luis 
Enrique Ferrera Garcia, describing the release of six 
dissidents as a "necessary, but not sufficient, condition for 
a change in the attitude toward the regime in Cuba."  Cuban 
Ambassador to Slovakia Caridad Yamiri Cueto Milian responded 
to Hrusovsky's letter in classic fashion.  Her harshly-worded 
letter made headlines with the statement, "the dignity and 
morals of the Cuban nation stand high above the misery of 
people like you."  Op-eds argued that this incident alone was 
excuse enough to oppose the EU policy toward Cuba. 
Nonetheless, Hlavacek said that when FM Eduard Kukan convoked 
the Ambassador to indicate that such language was 
unacceptable, he only discussed diplomatic protocol and did 
not address the substance of the human rights letter that 
sparked the reaction. 
 
9. (U) Another leader in parliament on Cuban human rights is 
Laszlo Nagy of the Hungarian Coalition Party (SMK).  As 
president of the committee on human rights in Parliament, he 
traveled to Cuba last Spring to meet with dissidents with 
other parliamentary leaders from the Czech Republic and 
Sweden.  He felt Cuba had been overshadowed by the events of 
1989, which represented a lost opportunity to influence 
regime change,  He commented that the Cuban dissident 
movement is much more organized than what existed in 1989 in 
the former Czechoslovakia.  He informed poloffs that more 
investment into this group is urgently needed and further 
relaxing the isolation policy would be a clear victory for 
the Castro regime. 
 
NGO Activism 
------------ 
 
10. (SBU) Eliska Slavikova from the NGO People in Peril and 
Milan Nic of Pontis Foundation detailed the activities of 
their organizations in support of Cuban democratization. 
People in Peril focuses on raising public awareness and 
grassroots support, while Pontis has taken a more political 
route.  With support from a 2003 Democracy Commission grant, 
People in Peril organized several music and film festivals 
throughout Slovakia, published newsletters, and hosted 
discussion fora on human rights issues, several specifically 
on Cuba.  The organization collected small donations at these 
events to support the families of Cuban political prisoners. 
People in Peril also encourages the Slovak media to cover 
Cuban issues. 
 
11. (C) Nic described Pontis' activities to include "prisoner 
adoptions," lobbying the GOS, and supporting Cuban 
dissidents.  The "prisoner adoption" scheme asks each 
political party to identify one political prisoner of the 
same party affiliation and coordinate public statements and 
fund raising on that prisoner's behalf.  Pontis has asked 
both MPs and MEPs to consider this option.  They have also 
lobbied the GOS to invite dissidents to diplomatic functions 
in Havana and opposed the choice of the new Slovak Ambassador 
to Cuba.  Nic described the new Ambassador as a businessman 
"not connected with human rights concerns."  He noted that 
Slovak trade with Cuba is small.  He claimed a 
non-transparent 400 million USD energy project between the 
politically well-connected Slovak firm SEZ Tlmace and the 
Cuban government is driving the GOS' Cuba policy.  He also 
said the 15 UN Caribbean votes that Cuba held influence over 
were an important part of Slovakia's bid for a 2006/2007 
non-permanent Security Council seat.  (NOTE: Slovakia has 
since won this seat, the top priority of the GOS' UN policy.) 
 
12. (C) Comment: The GOS Cuba policy is trying to balance 
many interests: human rights and support for dissidents, 
potential to influence a future regime, promotion of 
commercial interests, and being a good EU team player.  The 
gut instinct of Slovakia's top leaders is pro-democracy, 
pro-market economy, and pro-reform.  Our challenge remains 
getting that instinct to come out around the tables in 
Brussels. 
WEISER 
 
 
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