US embassy cable - 04TAIPEI3939

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 TAIPEI 003939 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS AIT/W 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, TW 
SUBJECT: LY CAMPAIGN ENTERS THE FINAL STRETCH 
 
REF: A. TAIPEI 03779 
 
     B. TAIPEI 03031 
 
Classified By: AIT Deputy Director David J. Keegan, Reason: 1.4 (B/D) 
 
1. (C) Summary: As the campaign for control of the 
Legislative Yuan (LY) enters its final day, the outcome looks 
increasingly to be determined by a few key variables: signs 
that the KMT's "peipiao" vote allocation is breaking down, 
DPP fears of a TSU late surge, a spate of vote-buying 
arrests, and last minute appeals to middle voters, who may 
(or may not) provide key swing votes.  In the end, however, 
many of the closest races are still too close and complicated 
to predict and will ultimately be decided, party officials 
claim, "by luck."  While some of these factors are common to 
elections everywhere in the world, many are unique to 
Taiwanese LY elections and their multi-member districts. 
This election is expected to be the last held under this 
system, so many of these issues will become a thing of the 
past after December 11.  End Summary. 
 
2. (C) As time runs out in the LY campaign, both camps are 
making their final appeals to both core voters and centrists, 
but the real battle is playing out over vote allocation 
"peipiao."  Presidential aide Liu Shih-chung told AIT on 
December 10 that the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) has 
revised down its internal assessment from 110 to 107 based on 
recent trends, but said this pessimism was based on the 
assumption that the Pan-Blue would formally abandon its 
poorly designed peipiao scheme in the final hours of the 
campaign.  "If they don't, we will go back to our 110-111 
range estimate."  As if on cue, Kuomintang (KMT) Chairman 
Lien Chan publicly rejected calls for dropping the KMT's 
peipiao plan, stating that "as long as we do a good job of 
peipiao, all of our candidates will win." 
 
3. (C) Both sides seem to see the KMT's handling of peipiao 
as the key final variable in this election.  The DPP 
finalized its peipiao arrangements in most districts in the 
last two weeks of the campaign.  It disseminated its vote 
allocation instructions to voters by a variety of means, from 
traditional billboards, newspaper and bus-side advertising to 
commemorative stamps and even condoms.  Then the KMT came 
under pressure to respond.  In a press conference on December 
6, they announced that they would implement peipiao 
allocation in ten of the most hotly contested districts. 
Closer examination reveals, however, that some of the KMT's 
announced peipiao schemes are merely empty propaganda.  When 
AIT asked Miaoli County KMT Chairman Lee Chin-sung about the 
peipiao plan for his district, for example, he replied that 
the "new" peipiao plan was just a repackaging of the 
traditional (and generally ineffective) geographic 
distribution effort they had been using before the 
announcement. 
 
KMT Candidates Rebel ... 
------------------------ 
 
4. (C) In other districts, however, the KMT's announcement 
has instilled panic in many of its candidates who had been 
doing well in the polls.  Some have openly rebelled against 
the party leadership, publicly urging their followers to 
disregard the party's peipiao instructions.  One Taipei City 
KMT candidate, Lai Shih-pao, a consistent front-runner in the 
polls, became desperate enough to spam random mobile phones 
(Poloff's included) with text messages begging voters to 
ignore the "fake peipiao order from KMT central."  Part of 
this is certainly motivated by candidates' desire to win by a 
large margin, thus bolstering their chances of being 
nominated in the next election (Ref A), but many 
front-runners are legitimately afraid.  Ham-handed KMT 
peipiao attempts in previous elections have more than once 
resulted in the most popular candidate in a district losing 
the election entirely. 
 
... While PFP Candidates Riot 
----------------------------- 
 
5. (C) Some in the PFP, however, are literally rioting over 
the KMT's peipiao plans.  In Chiayi on December 7 PFP 
supporters burned the local KMT Chairman in effigy and tried 
to storm the KMT Headquarters there to demand that the KMT 
share votes with their candidate.  Complaints about being 
left out of the KMT's peipiao plans have been a constant PFP 
theme for the last few weeks of the campaign.  However, this 
is only one issue among many in the rapidly declining 
relationship between the KMT and the PFP since plans for an 
early merger between the two parties fell apart in October 
(Ref B).  Cooperation between the two parties is now 
non-existent even in the few places (such as Nantou County) 
where it seemed inter-party peipiao could be safely 
implemented.  This makes it more likely that Pan-Green 
candidates will pick up extra seats in those districts.  The 
acrimony between the two parties has reached the point where 
many doubt the post-election merger will take place at all. 
 
Possible TSU Surge Has the DPP Nervous 
-------------------------------------- 
 
6. (C) Internecine fighting and nervousness over peipiao is 
not confined to the Pan-Blue camp, however.  Many lagging TSU 
candidates have expressed renewed confidence in their chances 
for victory in the wake of a surprisingly well-received rally 
speech by TSU leader Lee Teng-hui on December 5.  Lee 
characterized the TSU as Taiwan's only loyal opposition party 
and attacked the DPP as incapable of truly defending Taiwan's 
sovereignty.  These remarks have reenergized fundamentalist 
Green voters and drawn them away from the DPP and toward the 
TSU.  Commentators are predicting this last minute surge 
 
SIPDIS 
could propel the TSU to a better than expected performance on 
election day, possibly taking more than 20 seats.  Even DPP 
officials are now expressing concern that the TSU might 
unseat senior DPP incumbents in Keelung, Chiayi and Hsinchu 
City.  In many other districts where the DPP and TSU had 
negotiated joint peipiao plans, the DPP candidates are 
showing uncharacteristic reluctance to participate, although 
for now they appear to be at least nominally willing to 
cooperate.  However AIT's assessment is that talk of a last 
minute TSU surge may be exaggerated.  Even if the TSU is able 
to transform this momentum into success at the polls, it will 
likely only increase its total to 17-19 seats and most of the 
gains will be in places like Yunlin, Nantou and Taipei City 
where the seat might have otherwise gone to an independent or 
KMT candidate.  At most, two or three of the DPP's weaker 
newcomers might be displaced by the TSU's rally. 
 
Chen's "Contract for Taiwan" - At the 11th Hour 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
7. (C) Another variable that both sides are concentrating on 
in the last hours of the campaign is the centrist voter.  The 
bitterly divisive campaign and extreme rhetoric of the past 
few weeks have largely alienated moderate voters, but with 
many races likely to be decided by less than 1000 votes, both 
camps are belatedly appealing to voters in the middle. 
President Chen's eleventh hour appeal takes the form of a 
"Contract For Taiwan" whose ten points include a variety of 
sensible tax and fiscal proposals as well as promises of 
judicial reform and passage of the special defense 
procurement package.  (Comment: None of these constructive 
topics have received much attention from Chen or other DPP 
candidates, despite several predictions to AIT by senior DPP 
officials that they would.  End Comment.) 
 
"Contract ON Taiwan" - The KMT Threatens Gridlock 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
8. (C) The KMT's last minute appeal is instead a variation on 
the divisive.  LY Speaker Wang Jin-pyng, in an interview with 
Hong-Kong media, threatened that if the Pan-Blue lost the 
majority and he were not reelected Speaker, then Pan-Blue 
legislators would "paralyze" the LY by derailing every bill 
proposed by the majority.  KMT Chairman Lien Chan offered a 
depressingly similar promise should the Pan-Blue win a 
majority.  On December 4, he told supporters that if the 
Pan-Blue retained its majority, it would form a new 
government.  DPP officials blasted Lien's proposal as 
"unconstitutional", pointing out that under Taiwan's 
constitution, it is the President, not the Legislature that 
appoints the cabinet and forms a government.  The KMT 
spokesman later clarified that Lien had really meant that 
Chen "should respect the mandate shown in the election" when 
nominating the cabinet.  Lien, however, has refused to back 
down and on December 9 named LY Vice President Chiang Pin-kun 
as the next Premier should the Pan-Blue win a majority.  He 
threatened a no-confidence vote against any other nominee 
from Chen.  (Note:  The Taiwanese Constitution technically 
allows for such a no-confidence vote by the LY under certain 
circumstances, but the President is then entitled to dissolve 
the LY and call a new election.  End Note.) 
 
Handbags for Votes 
------------------ 
 
9. (C) As expected, vote-buying has also become a prominent 
issue in the last week of the campaign.  Prosecutors have 
zealously adhered to pledges to crack down on vote-buying in 
this election, and there have been a flurry of indictments. 
Those accused of vote-buying have primarily been campaign 
assistants and district party chairmen, rather than the 
candidates themselves.  The majority of indictments have been 
on the Pan-Blue side, and KMT officials have predictably 
complained that these vote-buying charges are politically 
motivated and carried out by a judiciary "controlled by the 
DPP."  However, DPP and TSU campaign offices have also been 
targeted.  Miaoli County DPP Chairman Hsu Chin-jung, noting 
the indictment of one of his campaign managers, complained 
that most of the indictments, on both sides, were for petty 
offenses such as hosting banquets for supporters or giving 
out handbags or baseball caps at rallies.  "The real 
vote-buyers aren't getting caught," he said, because the 
evidence is so much harder to find.  He noted that many of 
the independent candidates have organized crime connections, 
presumably rely primarily on vote buying for their support, 
and are still running strong in this campaign. 
 
Non-Violent Campaign Marred by Bombing on Eve of Election 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
10. (C) So far there has been no significant violence in this 
LY election campaign (which is more than can be said of the 
LY itself), even in the south, where it has been a particular 
problem in the past (Septel).  Simultaneous large-scale 
rallies in Taipei on December 5 by the KMT and TSU were held 
within blocks of one another without erupting into violence. 
On December 9, however, the city of Taipei saw several 
threatening incidents, although it is not yet clear if and 
how they are related to the election.  A van loaded with 11 
bottles of gasoline and cooking gas burst into flames around 
noon near Taipei Railway Station.  Four hours later several 
suspicious packages were found in the station itself. 
Additionally, several TV news anchors received letters saying 
that in the presidential election there had been two bullets, 
but in this election there would be four.  The letters 
demanded that President Chen give up his pursuit of Taiwan 
independence and threatened that explosives would be placed 
in the Taipei Railway Station and in the Taipei 101 
skyscraper. 
 
Comment: Final Stretch for an Anachronism 
----------------------------------------- 
 
11. (C) Some of the variables that will determine the final 
outcome of this election, such as the role of centrist 
voters, smearing, and last-minute rhetoric, are common to 
elections in democracies all around the world.  However, many 
more are unique to Taiwan.  The overwhelming importance of 
peipiao, and the central role it plays in every phase of the 
campaign, are artifacts of the multi-member district 
electoral system.  The low margin of victory in almost all 
such districts also increases the effectiveness of and 
temptation for vote-buying.  It also drives candidates to 
appeal to small and often extremist elements of the 
electorate.  Even Taiwan's complex inter-party dynamics are 
partly the result of its hybrid electoral systems: the LY 
system encourages multiple parties and factionalism within 
each party, while the first-past-the-post system used in the 
Presidential race promotes two large "camps".  If the package 
of Legislative Constitutional reforms passed in August is 
ratified by the National Assembly early next year, as 
expected, this will be the last election of this kind in 
Taiwan.  All of these complex, non-policy tactical issues 
will then presumably disappear as well.  Perhaps we can look 
forward to a more moderate, issues-focused debate at that 
time. 
PAAL