US embassy cable - 04BRUSSELS5226

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EU COUNCIL PERSPECTIVE ON BOSNIA REFORMS

Identifier: 04BRUSSELS5226
Wikileaks: View 04BRUSSELS5226 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Brussels
Created: 2004-12-10 16:09:00
Classification: SECRET
Tags: PREL PGOV EAID MARR BK EUN USEU BRUSSELS
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.


 
S E C R E T BRUSSELS 005226 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, EAID, MARR, BK, EUN, USEU BRUSSELS 
SUBJECT: EU COUNCIL PERSPECTIVE ON BOSNIA REFORMS 
 
REF: A. STATE 257395 
     B. STATE 257497 
     C. SARAJEVO 3182 
     D. SARAJEVO 3197 
 
Classified By: Rick Holtzapple, PolOff, Reasons 1.4 (B/D) 
 
1. (C) PolOff has discussed the texts of Secretary Powell's 
letters (REFS A and B) to High Rep Solana about 
Bosnia-Herzegovina with Stefan Lehne, Solana's key Balkan 
policy advisor.  Lehne said that Solana's understanding of 
the situation and way forward in Bosnia-Herzegovina was 
generally in line with the themes of the letters, but not 
quite as clear-cut as we had presented it. 
 
2. (C)  The EU agreed that both police and defense reform 
were needed, as suggested in ref B.  But from Lehne's 
perspective, the specifics of what needed to be done were 
clearest in the field of defense reform, which he noted was 
largely an issue for NATO, rather than the EU.  He said in 
this area his impression was that the "details are all there, 
it is only a question of the pace."  But on police reform, 
while progress on this is clearly one of the EU's 16 
preconditions for beginning negotiations on a Stabilization 
and Association Agreement with B-H, it is not as clear that 
this must lead to a single structure.  (We note that Lehne's 
view is at odds with the EU position as described in REF D). 
The EU was "cautiously positive" regarding progress in this 
field, but the necessary final outcome of police reform "is 
not completely defined." 
 
3. (S) Lehne also expressed some caution about ref A's 
reference to "measures to target those in the Republika 
Srpska government who are most responsible for obstructing 
ICTY cooperation."  He did not argue that it was the wrong 
way to go, but said he was not sure that High Rep Ashdown was 
as intent on going after a broad swathe of SDS and PDP 
leadership as the US seemed to be suggesting. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
4. (S) Lehne, of course, does not have final say about what 
actions the EU might take against Republika Srpska officials 
-- such a decision would have to be taken by EU Member States 
in the Council.  But his reaction does not give us much 
optimism that the EU would be prepared to follow the US lead 
in imposing measures against a list of any length without a 
lot of heavy lifting from Ashdown's side. 
 
SCOTT 

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