US embassy cable - 04ABUJA2039

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 002039 
 
SIPDIS 
 
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - ADDED ADDRESSEE 
DEPT FOR INR/AA (SANDERS) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/19/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PINR, MARR, KPKO, MOPS, NI, SU, POLMIL 
SUBJECT: CONCLUSIONS ABOUT NIGERIAN MILITARY 
DECISION-MAKING AND DARFUR 
 
REF: A. IIR 6 871 0009 05 
     B. IIR 6 871 0005 05 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John Campbell for Reasons 1.5 (B & D). 
 
1.  (C)  Summary.  U.S. efforts to assist Nigerian Army 
deployment to Darfur were obstructed by the Nigerian Defense 
Headquarters, apparently at the highest levels.  U.S. 
provision of airlift for Nigerian troops to Darfur on October 
28 was deeply resented by Defense Headquarters and the 
Nigerian Air Force and has highlighted ongoing Nigerian 
military anger at continued U.S. reference to the Benue 
massacre and our concomitant refusal to support the 72nd 
battalion, which was putatively responsible for it.  The 
Chief of Defense Staff sees us as blaming the military for an 
atrocity that was the responsibility of President Obasanjo or 
others close to him. 
 
2.  (C)  The Darfur lift episode highlights that the 
President prefers to work outside conventional military 
command structure, indeed, without much reference to it.  But 
the President's personal focus on his role as an 
international leader outside of Nigeria combined with his 
incessant travel and unwillingness or inability to delegate, 
translates into insufficient attention and engagement to 
ensure that the military command structure implements his 
policies.  The civilian Minister of Defense and the Minister 
of State for Defense appear to have little or no involvement 
in peacekeeping decision making, and the military command 
sees our efforts to engage with civilians on Darfur 
deployment or other military operations as irrelevant, if not 
irritating. 
 
3.  (C)  Meeting these challenges and developing a security 
partnership with Nigeria in an AU context will require that 
we demonstrate our support for "African Solutions for African 
Problems" in our diplomatic and military tactics. We will 
also have to accept that it can take more time than we would 
like to work through operational issues and that identifying 
decision makers on any particular issue may be difficult. 
Military leaders may already have become sufficiently 
disenchanted with the U.S. to begin looking to build stronger 
ties with China.  End Summary. 
 
Military Obstructionism 
----------------------- 
4. (C)  In the cases of specific obstructionism outlined 
below, the Nigerian Defense Staff and Nigeria's DIA appear to 
have lost sight of the fact that our actions were entirely 
supportive of Obasanjo's and the AU's Darfur goals. 
 
--It was President Obasanjo and the AU that determined the 
October 28 date for Nigerian deployment to Darfur.  Yet as 
late as October 22, the Nigerian military had no sense of 
urgency, and were proposing a planning meeting for October 
26.   Only Chief of Army Staff Gen. Agwai's intervention-by 
telephone from Ghana-energized the planning. 
 
--On October 27, the Nigeria Air force refused to provide a 
diplomatic clearance for the USAF C-130 flight from Kigali to 
Abuja.  The flight had already left Kigali before the 
Nigerian Air Force relented, and then only because British 
funding for a Nigerian lift was not available. 
 
--The Nigerian DIA repeatedly denied our request for a USAF 
survey team to visit the airports at Port Harcourt and 
Calabar, a prerequisite for the USAF to provide lift from 
those locations. 
 
--The Nigerian DIA delayed for several days a response to the 
DATT's request to visit the 6th battalion, identified by the 
Army Chief of Staff for deployment to Darfur, to assess its 
readiness for its mission and identify the cargo that might 
be lifted by the USAF.  This assessment, too, is a 
prerequisite for the USAF to provide lift.  Eventually the 
Nigerian side relented, but refused the British DATT 
permission to accompany our DATT. 
 
5.  (C)  On U.S. provision of lift on October 28, Gen. 
Ogomudia lashed out at us through the British DATT (ref A). 
He said that the Nigerian Air Force was ready, willing and 
able to conduct the lift and that the U.S. "went behind his 
back" to do the mission.  Left unsaid was what he thought the 
U.S. motivation was, though he has been prickly about others 
questioning Nigerian competence 
 
Operational Environment 
----------------------- 
6.  (C)  Nigeria has an elaborate military hierarchy with 
large numbers of very senior officers.  In theory -- but 
probably not in practice -- the chief of Defense Staff, Gen. 
Ogomudia, is at the pinnacle.  However, the President 
regularly identifies himself in public as the Commander in 
Chief of the Armed Forces of Nigeria.  On peacekeeping 
issues, he appears to prefer to work directly with the Chief 
of Army Staff, Gen. Agwai. 
 
7.  (C)  On the civilian side, our experience has been that 
with respect to peacekeeping operations, Obasanjo ignores the 
Minister of Defense and the Minister of State.  After the 
2003 elections, President Obasanjo initially was inclined to 
serve as his own Minister of Defense.  In the end, in support 
of his efforts to promote civilian control of the military, 
he appointed the defeated candidate of his party for Governor 
of Kano state.  The Minister of State for Defense is a 
medical doctor who has proven to be energetic about improving 
conditions of service for military personnel.  Neither 
appears to have much operational role with respect to 
peacekeeping. 
 
8. (C)  We see through a glass darkly as to how Nigerian 
military decisions are made, as does practically everybody 
else.  Within the Nigerian government, legislative oversight 
of the military is only in its earliest infancy.  The 
military's operating budget is unknown to all -- including, 
we suspect, the President and Defense Headquarters.  For 
example, the military pays nothing for the electricity it 
receives from the relevant parastatal. 
 
9. (C)  The DATT, along with her colleagues,  operates under 
serious constraints imposed by the Nigeria DIA.  In effect 
she is forbidden to work directly with the senior reaches of 
the Nigerian military except through the Nigerian DIA. 
 
Conclusions 
------------ 
10. (C)  We suspect that the October 28 deployment date was 
determined by President Obasanjo and the AU without 
consultation with Gen. Ogomudia, but that Agwai was involved 
from the beginning. Subsequently, the Defense Headquarters 
appeared to be out of the loop, or, at best, several steps 
behind Agwai's Army Headquarters during the planning and 
decision making process.  Nevertheless, Agwai's own ability 
to direct his nominal superiors is unclear.  We do not think 
Agwai was responsible for the final Nigerian provision for a 
diplomatic clearance for the October 27 C-130 flight. 
Instead, there was a stand-off between the Army, which wanted 
the U.S. deployment, and the Air Force, which wanted to do 
it.  The stand-off ended only when the Air Force saw that 
with the British withdrawal there was no alternative. 
Obasanjo, characteristically, was out of Abuja on October 27, 
as was Gen. Agwai, and neither appeared to referee. 
 
11.  (C)  On the Darfur lift, it is unlikely that the 
military was deliberately stone-walling President Obasanjo, 
though that possibility cannot be ruled out.  More likely, 
however, the seeming incoherence of Nigerian military 
decision making, at least with respect to U.S. help with lift 
for Darfur, reflects the bureaucratic and administrative 
underdevelopment that is endemic throughout the government of 
Nigeria.  Obasanjo's own style probably exacerbates this with 
respect to the military. On Darfur, as on other issues of 
personal concern to him, he appears unwilling or unable to 
delegate much of the decision-making.  Yet, it is impossible 
for him to devote his attention to many of the operational 
details.  His personal focus is on his international 
responsibilities, not on the details of government: he serves 
as the head of the Commonwealth and of the AU, plays a major 
role in ECOWAS, and has ambitions for a Nigerian permanent 
seat on the UN Security Council. 
 
Implications for U.S. operations in this environment 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
12.  (C)  Obasanjo's operating style is unlikely to change. 
He will continue to make tactical and other decisions about 
peacekeeping without reference to the conventional military 
chain of command.  In this environment, we are likely to have 
the greatest success when our tactics are clearly supportive 
of "African solutions to African Problems" and take into 
account the slow, round about nature of Nigerian military 
decision-making.  However, this approach will also require us 
to accept that implementation will probably take longer than 
we would like or see as necessary.  We may be asked to 
provide assistance in areas difficult for us, and our 
assistance in areas where it is easy for us may not be 
accepted.  In terms of building our overall relationship with 
the military, the ending of the sanctions regimes  that limit 
our provision of training might go far. 
13.  (C)  In the end, our efforts to work with Nigeria's 
military while imposing sanctions and refusing to work 
with/support "pariah" units, may have pushed Nigeria's 
military leadership to look eastward for support.  DATT 
received a report (ref B) that highlighted the military's 
concern over perceived "U.S. disdain for the leadership role 
of (Nigeria) in the West Africa subregion."  This report also 
recommended to President Obasanjo "we turn to the Chinese for 
assistance, especially in the area of defense." 
CAMPBELL