US embassy cable - 04RANGOON1563

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NLD ISSUES ULTIMATUM TO THAN SHWE

Identifier: 04RANGOON1563
Wikileaks: View 04RANGOON1563 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Rangoon
Created: 2004-12-10 05:20:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PHUM PGOV KDEM BM NLD
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L RANGOON 001563 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/BCLTV, DRL 
COMMERCE FOR ITA JEAN KELLY 
USPACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2014 
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, KDEM, BM, NLD 
SUBJECT: NLD ISSUES ULTIMATUM TO THAN SHWE 
 
REF: A. RANGOON 1530 AND PREVIOUS 
     B. RANGOON 1149 AND PREVIOUS 
 
Classified By: COM Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.4 (B,D) 
 
1. (C) Summary: Excerpts from a December 2nd letter from the 
NLD to Senior General Than Shwe indicate a new effort to 
engage the SPDC and prompt a bilateral dialogue.  The letter 
is purportedly the "soft" approach, which, if ignored, will 
be followed up by more "confrontational methods."  Though the 
Committee to Represent the People's Parliament (controlled by 
the NLD but also representing ethnic political parties) has 
endorsed this approach, we have our doubts that if push comes 
to shove the Committee's minority group of non-NLD ethnic 
members will take personal risks without some promise of a 
seat at the negotiating table should the regime agree to 
talk. End summary. 
 
NLD Issues Ultimatum 
 
2. (SBU) On December 9th, the NLD released a statement 
including a portion of a letter dated December 2nd from the 
NLD Central Executive Committee (CEC) to SPDC Chairman Senior 
General Than Shwe.  The NLD has not made available the rest 
of the clearly lengthy correspondence.  The portion released 
calls for a genuine and open dialogue "clear of grudges" and 
based on "mutual respect," "understanding," and "cooperation" 
to commence between the SPDC and the NLD.  It does not call 
for tripartite discussions, but notes that unity of all 
ethnic parties and groups is essential for "a strong and 
everlasting nation."  Dialogue, the letter states, is the 
only way to ensure a "strong and stable Union" into the 
future.  It reiterates the importance the NLD places on 
national reconciliation and national unity and seeks common 
ground with Than Shwe by quoting statements he made in a 
mid-November speech that stress the importance of "national 
unity" as the foundation of democracy. 
 
3. (SBU) The statement notes that the Committee to Represent 
the People's Parliament (CRPP, formed by the NLD in 1998 to 
represent 14 ethnic and non-ethnic political parties), 
endorses the contents of the letter and calls for a dialogue 
to commence before the Burmese Independence Day holiday on 
January 4th.  There are no consequences spelled out if this 
deadline is ignored or missed. 
 
CRPP's Warning Shot? 
 
4. (C) According to a reliable CRPP source, the letter to 
Than Shwe is the brainchild of the NLD-dominated CRPP, which 
met on November 18th and again on the 29th to work on the 
draft.  According to the source, the CRPP decided to try 
first offering an olive branch to Than Shwe, convincing him 
that the two sides were after the same objective and thus 
good-faith negotiations should occur.  The source told us 
that the CRPP agreed that if this soft approach fails "more 
confrontational" methods would be used to break the political 
deadlock.  The source refused to hint at what these methods 
might be.  One proposal suggested in late August by some of 
the more impatient NLD regional leaders was to convene a 
shadow "People's Parliament" (ref B).  However, this 
provocative act still seems an unlikely move with NLD leaders 
Aung San Suu Kyi and U Tin Oo under house arrest. 
 
Comment: A Risky Strategy 
 
5. (C) The CRPP runs some risks by issuing an ultimatum 
promising a "confrontational approach" should it be ignored. 
Internal CRPP politics and discussions are not clear, but we 
have doubts that the Committee's minority group of non-NLD 
ethnic members would agree wholeheartedly to take personal 
risks by actively confronting the SPDC without some guarantee 
of a seat at the negotiating table should the regime agree to 
talk.  We would be surprised if the SPDC responds favorably 
to this initial soft-line.  If the deadline passes, and the 
NLD CEC decides to push for implementation of more aggressive 
measures, unity of the CRPP could come under strain.  End 
comment. 
MARTINEZ 

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