US embassy cable - 04BOGOTA12603

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UN MAY CONSIDER DDR PROGRAM FOR COLOMBIA; HUMANITARIAN ACTION PLAN IN TROUBLE

Identifier: 04BOGOTA12603
Wikileaks: View 04BOGOTA12603 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Bogota
Created: 2004-12-10 00:10:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: EAID PGOV PHUM PINR PREL CO
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BOGOTA 012603 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2014 
TAGS: EAID, PGOV, PHUM, PINR, PREL, CO 
SUBJECT: UN MAY CONSIDER DDR PROGRAM FOR COLOMBIA; 
HUMANITARIAN ACTION PLAN IN TROUBLE 
 
REF: BOGOTA 11339 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William B. Wood, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1. (C) Begin Summary:  UN Special Advisor on Colombia James 
LeMoyne, visiting Bogota this week, told major donors on 
December 8 that the UN was considering a demobilization, 
disarmament and reintergration (DDR) program for Colombia, 
assuming certain conditions were met.  UNDP is also exploring 
the possibility of a major conference on DDR to highlight the 
issue in Colombia.  Per reftel, LeMoyne expressed continuing 
concern about the "deteriorating" GOC-UN relationship in all 
three areas of engagement -- human rights, good offices, and 
humanitarian assistance.  He said that UN officials in New 
York "were stunned" that a presumed agreement on a 
humanitarian action plan had recently unraveled, and appealed 
to donors to help the UN and GOC fix it.  He believes that 
GOC officials are convinced that the document in its current 
form would have been used as another vehicle to criticize 
Colombia.  Worse, he believes conceptual and ideological 
differences have emerged between the GOC and UN over how the 
conflict is seen.  LeMoyne noted that the UN-GOC, high level 
working group would finally meet in New York the week of 
January 17 and hoped these issues would be addressed.  End 
Summary. 
 
2. (C) On December 8, Swedish charge arranged a meeting with 
major donors for visiting UN special advisor on Colombia 
James LeMoyne.  Along with the UNDP Resident Representative, 
Ambassadors from Canada, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and 
the UK were present.  Polcouns represented the U.S.  LeMoyne 
will remain in Bogota until December 10, and has meetings 
planned with FM Barco, Peace Commissioner Restrepo, Senator 
Pardo, the Papal Nuncio, and various other embassies.  Issues 
covered included UN discussions about a demobilization, 
disarmament and reintegration (DDR) program, delays in the 
launch of the humanitarian action plan (HAP), and the GOC-UN 
relationship. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
DEMOBILIZATION, DISARMAMENT AND REINTEGRATION (DDR) 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
3. (C) LeMoyne said that preliminary discussions were 
underway at UN Headquarters about committing to a DDR program 
in Colombia.  The focus was reinsertion.  While the GOC was 
offering as much as it could, it would not be enough, 
resulting, he said, in the return of ex-fighters into 
guerrilla or criminal groups.  According to LeMoyne, senior 
UN officials including the SYG, U/SYG Prendergast and Chef de 
Cabinet Riza, were signaling a "qualified maybe" and had 
solicited possible parameters and conditions for such a 
program.  While acknowledging that the UN had been too 
extreme in the past on the conditions it demanded of the GOC, 
LeMoyne said the UN would probably insist on at least three: 
(1) an official GOC request; (2) the creation of a separate 
GOC agency to manage DDR; and (3) passage of the "Law for 
Justice and Reparations."  He stressed that these were still 
at the discussion stage, and while he awaited a political 
green light from the 38th floor, he did have instructions to 
consult with major donors on the issue.  The group's reponse 
to the conditions was unenthusiastic (except for Switzerland) 
and LeMoyne was asked to investigate whether the UN had 
imposed similar conditions on other governments which hosted 
a UN DDR program. 
 
4. (C) UNDP Resident Representative Alfredo Witschi said 
that, in light of the discussions in New York, local agency 
reps were reviewing how the UN system could become involved 
in DDR.  He recommended that the issue be discussed in 
Cartagena in February to ensure a strong signal of support 
from the international community.  One idea being considered 
was an international conference on DDR, led by Iqbal Riza, 
featuring countries which had "come out the other end" of a 
DDR process.  Witschi also noted that the humanitarian action 
plan still under discussion (see para 7) with the GOC did not 
include a DDR component, but UN agencies were preparing 
themselves should a consensus emerge to add one.  Swedish 
charge Ingemar Cederberg announced that the GOS had 
identified an additional USD 300,000 as a potential 
contribution to UNDP, a substantial portion of which would 
likely be earmarked for DDR activities. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
UN-GOC RELATIONS DETERIORATE FURTHER: GOC BALKS AT 
HUMANITARIAN ACTION PLAN 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
5. (C) LeMoyne underscored that discussions on a DDR program 
could be affected by the increasingly strained relations 
between the GOC and the UN.  He reviewed the state of play, 
mostly repeating what he shared with the Ambassador on 
October 30, reported reftel.  He said that, in addition to 
the ongoing problems with the Office of the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights and with the good offices role (i.e. his own 
operation), the GOC was now balking at the latest version of 
the humanitarian action plan. 
 
6. (C) LeMoyne hypothesized that GOC officials, including the 
President, Vice President, Foreign Minister, UN permrep, and 
Peace Commissioner, have concluded that the GOC erred in 
permitting a large UN presence in the country, and that the 
UN has taken unfair advantage.  These same officials believed 
that there remains a conceptual and ideological difference 
between the way they and the UN see the conflict.  According 
to LeMoyne, the GOC views it as terrorism, "in the Chechnya 
model," not an internal conflict as the UN labels it. 
Furthermore, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human 
Rights in Bogota has become the enemy, neither transparent 
nor effective, and the GOC was now prepared to "take it on." 
 
7. (C) According to LeMoyne, the apparent failure of UN 
humanitarian agencies and the GOC to reach final agreement on 
a humanitarian action plan "stunned us in New York."  He 
surmised that the GOC, in particular its permrep in New York, 
concluded that the current version was drafted like a new 
human rights instrument that would be used to judge the GOC, 
and ultimately block support.  He appealed to the government 
reps present to help the GOC and UN fix it. 
 
8. (C) With respect to the good offices role, LeMoyne again 
reported that UN Secretariat officials remained inclined to 
suspend the good offices operation or reduce it 
significantly.  He also hinted that this would lead to his 
departure. 
 
9. (C) LeMoyne reported that the GOC-UN, high level working 
group, led by FM Barco on the Colombian side and U/SYG 
Prendergast on the UN side, would finally meet the week of 
January 17 in New York.  Given the ongoing difficulties with 
the relationship, LeMoyne had been ordered back to New York 
on Monday by Prendergast for two days of meetings, scrapping 
a scheduled visit to Brussels.  A note for the SYG on the 
state of play will be prepared before Christmas in 
preparation for the January meeting. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
10.(C) Following the meeting, UK Ambassador Thomas Duggin 
suggested that LeMoyne was "in overdrive crisis mode," 
exaggerating the problem between the GOC and the UN.  That 
said, GOC confidence in the UN has deteriorated to the point 
that any UN initiative, including one as potentially useful 
as a humanitarian action plan, is suspect.  This is something 
we should work to reverse in New York, Geneva and Bogota. 
UNDP's Witschi admitted to considerable dissension within the 
UN country team over the "pro-consul attitude" of OHCHR 
director Michael Fruhling.  According to Witschi, Fruhling 
was fuming that UNDP/Bogota recommended HCHR Louise Arbour 
attend the GOC-UN high level meeting the week of January 17 
instead of Fruhling.  Witschi believes that a high level GOC 
intervention with the HCHR is the only way to rein in 
Fruhling, and remains puzzled as to why it has not happened 
yet. 
WOOD 

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