US embassy cable - 04BRUSSELS5215

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NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUE ON TERMS FOR CROATIAN EU ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS

Identifier: 04BRUSSELS5215
Wikileaks: View 04BRUSSELS5215 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Brussels
Created: 2004-12-09 17:12:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PREL EAID HR EUN USEU BRUSSELS
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRUSSELS 005215 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2014 
TAGS: PREL, EAID, HR, EUN, USEU BRUSSELS 
SUBJECT: NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUE ON TERMS FOR CROATIAN EU 
ACCESSION NEGOTIATIONS 
 
REF: A. BRUSSELS 5125 
     B. THE HAGUE 3133 
     C. BUDAPEST 3181 
     D. VALLETTA 1099 
 
Classified By: Rick Holtzapple, PolOff, Reasons 1.4 (B/D) 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
1. (C) The Dutch text on Croatia that will be presented to EU 
FMs at the GAERC on December 13 should be unchanged from 
their original proposal (ref B).  But Austria, now with 
support from Luxembourg, can be expected to push alternative 
language that gets ICTY conditionality the wrong way around. 
A key factor would be getting those Member States who have 
been non-commital, or waffling, to reaffirm the EU's 
commitment to conditionality.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (C) Luxembourg, wearing its hat as the incoming EU 
Presidency, on December 8 suggested to the EU Permanent 
Representatives Committee (COREPER) unhelpful amendments to 
the Dutch-proposed text for the December 17 European Council 
(EU Summit) Conclusions on Croatia.  Rather than the Dutch 
proposal, where the EU would set a date to begin EU accession 
negotiations with Croatia "provided that full cooperation 
with ICTY has been confirmed by the Council", the Luxembourg 
PermRep proposed to "switch the key" so that the EU would 
begin negotiations on the date fixed UNLESS the Council finds 
that Croatia is not fully cooperating with ICTY.  Luxembourg 
coupled these proposal with the announcement that they have 
already invited ICTY Prosecutor Carla del Ponte to attend the 
February 2005 GAERC, and therefore argued this would provide 
a reliable trigger for a Council decision, if required. 
 
3. (C) Member States favoring strict ICTY conditionality 
expressed some surprise, and annoyance, at the Luxemborg 
initiative.  They told us they had expected such a tactic 
from Austria and/or Germany, but were not pleased to see the 
incoming Presidency land so solidly in that camp. 
 
4. (C) COREPER briefly debated the Luxembourg proposal on 
December 9 during an extended and restricted COREPER session. 
 Sources told us the chair, Dutch Ambassador Tom De Bruijn 
opened the discussion saying there were "bigger fish to fry" 
(i.e., Turkey), and the Presidency had no intention revising 
the text further, and so would stick with its original text 
on Croatia.  The UK and others who have suggested not 
including a date in the Conclusions said they would desist, 
if the Presidency's approach was adopted.  Luxembourg, 
supported by Austria and Germany, however, raised their 
proposal, but there was no consensus.  The Dutch text, 
therefore, will be that presented to the GAERC on December 
13, and the Dutch are unlikely to invite further debate on it 
there (although at some point a date needs to be inserted). 
A UK source said, however, that most Member States expect the 
Austrians to raise the issue. 
 
5. (C) A Belgian contact told us the GOB very much hoped to 
reach consensus on the Croatia text at as low a level as 
possible.  FM de Gucht has taken a strong stance on ICTY 
conditionality after being personally persuaded by del Ponte 
that the Croatians were hood-winking the EU; but the Belgian 
position could weaken if the Croatia issue is debated fully 
at Heads level, where German and Austrian Chancellors 
Schroeder and Schuessel continue to campaign actively for 
weak conditionality.  Our British contact noted that, 
whatever might be agreed at among  Ambassadors or even FMs, 
there would always remain a good chance of an Austrian or 
German "ambush" at the Summit on December 17. 
 
6. (C) Assuming the Dutch will not be able to avoid any 
further re-opening of the text, the position taken by some of 
the uncommitted Member States will be important.  The UK, 
Sweden, Belgium, and Latvia are definitely among those 
clearly favoring conditionality.  Slovenia has been waffling, 
apparently as it evaluates how best to advance its own 
bilateral issues with Croatia.  But FM Rupel is almost 
certain to speak up, and at length, if the issue gets opened 
a the GAERC, and it would be helpful to know which way he 
will go.  A contact here also indicated they had heard Madrid 
was considering coming out in support of the Dutch text as 
the best way forward.  If FM Moratinos would do so at the 
GAERC it would give the conditionality camp a big boost.  In 
the other direction, we note that some other Member States 
such as Hungary and Malta (Refs C and D) are moving more 
solidly into group favoring an easing off on conditionality. 
 
MCKINLEY 

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