US embassy cable - 04THEHAGUE3228

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THE NETHERLANDS: RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES FOR OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM

Identifier: 04THEHAGUE3228
Wikileaks: View 04THEHAGUE3228 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy The Hague
Created: 2004-12-09 16:51:00
Classification: SECRET
Tags: MARR MOPS PREL AF NL
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

S E C R E T THE HAGUE 003228 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/2014 
TAGS: MARR, MOPS, PREL, AF, NL 
SUBJECT: THE NETHERLANDS:  RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR SPECIAL 
OPERATIONS FORCES FOR OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM 
 
REF: A. STATE 251327 (NOTAL) 
 
     B. STATE 251753 (NOTAL) 
     C. THE HAGUE 3162 (NOTAL) 
 
Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY AMBASSADOR CLIFFORD M. SOBEL FOR REASONS 1 
.4 (B AND D) 
 
1. (S) PolMilOff made ref A demarche to MFA Security Policy 
Bureau Operations Office Director Rob Gabrielse on November 
26 and DATT also raised the issue with MOD ACOS Operations 
Air Commodore Pieter Cobelens.  Ambassador Sobel discussed 
this request with Defense Minister Kamp on December 8.  Kamp 
said he expected the Netherlands would offer special 
operations forces (SOF) for this mission.  He thought the 
Cabinet would take a decision to do this within the next 
30-60 days, with a view towards deploying Dutch SOF to south 
Afghanistan in April 2005.  We understand the deployment will 
probably consist of 80-100 SOF personnel from the Dutch 
Army's Korps Commandotroepen (KCT) and 100-150 support 
personnel along with three Chinook helicopters.  The Dutch 
plan to make these forces available for the full range of SOF 
missions.  Kamp said that parliament, whose concurrence is 
usually sought for military deployments, did not need to be 
advised of an SOF deployment, though they would be discretely 
informed of the mission outside of normal channels (which are 
usually a public Cabinet letter).  Kamp also noted there was 
agreement between MOD and MFA to go ahead with the 
deployment.  He said the Dutch might follow their SOF 
deployment by establishing a second Dutch ISAF PRT in the 
same region in 2006, in addition to their current PRT in 
Pol-e-Khomri, Baghlan province.  Kamp advised that he had 
raised the possibility of PRT cooperation with the Japanese 
during his recent visit there and had invited the Head of the 
Japanese Ground Self-Defense Forces to visit the Dutch PRT in 
Pol-e-Khomri.  He described the Japanese as "cautiously 
interested." 
 
2. (S) Comment:  Kamp's comments are the most positive signal 
that we have heard from the GONL on a possible Dutch SOF 
deployment for OEF for some time.  Such a deployment has been 
under discussion for more than two years.  During that period 
it has been the subject of disagreement between MOD and MFA, 
with each department alternatively expressing concern about 
the political risks of such a mission, including possible 
Guantanamo implications for any AlQaeda/Taliban members that 
Dutch SOF might detain.  We understand these concerns have 
since been resolved.  By linking this mission to a possible 
follow-on PRT, Kamp may be planning to package the deployment 
by presenting offensive operations (SOF) in combination with 
reconstruction efforts (PRTs) in a way that may be more 
palatable to the Dutch parliament.  End comment. 
RUSSEL 

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