US embassy cable - 04ANKARA6841

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CHP LEADERSHIP: SECULAR ELITISTS ALIENATE FELLOW TURKS

Identifier: 04ANKARA6841
Wikileaks: View 04ANKARA6841 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Ankara
Created: 2004-12-09 14:37:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: PGOV PREL TU
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 006841 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, TU 
SUBJECT: CHP LEADERSHIP: SECULAR ELITISTS ALIENATE FELLOW 
TURKS 
 
REF: ANKARA 6839 
 
Classified By: POLCOUNS John Kunstadter; reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
1. (C) Summary.  The ability of the Republican People's Party 
(CHP) to broaden its electoral and political support beyond 
its current base is limited by the sociological realities of 
the Turkish electorate, the public's negative perception of 
the party, and the failures of the party leadership. The 
party will be unable to overcome the current limits to its 
popularity and political viability unless it is able to 
narrow the chasm between its ideological preferences and 
contemporary Turkish realities.  End Summary. 
 
2. (C) CHP is the party of most of Turkey's secular elite. 
Most party members, accordingly, describe CHP as a 
contemporary, secular, and social democratic party. 
Left-of-center parties, however, have never received a 
majority of the vote in Turkey since the competitive 
multi-party system began in 1950.  Since 1983, the combined 
vote for all left-of-center parties has fluctuated between 25 
percent and 35 percent.  CHP received 11 percent of the vote 
in 1995, 9 percent of the vote in 1999, and 19 percent of the 
vote in 2002. 
 
3. (C) CHP receives most of its electoral support from 
relatively small ideological and sociological groups, e.g. 
"secularists", leftists, social democrats, Alevis, and "White 
Turks".  (Note: Alevis are heterodox Muslims who comprise 
about 10 percent of the Turkish population.  "White Turks" is 
a term understood to refer to the narrow elite descending 
from Islamized Balkan Slavs, Caucasians, and Jews who are 
widely seen as having only nominally converted to Islam, 
i.e., "White Turks" are people with no acknowledged roots in 
Anatolia.  In traditional usage, the 90 percent of the rest 
of the population is referred to as "Black Turks."  End 
note.)  Hard-core secularists, according to CHP MP Hasan 
Aydin, represent only 10-15 percent of the electorate. 
Pre-eminent national security analyst Faruk Demir estimates 
that "White Turks" comprise at most 10 percent of the 
population.  Alevis, have historically voted for pro-secular, 
left-of-center parties, but have more recently split their 
vote between the left and the right, according to 
center-right Alevi politician Reha Camuroglu. 
 
4. (C) There is, however, a great deal of overlap between 
these groups.  Most leftists, Alevis, and "White Turks", for 
example, are secular.  Even if CHP adopted a new dynamic 
leadership and ran a professional modern electoral campaign, 
it would be very hard pressed to win more than 25 percent of 
the vote, unless it broadened its appeal beyond its current 
base. 
 
5. (C) CHP has a reputation for being the party of "rich 
atheists," according to Aydin.  Deniz Baykal, the leader of 
CHP, and his inner circle have done little to alter this 
impression.  CHP's leaders are often dismissive of Islam. 
CHP vice chairman (and former career ambassador) Onur Oymen, 
for example, has publicly stated that Islam and democracy are 
incompatible and that Turkish democracy is impossible without 
secularism.  Baykal, a former university professor, and other 
CHP leaders tend to lecture in public speeches and they have 
a very condescending manner.  Most CHP politicians, moreover, 
dislike rubbing shoulders with the common voter or canvassing 
for votes.  CHP's leaders make little effort to listen to the 
man in the street's concerns.  They tend to believe that it 
is their responsibility to express their views and it is the 
people's responsibility to follow them. 
 
6. (C) This behavior is rooted in the fact that CHP's leaders 
are "White Turks".  In the late Ottoman Empire, forefathers 
of this group were accustomed to being a privileged elite and 
ruling over a subject people.  They promoted Westernizing 
ideas, a negative view of Anatolian Turks, and a skepticism 
towards religion.  During the early years of the Republic, 
"White Turks" had a monopoly on positions of power in the 
military, government bureaucracy, and academia.  "White 
Turks" also dominated the leadership positions in CHP. 
Finally, "White Turks" were able to take a leadership role in 
business because many of them received economic advantages 
from the state -- some "White Turks" started companies that 
received generous government contracts and others were 
awarded with businesses or property that had been abandoned 
by Greeks or Armenians fleeing Turkey or killed during World 
War I (1914-18) and the War of Independence (1919-22), or 
expropriated or taxed into abandonment starting in the 
mid-1930's. 
 
7. (C) Comment.  CHP has been unable to evolve ideologically, 
alter its condescending demeanor, develop coherent public 
policies, or expand its electoral base because Baykal and his 
circle are content to maintain the status-quo and wait in the 
belief that the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) 
will fail (REFTEL).  Lacking the imagination to broaden its 
base, CHP continues to defend a rigid "secularism" in such a 
way that it appears atheist or anti-Muslim.  CHP leaders must 
also shed their arrogance -- they need to listen to common 
voters and respond to common concerns.  Finally, the party 
must match the skill that AKP has shown for canvassing and 
block by block party building.  The current aversion to 
grassroots electioneering is no way to build a successful 
party.  End comment. 
EDELMAN 

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