US embassy cable - 04ANKARA6839

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 006839 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/09/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, TU 
SUBJECT: CHP LEADERSHIP WAITING FOR FAILURE 
 
REF: A. ANKARA 02153 
 
     B. ANKARA 01358 
     C. ISTANBUL 01729 
 
Classified By: POLCOUNS John Kunstadter; reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
1. (C) Summary. Main opposition Republican People's 
Party (CHP) does not have a constructive political or 
electoral strategy for confronting the governing Justice 
and Development Party (AKP).  CHP leadership is content 
to maintain its grip over the party, maintain the party's 
(eroding) representation in parliament, and wait for AKP to 
fail.  This approach, however, has contributed to the 
party's intellectual stagnation and exacerbated internal 
tensions.  CHP leadership must change or alter its approach 
if the party is to mount a serious challenge to AKP. End 
Summary. 
 
2. (C) CHP leader Deniz Baykal does not have a constructive 
political or electoral strategy for taking votes from 
governing AKP.  According to CHP MP Abdulkadir Ates, 
the CHP leadership is content merely to maintain its grip 
over the party, maintain the party's representation in 
parliament, and wait for AKP to fail.  Baykal and his inner 
circle, according to Ates, are waiting for an economic or 
foreign policy crisis to sap AKP's popularity and cause the 
party to divide into two or more groups.  In this regard, 
Baykal and his loyalists spare no opportunity to criticize 
AKP for allegedly betraying the Turkish Cypriots and selling 
out Turkey's interests to the EU.  They also use every 
opportunity to blacken U.S. policy, especially on Iraq, 
Kurds in northern Iraq, and the PKK and to accuse AKP of 
being a U.S. pawn.  In the aftermath of AKP's fall, CHP, 
according to this scenario, would come to power at the head 
of a coalition government. 
 
3. (C) The problem with Baykal's approach is that CHP may 
fall apart before AKP.  Since the 1990s, Baykal and his 
inner circle have manipulated the party by-laws to centralize 
the party machinery and tighten their grip over the party's 
central apparatus.  They have also moved ruthlessly to 
silence 
critical voices.  Baykal's authoritarian style has, according 
to several CHP contacts, led to the intellectual stagnation 
of the party and alienated many CHP reformists. 
 
4. (C) As a result, CHP's leadership has also been unable 
to address the ideological and electoral crisis facing the 
party.  CHP faces a difficult electoral environment.  Calling 
itself social democratic, CHP is a pro-establishment, 
status-quo, "secular party", but the majority of Turks are 
angry with the establishment, unhappy with the status-quo, 
socially conservative, and to a lesser or greater degree 
religious. Since 1983 the left-of-center parties have seen 
their combined vote generally hover between 25 and 35 
percent. 
Some CHP deputies believe that their party needs to adapt its 
ideology to new economic, religious, and social realities. 
The 
most notable advocate of ideological reform within CHP is 
former 
economic minister Kemal Dervis, but he has resigned from the 
party leadership (REF A).  Contacts across the board 
disparage his lack 
of will to fight for control of the party and note that 
he remains an advocate of top-down guidance (including an 
important role for the military) of a populace he has limited 
contact with. 
 
5. (C) Many CHP contacts are frustrated with the party 
leadership's inability or unwillingness to formulate a 
political, electoral, or public policy strategy to counter 
the rise of AKP.  According to CHP MP Hasan Aydin, only 60 
of CHP's 170-odd deputies support Baykal and the central 
party 
leadership.  Only a small number of CHP deputies -- 
currently less than 30 -- are in open rebellion against 
Baykal.  The majority of deputies, however, are hoping for 
new leadership, but afraid to publicly challenge Baykal and 
his inner circle.  This past summer a number of CHP 
deputies tried to organize a party convention to oust 
Baykal from the party leadership, but they failed (REF B). 
This fall, CHP Istanbul Sisli Mayor Mustafa Sarigul has been 
sparring with Baykal, but most observers believe that 
corruption allegations against Sarigul, his arrogance, and 
divisions within the opposition will limit Sarigul's ability 
to mount a successful challenge (REF C). 
 
6. (C) Several Embassy contacts assert that Baykal and his 
inner circle will face their most serious leadership 
challenges in 2005 as the party elects new leaders at the 
grassroots level.  In the past, Baykal and his crowd have 
successfully manipulated these elections to keep their 
supporters in power, but given the increased 
dissatisfaction with their leadership, the outcome of the 
2005 party elections is less certain.  It is clear, 
however, that the CHP leadership must change or alter its 
approach if the party is to mount a serious challenge to 
AKP. 
EDELMAN