US embassy cable - 04BRUSSELS5195

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 005195 
 
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, EAID, ECON, MNUC, XF, EUN, USEU BRUSSELS 
SUBJECT: ENGAGING THE EU ON THE MIDDLE EAST IN 2005 
 
Classified By: CHARGE P. MICHAEL MCKINLEY; Reasons 1.4 (B,D) 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
1. (C) The Middle East remains a nexus of friction between 
the United States and the European Union.  Since 9/11, these 
differences have affected our ability to work together on 
Iraq, nuclear proliferation in Iran, Middle East Peace, and 
the promotion of broader reform in the region.    The irony 
is that on each of these four issues, the EU largely shares 
our vision of the desired end state:  an independent 
Palestine at peace with Israel; a stable, democratic Iraq; a 
non-nuclear Iran; and a Middle East region pursuing political 
and economic reform. 
 
2.  (C) This common ground has enabled us to coordinate 
successfully our policies in the region, but only on a 
case-by-case basis and with considerable effort on our part. 
All too often, we are disappointed to find Europe pursuing 
policies in the region that diverge from, conflict with, or 
undermine our approach.  These difficulties, however, should 
not obscure the changes in the landscape.  The Europeans are 
coming to realize, for example, that their eighteen months of 
engagement with Iran have at best won a window of respite 
from the tough decisions ahead regarding Iran's nuclear 
ambitions and its unhelpful role on terrorism and transition 
in Iraq.  With Arafat,s death, there are also new signs of 
realism within the EU on how best to engage, and indications 
they are hearing us about not rushing to final status 
discussions.  On Iraq, while it is unlikely there will be a 
consensus EU decision to be more forthcoming before January 
elections are concluded, they are looking more actively at 
steps they can take to be helpful (the Paris Club debt 
forgiveness being the most striking example to date).  The 
EU, while sensitive on protecting its investment in the 
Barcelona process, is also supporting the Forum for the 
Future.  Finally, the EU remains a significant player on the 
resource front, providing over $1 billion a year in 
assistance to the region.    The fact remains that when we 
are able to bring the EU along on policy, its resources and 
political capital can act as force-multipliers for us.  This 
cable examines what recent experience indicates we can and 
cannot expect the EU to do with us in the Middle East in the 
coming months.  End Summary. 
 
Iraq:  What the EU is doing 
--------------------------- 
3. (C)  The transatlantic differences that emerged over the 
U.S. intervention in Iraq also deeply divided the EU, and 
revealed in stark contrast the shortcomings of Europe's 
efforts to forge a common foreign policy.  The EU's inability 
to forge a consensus on use of force in Iraq was seen in 
Brussels as a humiliating chapter never to be repeated. 
Nevertheless, the EU's External Relations Commissioner Chris 
Patten and its High Representative for Foreign and Security 
Policy Javier Solana determined by the spring of 2003 that a 
stable, democratic Iraq was in the EU's security interest, 
and began quietly to work with member states to build a 
consensus to fund Iraq's reconstruction. 
 
4. (C) They have been remarkably successful.  In the summer 
of 2003, Patten committed the Commission to provide 200 
million euros for 2004 -- equal to its contributions in 
Afghanistan -- and at the Madrid donors' conference EU member 
states added another $1.2 billion to this total.  The 
Commission is proposing another 200 million euros for 2005 as 
well.  Similarly, the Commission has consistently expressed 
strong support -- in public statements and with assistance 
money -- for the January 2006 Presidential elections. 
Commission spokeswoman Emma Udwin has made clear that the EC 
is not expecting "perfect" elections, but that the EC will 
make every effort to lend international legitimacy to the 
vote. 
 
5. (C) Solana persuaded EU member states to welcome the 
Interim Iraqi Goverment, and invited Prime Minister Allawi to 
meet with EU Foreign Ministers in October.  When the UN 
launched an appeal for funding for security forces to protect 
an expanded UN presence in Iraq, the EU quickly expressed its 
commitment to help.  When the Commission lawyers concluded 
that for legal reasons it could not fund military operations, 
the Dutch EU Presidency took on the burden of soliciting 
bilateral pledges from member states, receiving a total of 
some $12 million.  The next hurdle was how to transfer the 
funding, leading to protracted discussions with a UN 
reluctant to establish a trust fund for that purpose.  (The 
UN has now done so, although new problems have arisen 
regarding delays in withdrawals from the fund.) 
 
6. (C) The Europeans are looking at other ways that the EU 
can help support a successful outcome in Iraq that all their 
25 member states can support.  The Paris Club agreement on 
Iraqi debt forgiveness was a major step.  They have also 
committed themselves to support police and rule of law 
training.  And the Commission is preparing the ground for 
setting up a mission inside Iraq after the elections if the 
security situation allows it.  As follow-up to the recent 
Senior Level Consultative Group (SLCG) meeting with the EU, 
there was a recognized need for closer consultations with the 
US on how to engage on Iraq reconstruction. 
 
Iraq:  What the EU won't do in Iraq 
----------------------------------- 
7. (C)  As the EU has sought creative ways to support a 
stable and democratic Iraq, it has consistently staked out 
what for it constitute -- at least for now -- "redlines." 
The EU cannot, for example, be expected to take any steps 
that members like France or Germany would interpret as 
legitimizing the use of force ex post facto.  Not only does 
this mean no EU boots on the ground in Iraq (as distinct from 
troops supplied by individual EU member states, it means that 
until an elected government is in office and the U.S. has a 
firm departure date for the bulk of its troops, every appeal 
we make to the EU for additional assistance will be suspected 
-- by some -- as an effort by the U.S. to obtain back-door 
endorsement for our intervention.  The EU's second consistent 
"redline" is that the Commission will not put staff inside 
Iraq until the security situation is stabilized.  Thus, the 
EU has declined to deploy election observers inside Iraq. 
Instead, it will mount a remote monitoring mission in Amman. 
Similarly, the Commission has held back on opening an office 
in Baghdad, coordinating its assistance from Amman instead. 
 
Peace Process: what the EU is doing 
----------------------------------- 
8.  (C)  The EU's Javier Solana has consistently stated that 
Middle East Peace is his and the EU's highest foreign policy 
priority (the Balkans is his other area of focus).  This 
issue remains very much at the forefront of every 
Commissioner working foreign affairs, and is a central 
concern in European Council meetings as well.   In part, this 
is due to the strong sense of priority EU member states 
collectively attach to this issue -- Solana's job, after all, 
is to look for areas where it is possible to forge common 
policies, and the Middle East fits the bill. 
 
9.  (C) The EU has put its money where its mouth is.  They 
have been a major donor to the Palestinian Authority, and 
were heavily engaged in sustaining the reform agenda in the 
PA -- a crucial factor in establishing and sustaining 
effective Palestinian governance.  Following Arafat's death, 
the EU has focused on supporting Presidential elections in 
January, and on the steps Israel should take to facilitate 
the vote.  The EU is also intensely interested in providing 
observers for the election, in response to a request from the 
PA, and consistent with EU support during the 1996 elections. 
 
10.  (C) More importantly, and after pressure from the United 
States, and after initial skepticism regarding Israel's Gaza 
disengagement plan, the EU is now firmly on board working 
with other donors to support a successful withdrawal.  The 
tactical shift is noticeable elsewhere.  When EU frustration 
with the lack of progress on the roadmap surged in the months 
prior to Arafat's death, Spain's FM Moratinos (former EU 
envoy to the peace process) and Germany's Fischer indicated 
they wanted to see a more active EU policy or would consider 
taking independent initiatives.  In reaction, Solana prepared 
a blueprint for renewed EU engagement.  The purpose, in the 
words of one EU official, was to reign in Spain and Germany 
and ensure that the EU maintained the integrity of Quartet 
coordination. 
 
11. (C) In each of these instances outlined above, the EU, 
and Solana in particular, has been prepared to coordinate its 
actions with the U.S.  The indications are that they view the 
proposed January 9 elections in the Palestinian territories 
as an opportunity to reengage in the peace process in a 
meaningful fashion, and seem receptive to our pitch on 
step-by-step application of the Roadmap, with a focus on 
elections, security, Gaza withdrawal, and the emergence of 
effective democratic Palestinian institutions before moving 
to final status questions. As we move into 2005, however, we 
will need to be wary of European freelancing; PM Blair's 
proposal for an international conference on the Middle East 
in particular will likely gain momentum as the UK takes over 
both the G-8 and EU presidencies next year. 
 
Peace Process:  What the EU won't do 
------------------------------------ 
12.  (C)  The tactical shift cannot mask the fact that the EU 
does not share the U.S. view of the conflict in key respects, 
and even Solana has not been content with what he perceives 
to be an assigned secondary role within the Quartet.  The EU 
looks to the U.S. to use its influence on Israel to 
kick-start implementation of the Roadmap, and has been deeply 
disappointed by the lack of progress these past four years. 
In EU minds, the asymmetric capabilities of the two parties 
confer different responsibilities on each.  The EU believes 
that Israel, with all the power of a state, bears the burden 
for taking the initiative to make peace.  Europeans see 
Israel's occupation of Palestinian territory -- and continued 
settlement expansion -- adding a legal and moral 
justification to their views.  As a result, the EU holds 
Israel to a higher standard than it does the Palestinians, 
and many believe the US is not applying enough pressure on 
Sharon to moderate Israeli policies.  They hold a much harder 
view on Israel's separation fence, and the implementation of 
the ICJ decision. 
 
13. (C) At the same time, there is no sense that the EU sees 
a corresponding obligation on itself, as proponent of the 
Palestinian cause, to compel the PA to take real steps to 
curb terrorist violence.  Instead, EU officials talk of the 
"limited capacity" of the PA, given Israeli actions against 
PA security forces and its tight grip on the territories. 
The main result of the position the EU has taken has been the 
loss of credibility with Israel as a potential mediator. 
Neither the EU's expectation that Israel should take the 
first conciliatory step, nor its readiness to explain the 
PA's inability to do so (or even to respond), are likely to 
change.  This does not mean the EU cannot be a constructive 
partner, but it does mean that we will always need to devote 
a certain amount of effort to keeping the EU on the 
reservation, and limiting the potential damage it can 
unintentionally cause merely by restating its perspective on 
the conflict. 
 
Iran:  Engagement vs. Isolation 
------------------------------- 
14.  (C)  The EU and the U.S. have common ground:  we share 
the conviction that Iran is pursuing a nuclear weapons 
program, we have both stated publicly a nuclear Iran is 
unacceptable, and we have successfully kept Iran's nuclear 
program in the public spotlight.  But, where we conclude that 
Iran will only respond to pressure and isolation, the EU is 
firmly committed to a policy of engagement. 
 
15. (C) In part, the EU pursues engagement so persistently 
because, lacking a military capability, it has no other 
viable alternative, as a senior EU official has admitted. 
When engagement fails, as it has for the EU with Iran during 
the past two years, the EU response is to offer "more 
engagement." Hence the EU-3's recent initiative to provide 
sufficient "carrots" to entice Tehran to suspend uranium 
enrichment.  We view this as rewarding Iran for complying 
with commitments it has made and breached.  The EU sees it as 
an unfortunate but necessary compromise to keep open Iran's 
remaining channel for dialogue with the West, in the hope 
that the EU can influence the "reform" element inside Iran. 
 
16. (C) In this situation, our best ally in changing the EU 
view over time will probably prove to be Iran's own 
duplicity.  Sharing information that indicates 
Iran's response to the EU-3 is a tactical ploy, and not a 
strategic decision to forego pursuit of nuclear weapons, can 
help the EU draw its own conclusions about the 
ineffectiveness of engagement in this instance.  Whether the 
Europeans can be convinced to adopt tougher stances in the 
future is another question, but as Iranian intransigence 
becomes ever more obvious, it may be possible to move the EU 
away from blocking international sanctions in the future. 
 
Broader Middle East:  Reluctant Ally with Deep Pockets 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
17.  (C)  After initial hesitation, The U.S. and EU are now 
on the same track; our respective missions in the region are 
meeting to identify areas where we can work in parallel to 
promote political, economic and social reform in the region. 
Since early spring 2004, officials of EuroMed and the US 
Middle East Partnership Initiative have been pursuing a 
senior-level consultative process to improve information 
sharing and coordination of our respective reform efforts. 
We each provide about $1 billion annually to the region, and 
both the EU and U.S. have recently reviewed their assistance 
programs with an eye to making aid more conditional on 
progress on reform.  This linkage is explicit in the EU's new 
European Neighborhood and Partnership Initiative, where 
negotiated Action Plans provide EU incentives as specific 
reforms are enacted.  Clearly, there is potential for 
synergies that can help raise the profile of reformers in the 
region. 
 
18.  (C) Getting to this point with the EU, however, has not 
been easy.  The EU was skeptical of our BME approach from the 
start.  First, the EU questioned our decision to launch the 
initiative at high-profile G8 and U.S.-EU summits, fearing 
this would create the perception that we sought to impose 
reform on the region.  Next, the EU insisted that without 
progress on Middle East Peace, the initiative would appear 
insincere.  Third, given Europe's own historical baggage in 
the region, the EU was reluctant to have its programs 
identified with the U.S. at a time when they believe U.S. 
credibility in the region has fallen to record lows.  Fourth, 
the EU was concerned that we were proposing to create 
jointly-funded assistance programs, a concept that is a 
complete non-starter given the EU's complex assistance 
regulations and long budgeting cycle. 
 
19. (C) Finally, the EU was sensitive to having a U.S. 
initiative overshadow its ten-year efforts under the 
Barcelona Process to build relations and promote change with 
its Mediterranean partners.  In fact, the U.S. initiative 
opened a fresh wound among EU member states, who are 
privately divided over the effectiveness of the Barcelona 
Process.  Northern European countries view the program as 
completely ineffective; southern members see good value in a 
program that has bought stability and good relations with 
North Africa.  Only recently, the EU has grudgingly begun to 
acknowledge that, in contrast to the EU's Barcelona Process, 
the BME initiative has actually succeeded in putting the 
issue of reform front and center on the region's political 
agenda. 
 
20. (C) The Forum for the Future may indeed provide the 
launch of a new phase in US-EU cooperation on reform in the 
Middle East.  As we look beyond Rabat, keeping our sights 
focused on how we and the EU together can most effectively 
advance reforms, including by letting the EU take the lead on 
issues or in countries where it has a comparative advantage, 
will be critical to keeping the EU engaged with us. 
 
Comment 
------- 
21.  (C) In recent meetings by high-level officials in 
Brussels, the message from the new Commission is one of 
realistic engagement.  They will have to deal with the 
realities of national politics in member states, some of them 
with strong alternative agendas in the Middle East.  That 
said, there seems to be an opportunity for a revitalized 
dialogue with the EU that can become more operational in 
areas of key concern to the United States as the harsh and 
complex realities of the post 9/11 world sink in at new 
levels in Europe.    EU endorsement offers a legitimacy to 
U.S. initiatives in the region that no other country or 
institution can match.  When the U.S. and EU speak with a 
single voice, countries in the region will listen.  When the 
U.S. and the EU are divided, it is easy to play us off 
against each other and avoid taking the tough decisions 
needed for the region's long term stability and prosperity. 
 
MCKINLEY