Disclaimer: This site has been first put up 15 years ago. Since then I would probably do a couple things differently, but because I've noticed this site had been linked from news outlets, PhD theses and peer rewieved papers and because I really hate the concept of "digital dark age" I've decided to put it back up. There's no chance it can produce any harm now.
| Identifier: | 04TAIPEI3904 |
|---|---|
| Wikileaks: | View 04TAIPEI3904 at Wikileaks.org |
| Origin: | American Institute Taiwan, Taipei |
| Created: | 2004-12-08 10:05:00 |
| Classification: | UNCLASSIFIED |
| Tags: | PREL KPAO TW |
| Redacted: | This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks. |
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 TAIPEI 003904 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR INR/R/MR, EAP/RSP/TC, EAP/PA, EAP/PD - ROBERT PALLADINO DEPARTMENT PASS AIT/WASHINGTON E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: PREL, KPAO, TW SUBJECT: "CHINA TIMES" EDITORIAL ON U.S.-TAIWAN RELATIONS Summary: The Chinese-language "China Times" ran an editorial Wednesday (12/08/04) discussing the confidence crisis in interactions between Taiwan and the United States following President Chen's recent remarks on the timetable for Taiwan's new constitution and the Taiwan government's plan to replace `China' with `Taiwan' in the names of all its overseas representative offices and state-owned enterprises. Full text translation of the editorial follows. "Confidence Crisis in Taiwan-U.S. Interactions" The centrist, pro-status quo "China Times" editorialized (12/8): "For two consecutive Sundays during campaign rallies for the legislative elections, President Chen Shui-bian has been throwing out a timetable for [Taiwan's] new constitution and the government's plan to replace `China' with `Taiwan' in the names of all its overseas representative offices and state-owned enterprises. Immediately following Chen's remarks, the U.S. State Department promptly gave its response during its regular news briefing the next Monday (Washington time). With regard to [Chen's plan] to hold `a referendum on [Taiwan's] new constitution,' State Department Spokesman Richard Boucher said the Monday before the last that the United States takes President Chen's Four No's pledge seriously and Chen has to offer a clarification regarding whether his remarks have violated his pledge. As for Chen's latest remarks on Taiwan's name-change plan, State Department Deputy Spokesman Adam Ereli responded last Monday, in a more direct and impolite manner, [by saying] that regarding the name change, `Our view is, frankly speaking, we do not support it.' "Within just one week, the State Department addressed Chen's so-called campaign rhetoric by first asking him to clarify [his remarks] and then by clearly indicating that Washington does not support Taiwan's plan to change names because it believes this will unilaterally change the status quo of Taiwan. As far as we can recall, the U.S. government has never made one response after another in such a short period of time with regard to the words and behaviors of an R.O.C. president. Judging from the context of its responses, Washington was already very impolite and had gone beyond the [bounds of] international courtesy or protocol by asking in public for Chen's clarification the Monday before last. This week, Washington's clear indication of its attitude of not supporting [Taiwan's name change] was [a type of response] rarely ever seen in the engagements of the international community. [Washington's response last Monday] can be viewed as a rough intervention with regard to Taiwan's domestic affairs and a public insult for the Republic of China, including President Chen himself. "Why did the United States want to adopt such an unusual measure? Why was it so strict with Taiwan? These are topics that require serious attention and reflection from the Taiwan people as well as President Chen. The United States' response was actually understandable if [we] analyze it under the large framework of the international situation. To put it simply, in the face of a China whose national strength is on the rise, it is in the United States' strategic interest to maintain the status quo in the Taiwan Strait; but under circumstances where Beijing will not renounce the use of force against Taiwan, Washington naturally will have to do whatever it can to prevent either side of the Taiwan Strait from altering the status quo so that the [cross-Strait] situation will not get out of hand and, as a result, drag the United States into a war. "It is exactly because of such a consideration of its strategic interests [that] the United States not only will do all it can to ensure that the status quo will not be changed, but has also announced in public that whether the status quo is changed will be defined by the United States. The State Department's public articulation yesterday clearly stating that it will not support Taiwan's name change is, in fact, a result of the United States' subjective definition [of what constitutes a change in the status quo]. Washington believes that not only Taiwan's plan to change the name of its overseas representative offices, but also the move to replace `China' with `Taiwan' in the names of its state-owned enterprises, are attempts to change the status quo. "Even though the underlying reasons for Washington's immediate responses to Chen's words and behaviors which, according to the United States, might result in a change in the status quo are the U.S. national interests and the tacit agreement it reached with Beijing after negotiations, it is still regrettable and embarrassing for Taiwan to see such a strict response from the United States. Former President Lee Teng-hui got so angry that he even shot back with [the words:] `the United States is not Taiwan's father.' While feeling angry and embarrassed, what deserves our consideration is that even if the United States wants to respond, why can it not adopt a more indirect or gentle way but had to do it in such a straightforward manner and with total disregard for Taiwan's feelings? "To find out the reason, we believe that the ultimate source of Washington's tough and direct attitude is that over the past few years, our leaders have more than once exhausted the United States' confidence in and goodwill toward Taiwan. Let's first put aside what happened earlier when former President Lee paid a visit to Cornell University and [spoke of] his `special state- to-state relationship' doctrine that he had given no warning about to Washington in advance. During the four years of the Bush administration, Chen's doctrine of `one country on each side of the Taiwan Strait' and his insistence on holding a referendum by using loopholes both triggered new tensions across the Taiwan Strait and thus put the United States under heavy pressure from Beijing. The remarks, behaviors, and policies of [Taiwan's] former and incumbent leaders have woven into a picture of which the surface is Taiwan's consciousness of its sovereignty while internally it is actually moving towards Taiwan independence and building a new country. Such a picture, as seen in the eyes of the United States, is exactly an attempt to change the status quo. As a result, even though the United States has reiterated its basic stand that it does not support Taiwan independence and is opposed to any attempt by either side [of the Taiwan Strait] to change the status quo, it obviously felt that it has not done enough. Finally it has to use a preventive diplomatic approach to adopt a more severe standard for judging if the status quo has been changed. [What the United States] looks into is not only whether the move has really changed the status quo; instead, it will clearly and firmly stop any attempt to change the status quo by either side just to take precautions. "After Chen announced a timetable for Taiwan's new constitution, Washington asked publicly for Chen's clarification. Chen's only argument was that the new constitution might not possibly pass the threshold of the Legislative Yuan. Washington said this week that it does not support Taiwan's name changes, believing that [the plan] is a move to change the status quo. This time it was Taiwan's premier and the Presidential Office that responded [to Washington], stressing that the plan is merely meant to highlight Taiwan's entity and it has nothing to do with changing the status quo. We are not sure whether such an explanation will satisfy the United States. But it is certain that the United States' confidence in Taiwan is quickly eroding and its goodwill is obviously gone. Now the United States can only closely monitor the words and behaviors of Taiwan's leaders as if it is guarding against a thief; it has to make immediate and necessary responses and has no time to judge whether its manner is rough and strict or not. "After we analyze the pattern of the latest interaction between the United States and Taiwan, which, in a way, demonstrates the difficult situation Taiwan is in, we cannot help but ponder why the Taiwan-U.S. interaction has changed this way. Who has caused it and who has made it happen? Doesn't Taiwan have a better way of expressing itself other than acting and pushing recklessly? Can Chen take on all the consequences of his pushing the envelope? Or will it be all the Taiwan people who have to shoulder the consequences?" PAAL
Latest source of this page is cablebrowser-2, released 2011-10-04