US embassy cable - 04THEHAGUE3184

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 THE HAGUE 003184 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AC/CB, NP/CBM, VC/CCB, L/ACV, IO/S 
SECDEF FOR OSD/ISP 
JOINT STAFF FOR DD PMA-A FOR WTC 
COMMERCE FOR BIS (GOLDMAN) 
NSC FOR JOECK 
WINPAC FOR WALTER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/08/2014 
TAGS: PARM, PREL, CWC 
SUBJECT: CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION (CWC):  HOST COUNTRY 
AGREEMENT MEETINGS IN THE HAGUE, 29 NOV-3 DEC 
 
REF: A. REF A. STATE 240245 
 
     B. REF B. STATE 225581 
     C. REF C. STATE 225585 
     D. REF D. STATE 225592 
     E. REF E. STATE 225599 
     F. REF F. STATE 213871 
 
Classified By: Amb. Eric M. Javits, U.S. Perm Rep to the OPCW for reaso 
ns 1.4 (h). 
 
This is CWC-144-04. 
 
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Background 
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1.  (C) The U.S. invited a number of countries (Refs A-F) to 
send representatives to The Hague, during the 9th CWC 
Conference of the States Parties (from 29 Noveber-3 December 
2004) for informal bilateral expert discussions on Host 
Country Agreements (HCA).  With the exception of Luxembourg, 
the DoD led team was successful in meeting with all intended 
delegations (Norway, Denmark, Spain, Portugal, Jordan, 
Belgium, and Hungary).  Other HCA-related matters were 
discussed with Italy and Germany. 
 
2.  (C) All indications were that the discussions were 
beneficial in promoting a greater understanding among the 
host countries as to why an agreement should be aggressively 
pursued and concluded.  Delegations we talked to provided 
reasonable degrees of assurance that it was their intent to 
provide prompt responses to the latest draft texts provided 
to them. 
 
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Highlights 
------------ 
 
3.  (C) Several delegations wanted to know how many other 
countries the U.S. was attempting to conclude agreements 
with, followed by a request to obtain a copy of an approved 
agreement the U.S. had with another country.  They stated 
that having such knowledge and information would help 
generate support within their own country to conclude an HCA 
with the U.S. 
 
4.  (C) None of the countries provided any clear indication 
they preferred a legally binding agreement with the United 
States. 
 
5.  (C) Some countries assumed that our push to conclude an 
agreement with them may somehow be connected with the EU's 
recent call for a Challenge Inspection (CI) Action Plan. 
This, in turn, appeared to produce some reluctance on their 
part to engage in further discussions with the U.S. until 
they consulted with the EU.  The del however, effectively 
dispelled this misconception regarding an EU connection. 
 
6.  (C) Del addressed the HCA in general terms, noting why we 
felt an HCA was necessary and how it functioned as a 
communications and coordination plan, intended to help 
clarify expectations in circumstances where time was at a 
premium in light of a politically significant event. 
 
7.  (C) Del expressed an interest in hearing specific 
concerns any of the countries may have as soon as possible, 
noting we had the goal of concluding this agreement by March 
2005 (with exception of Jordan).  Countries appeared somewhat 
surprised, but generally receptive to our request for capital 
visits. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Summaries of Individual Discussions 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
8.  (C) Portugal: Attending for Portugal was Mr. Rui Lopes 
Aleixo from the MFA, and Ms. Rita Guerra, Permanent Delegate 
to the OPCW.  The del conducted a "near" line-by-line review 
of the agreement with the Portuguese delegation.  Aleixo 
pointed out that conceptually the agreement posed no problems 
and that he understood the need to conclude an agreement; 
however, he pointed out that he could not guarantee that they 
could agree on the format, explaining that an "exchange of 
notes" may be a better approach in order to avoid an 
interagency and Parliamentary review.  He also emphasized 
that a MFA legal review, not yet undertaken, would be needed 
to clarify whether Portugal can accept the draft HCA in its 
existing form. Portugal was under the impression that the CWC 
provided sufficient detail to conduct a CI, and thus 
questioned why an agreement was needed at all.  Del pointed 
out that the CWC only provided for requesting and receiving 
challenge inspections, as well as requirements for the 
conduct of the inspection.  It did not provide the necessary 
information for protecting national security interests, 
especially as it might apply for protection of another 
country's assets located within the host country's territory. 
 The del also pointed out that the agreement lays the 
framework for determining significant administrative, 
communication, logistical and policy details that the CWC did 
not address.  Portugal was also concerned about the timing of 
this request, hinting that the USG might be planning 
something that would require the HCA to be implemented, or 
that there was some connection between the agreement and the 
EU's recent call for a CI Action Plan.  Their concerns were 
quickly dispelled, however.  Finally, Aleixo did solicit our 
patience with concluding the agreement, pointing out that 
Portugal is undergoing several governmental CWC position 
changes.  In saying that, Aleixo stated it would be useful to 
obtain a copy of an existing agreement between the U.S. and 
another country, in mustering support for an agreement 
between Portugal and the U.S. 
 
9.  (C) Hungary: Mr. Istvan Fehervari, Hungary's Deputy 
Director for Arms Control and Non-proliferation, led 
discussions for Hungary.  Fehervari expressed concern 
regarding the need for such an agreement, as well as the 
legal status of the agreement, financial implications, and 
the MFA's ability to compel Hungary's CWC National Authority 
to execute the agreement.  He noted that, since US forces are 
not stationed in Hungary, there may be no need for such an 
HCA.  US replied that when we first contacted Hungary about 
an HCA, there was a large operational US presence in Hungary 
at Tazar, and that these forces had been inspected under 
different arms control agreements during the Kosovo crisis. 
Del also pointed out that there are continuing NATO exercises 
with Hungary that make the existence of such an agreement 
relevant.  Fehervari expressed concern about the relevance of 
this agreement in a larger context, wondering if the HCA had 
anything to do with US force redistribution in Europe or the 
EU's initiative on 
CWC CIs.  We noted that neither factor was a motivation for 
seeking an HCA now - we are simply renewing our interest in 
an agreement that had been initiated several years ago. 
Finally, Fehervari requested that we reveal what other 
countries we have agreements with and whether it was possible 
to obtain a copy of one of the agreements. 
 
10.  (C) Jordan: Del spoke with Jordan MFA Rep Saqer M. Abu 
Shattal, First Secretary, Embassy of the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan.  The del provided a fairly detailed conceptual 
overview of the intent and purpose of the HCA with Jordan's 
MFA rep, which he later acknowledged as being very 
beneficial.  His immediate concern, however, was to ascertain 
with which other countries within the Middle East Region the 
U.S. was negotiating or had concluded agreements.  Del 
explained that we are not able to reveal that information per 
the request of those member-States, and that we treat our 
draft agreement with Jordan with the same confidentiality. 
He was not surprised by our response and pointed out that 
other Arab countries' knowledge of any agreements with the 
U.S. is treated with suspicion and skepticism.  He pointed 
out that while Jordan's existing CWC governmental 
infrastructure had been created, there was little to no 
support staff in place.  The clear implication was that it 
may be difficult to provide a quick response that included a 
line-by-line review of the text.  He did state he would 
address the HCA with Amman. 
11.  (C) Denmark:  Del met with Danish Minister Niels Erik D. 
Jensen, Permanent Representative to the OPCW.  Mr. Jensen 
posed a few basic questions as to why an HCA was necessary, 
who else has the USG approached, how many agreements have 
been concluded and with whom.  Del answered these questions 
per guidance and expressed an interest in concluding an 
agreement with Denmark in March 2005.  Following 
negotiations, Mr. Jensen contacted Copenhagen to ensure that 
Denmark had the latest draft HCA text in hand and to query 
whether the text was actively under review.  He later 
confirmed that the text was being reviewed as requested. 
12.  (C) Norway:  Del approached Norwegian del with a request 
to cover the HCA and the need to move forward with concluding 
the text.  Norwegian del stated that they were under guidance 
from Oslo not to engage in any discussions until they had 
time to adequately consider the text.  In saying this 
however, they did acknowledge the importance of addressing 
the text and understood the U.S. desire to move forward with 
an agreement as soon as feasible. 
 
13.  (C) Spain:  Del met with Spanish MFA Rep Tomas Lopez 
Vilarino to discuss the HCA provided to Spain for review. 
Mr. Lopez acknowledged receipt of the text and stated Madrid 
experts were reviewing it.  He stated it had been Madrid's 
intention to have experts at The Hague for HCA discussions. 
It was decided at the last minute not to send anyone, 
however, due to other ongoing events.  He did acknowledge the 
significance of the agreement, and stated he would contact 
Madrid to highlight our desire to engage in dialogue on the 
agreement in the near future, as well as the need to provide 
specific comments to the text in the interim. 
 
14.  (C) Belgium:  Del met briefly with Mr. Filip DeClercq of 
the Belgian MFA and Mr. Dominique Jones of their MOD.  While 
not prepared to discuss the text line by line, their 
delegation was notably familiar with the subject and 
demonstrated little of the confusion over the document shown 
by some other delegations.  They stated simply that the 
document required extensive legal review, as well as review 
by other elements of their government and that they would 
convey to Brussels the urgency with which we wanted the 
matter treated.  Neither expressed hesitation or skepticism 
when del advised them we wished to pursue a substantive 
discussion of the document, with an eye toward finalizing and 
signing it, in the March 2005 time frame. 
 
15.  (U) Italy:  Del met with Italian MFA Rep Dr. Gianfranco 
Tracci to obtain a status update on the U.S./Italian HCA, 
which was scheduled to have been signed in Rome in Oct 04. 
Tracci stated that the agreement had in fact been signed on 6 
Oct 04. However, he added that the agreement still needed to 
be submitted to Parliament for ratification.  When asked how 
long he anticipated the ratification process taking, Tracci 
stated that it could take up to two years.  Del asked how the 
U.S. should treat the agreement in the interim.  It was 
Tracci's view that it should be treated as a formal agreement. 
 
16.  (C) Del also solicited Tracci's views on releasing the 
unclassified U.S./Italian HCA to other member-States.  We 
 
SIPDIS 
explained that, based on a number of requests, doing so may 
facilitate the process of getting other agreements approved. 
Tracci stated with a significant degree of confidence that he 
saw and anticipated no problem at all in releasing the 
agreement to other member states.  Del pointed out that we 
still need to consider the matter in Washington, and if no 
concerns exist, we would make a formal request to Italy for 
release of the agreement to other countries.  Tracci 
concurred with our approach. 
 
17.  (C) Germany:  Del met with MFA Rep Bernhard Brasack to 
gain more insight into Germany's request to have the HCA 
currently being negotiated with Germany be a more "ad hoc and 
generalized arrangement" than what was being proposed by the 
U.S.  Mr. Brasack pointed out that Germany's position to have 
such an ad hoc arrangement came from "high-up" in their MFA, 
suggesting they had little latitude to conclude the agreement 
in any other manner.  He also stated that the MOD had 
expressed little support for the proposed text as currently 
drafted.  Brasack stated it was Germany's view that the 
proposed text was logistically unfeasible to support and 
execute.  More specifically, he stated that too many German 
resources would be needed and consumed to support the 
envisioned size of the U.S. host team (50  personnel).  It 
was his view that the U.S. only needed to have a small 
contingent of liaison representatives (1 to 2 personnel) 
present to represent U.S. interests, and that we must trust 
Germany's ability to help protect U.S. interests during the 
course of a CI.  He also pointed out that the mutual 
notification requirements upon receipt of a CI notification 
did not make sense.  Finally, Brasack stated it was Germany's 
objective to demonstrate compliance as quickly possible, 
suggesting the U.S. desire to control the pace of the 
inspection (via full use of the CI timelines to prepare out 
assets) would create significant political problems for 
Germany.  In stating the above however, Brasack did not 
discourage the del from providing a counter-proposal to 
Germany's latest response to the U.S. draft 
 
18.  (U)  Javits sends. 
RUSSEL