US embassy cable - 04THEHAGUE3182

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 THE HAGUE 003182 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR AND WHA/CCA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/02/2014 
TAGS: CU, ETTC, PREL, NL, EUN 
SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/CUBA/LIBERTAD ACT: REVIEW OF POLICIES 
AND ACTIVITIES 
 
REF: A. (A) STATE 248337 
     B. (B) THE HAGUE 1639 (RESPONSE TO PREVIOUS TITLE 
        III REQUEST) 
     C. (C) THE HAGUE 1692 (RE. TITLE III WAIVER 
        MISUNDERSTANDING) 
     D. (D) THE HAGUE 2590 (UNGA RESOLUTION POSITION) 
     E. (E) THE HAGUE 2728 (MPS DENIED ENTRY) 
     F. (F) THE HAGUE 2758 (DUTCH POSITION ON POSSIBLE 
        EU POLICY REVISION - OCTOBER) 
     G. (G) THE HAGUE 3006 (NOV COLAT READOUT) 
     H. (H) BUCKNEBERG-SIBILLA EMAIL 12/2/04 (DUTCH 
        POSITION ON POSSIBLE EU REVISION - 
        DECEMBER) 
 
Classified By: DCM Daniel R. Russel for Reasons 1.4 (b/d) 
 
1. (C) Summary: Dutch government and society puts primary 
emphasis on human rights and freedoms in policies and 
activities toward Cuba.  While the Dutch adhere to the EU 
Common Position on Cuba, the GoNL is currently resisting 
Spanish-led efforts to unconditionally revise EU relations 
with Cuba.  Dutch NGO activities focus attention in Cuba and 
abroad on the human rights situation on the island, and 
prepare the way for a free post-Castro Cuba.  While the Dutch 
have limited investments in Cuba, a non-waiver of Libertad 
Act Title III would undermine cooperation toward our shared 
ultimate goal of a free and democratic Cuba.  Strong Dutch 
policies and actions toward Cuba, together with general 
cooperation with the U.S., make a renewed suspension of Title 
III of the Libertad Act a matter of national interest.  End 
Summary. 
 
Policy Ties Relations to Human Rights 
------------------------------------- 
 
2. (C) The Dutch government maintains a primary focus on 
human rights and freedoms in its policy and activities in 
Cuba, speaking out both publicly and privately against the 
human rights situation on the island (see Ref D for most 
recent example).  Officially, the Dutch adhere to the EU 
Common Position on Cuba, but are currently standing firm in 
the face of a Spanish-led effort to revise policy 
unconditionally (refs E-H).  While the Dutch stated in the 
past that they would insist that the Cuban regime release the 
75 political prisoners detained in March 2003 before the EU's 
June 2003 punitive measures could be revised, MFA Western 
Hemisphere Department's Cuba Policy Adviser Jan Jaap 
Groenemeijer expressed to poloff December 2 a cautious 
willingness among the Dutch to consider alternative policy 
only if they could be convinced it would be more effective in 
improving the human rights situation in Cuba, especially for 
dissidents (ref H).  Although stiffer EU policies toward Cuba 
would be preferable to many parliamentary and ministry 
officials (refs D, F), the Dutch EU Presidency role has 
restrained the Dutch government from actively lobbying EU 
colleagues over the past six months (refs B, E-H).  Dutch 
officials continue to voice human rights concerns with regard 
to Cuba, however, and have sought to frame EU discussions in 
terms of the humanitarian situation and increasing support 
for dissidents. 
 
Activities Focus on Human Rights, Freedoms 
------------------------------------------ 
 
3. (U) Several Dutch NGOs also help focus public attention on 
human rights in Cuba.  See ref B regarding activities of 
Dutch NGOs Pax Christi, HIVOS and NOVIB in Cuba.  More 
recently, Christian Labor Federation (CNV) has spoken out 
against changing EU policy, favoring paying more attention to 
the Cuban democratic opposition and pressing to continue 
present policy until the 75 prisoners are freed.  CNV also 
subsidizes the "organizational development" of CUTC trade 
union in Cuba, and sponsors the families of several CUTC 
members in prison.  Domestically, CNV has an ongoing petition 
campaign asking the public's attention for the Cuban 
prisoners, and signing letters protesting the Cuban 
government's treatment of CUTC members. 
 
4. (U) NGO Cuba Futuro has stepped up activities raising 
awareness among the Dutch and international public about the 
human rights situation and working for a democratic 
transition in Cuba.  Cuba Futuro organized the October 15 
journey of two Dutch and one Spanish MP to Cuba, which 
inspired several days of Dutch media coverage and a 
groundswell of opinion calling for stiffened measures against 
the Cuban government after the three were denied entry to 
Cuba because they planned to meet with dissidents.  Cuba 
Futuro maintains contacts with the Dutch parliament, European 
and international organizations, Cuban dissidents, and the 
tourism and business community to campaign against the Castro 
regime's violations of human rights.  Through this campaign, 
Cuba Futuro seeks to enlist informed businesses and tourists 
in helping strengthen civil society on the island by, for 
example, bringing books for distribution there.  Cuba Futuro 
has also sought to raise awareness in commemoration of the 
ten-year anniversary of the July 13, 1994 Cuban attack and 
sinking of the "Remolcador" tugboat, in which 41 people were 
killed attempting to flee the island, stressing that the two 
boats used by the Cuban Government had been provided by a 
Dutch firm with the help of export subsidies.  (The MPs who 
were denied entry to Cuba were planning to throw flowers into 
the Havana harbor in commemoration of the tragedy.)  Cuba 
Futuro campaigns against the European practice of providing 
export subsidies to assist the sale of development materials 
to an authoritarian regime which employs them as tools of 
repression.  Next year, Cuba Futuro plans to draw attention 
to the anniversary of the 2003 human rights crackdown, as 
well as to Castro's unfulfilled promises made six years ago 
during the visit of Pope John Paul II.  Cuba Futuro plans 
also to continue promoting at a national and international 
level further debate on the labor, human rights, and 
investment conditions in Cuba. 
 
Non-Waiver Would Distract Focus From Human Rights 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
5. (C) As Cuba Futuro works to expedite a Cuban transition, 
lead activist Luduine Zumpolle nevertheless voiced concern to 
poloff November 30 about the potential for a non-waiver of 
Libertad Act Title III.  She noted that the potential for 
U.S. lawsuits and sanctions on foreign firms would 
"unhelpfully complicate" relations between the U.S. and EU. 
Rather than focusing attention on the Cuban regime, the harsh 
reality of Cuban repression would be overshadowed by a 
resulting trans-Atlantic dispute.  She believed all partners 
should work together toward their shared post-Castro agenda, 
and emphasized that "Cubans suffer from uncoordinated 
international policy" and that "Castro gains when he can 
portray the U.S. as a villain." 
6. (C) Per Refs B and D, the Dutch have reiterated that under 
the terms of the 1996 "Understanding" the EU would almost 
certainly renew its case against the U.S. with reference to 
the Libertad Act if the U.S. did not continue to suspend 
Title III.  Furthermore, they strongly object on principle to 
any potential treatment of EU countries differently with 
regard to Title III waivers (refs B-D). 
 
Minimal Investment in Cuba 
-------------------------- 
 
7. (SBU) According to the Dutch Embassy in Havana, Dutch 
investment in Cuba is minimal.  Damex Shipyards, which 
operates a facility in Santiago (El Nispero Shipyard), is the 
largest Dutch business interest.  The large Netherlands-based 
international bank ING, which owned the Netherlands Caribbean 
Bank Cuba in Havana, has pulled out, leaving only a small 
representation office.  UK-Dutch consumer products company 
Unilever also maintains a sales office. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
8. (C) The Dutch remain a strong voice within the EU for 
maintaining pressure on the Cuban government to improve its 
human rights record.  The Dutch policy focus on human rights 
and freedoms in Cuba, combined with the Dutch government's 
energetic support for actions paving the way for a 
post-Castro free and democratic Cuba, weigh heavily in favor 
of a waiver of Libertad Act Title III in the national 
interest.  Failure to waive Title III would be perceived here 
as incompatible with our shared objective of drawing 
attention to the human rights situation in Cuba, and could 
have a negative impact on U.S.-Dutch and U.S.-EU cooperation 
in this area. 
RUSSEL