US embassy cable - 04AMMAN9672

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 009672 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/05/2014 
TAGS: IZ, JO, PINR, PREL 
SUBJECT: PM ALLAWI'S AMMAN MEETINGS WITH IRAQI 
OPPOSITIONISTS 
 
REF: A. BAGHDAD 2003 
 
     B. AMMAN 9485 
     C. AMMAN 9411 
 
Classified By: CHRISTOPHER HENZEL, CHARGE D'AFFAIRES, REASONS: 1.4 (B & 
D) 
 
1.  (S) On December 1 and 2 Iraqi PM Allawi and DPM Barham 
Saleh held meetings in Amman with Iraqi Sunni figures, most 
from Al-Anbar province, ranging from IIG-allied brothers Amer 
and Sheikh Majid ali Suleimein Dulaim, to prominent Sunni 
Arab rejectionists.  The latter category included the 
normally Syria-based Muadher Khorbit, believed by USG sources 
to have played a role in supporting the Iraq insurgency. 
According to our sources Khorbit met at least three times 
with Allawi, twice in small group meetings with other 
oppositionist figures, and once privately.  Khorbit 
subsequently claimed to several of our contacts that Allawi 
invited him to endorse and join the democratic political 
process and return to Iraq "with Allawi on his plane." 
Khorbit is still in Amman and, according to our Iraqi 
contacts, is considering Allawi's alleged offer.  Khorbit 
(who reportedly stalked out of one small group meeting when 
Majid ali Suleiman showed up) is among those expected to meet 
again with Allawi when he returns to Amman on December 8 or 
9. 
 
Small-Group Meetings 
-------------------- 
 
2.  (S) Other Iraqi Sunni Arab figures who met with Allawi 
and Saleh in a series of small group meetings include Sheik 
Tarik al Abdullah, a wealthy businessman and the de facto 
leader of a Fallujah-area tribe; Mahsen Naif al-Faisal, a 
Shammar tribal leader; Abdul Jabar Kubaisi, a prominent 
lawyer from Fallujah and reported business associate of 
Allawi's brother; and Abdul Hamid al-Muhmadi, a senior 
Saddam-era intelligence official also from Fallujah 
(reportedly a Director in the Iranian section).  Sheikh 
al-Abdullah, who has known Allawi for several years, said 
that in their meeting Allawi spoke about an Iranian/Islamist 
threat and the need for Iraqi nationalists and secularists to 
unite.  They also discussed the need to provide humanitarian 
assistance to Fallujah IDPs and return people to their homes. 
 Al-Abdullah said that the Sunni interlocutors strongly 
pressed for an election delay and criticized the dissolution 
of the Iraqi army, and asked that at least part of it be 
stood up again.  Al-Abdullah claimed that Allawi agreed that 
an election delay is desirable, but said he lacks leverage by 
himself to force a delay.  Al-Abdullah said that Allawi 
agreed that disbanding the army was a mistake, stressing that 
he personally had no role in this decision. 
 
3.  (S) According to al-Abdullah, the upshot of the meeting 
was that Allawi is enthusiastically in favor of organized 
Sunni nationalist participation in the political and 
governing process.  Al-Abdullah said that Allawi made a 
favorable personal impression on the group, who agreed that 
it is time for Sunni Arabs to identify leaders and begin 
active participation in the electoral and governing process. 
Al-Abdullah said that the group stressed to a sympathetic 
Allawi that they need more time to bring Sunni Arabs on 
board.  Al-Abdullah thought the meeting was helpful and 
productive, with Allawi taking on their points. 
 
Apparent Progress with Al-Anbaris... 
------------------------------------ 
 
4.  (S) Allawi's series of meetings culminated on December 2 
in a private encounter with Beirut-based Dr. Hameed al-Gaaod, 
de facto leader of al Anbar's al-Gaaod clan, and his brother 
Jalal.  Also present were Barham Saleh, the Iraqi Minister of 
Defense (an old friend of the al-Gaaod's), and an unnamed 
British  member of Allawi's staff.  The al-Gaaod's 
subsequently told emboff that they were impressed by both 
Allawi and Saleh and asserted that the discussion has created 
the possibility for "historic developments" for Iraq.  They 
said that Allawi stressed that he and the Kurdish parties 
share Sunni Arab concern about the potential threat to Iraq 
posed by what they described as an Islamist/Iranian alliance. 
 
 
5.  (S) The al-Gaaods reported that Allawi claimed Iran has 
given $300 million to Adnan Chalabi and others to organize 
and buy votes, and is purchasing voter registration forms 
from Iraqis for $100 each.  Saleh said that the Kurdish 
parties know that a sovereign independent Kurdish state is an 
impossibility and are therefore allying with Allawi to 
promote a secular and modern state.  Jalal al-Gaaod quoted 
DPM Saleh as adding "if I thought a Kurdish state was 
possible, I wouldn't be here".   Allawi speaking for his 
allies and Saleh speaking for the Kurdish parties told the 
al-Gaaods that Iraq needs Sunni Arab nationalists to enter 
the political process, and be their allies in thwarting the 
extremist threat and in governing generally.  As a sign of 
sincerity, Allawi asked that the al-Gaaods consult with other 
al-Anbar leaders and give him a list of three candidates from 
which Allawi would choose a new al-Anbar governor, as well as 
a list of "credible and respected people" to serve on the 
Al-Anbar Governing Council. 
 
6.  (S) The al-Gaaods claimed (and Allawi aide Izzaat 
Shabinder separately seconded to us) that Allawi is prepared 
to support an election delay if a critical mass of Sunni 
leaders make a "clear break" with rejectionists in favor of 
full participation by Sunnis in the election process. 
Shabinder underlined that only then would it be possible for 
the IIG to accept the argument that some extra time is needed 
"to prepare the ground" for broad Sunni participation. 
While the al-Gaaods claimed Allawi said the USG still needs 
to be won over to this concept, they were convinced that he 
will exert all his influence in favor of an election delay if 
this condition is met.  The al-Gaaods tentatively committed 
to work with Allawi in organizing a notional large group 
meeting of Al-Anbar notables in Dubai, where they will meet 
Allawi "face-to-face" and hopefully hammer out an agreement 
of cooperation and political alliance.  Allawi aide Shabinder 
accompanied Hakeem back to Beirut on December 3.  (Note: We 
are closely monitoring this process and will provide further 
updates.  End Note). 
 
...But Mosul Figure Avoids Allawi 
--------------------------------- 
 
7.  (S) One prominent Sunni who refused to meet with Allawi 
was Mosul-based Sheikh Dari Mashaan al-Faisal, leader of 
Iraq's Shammar tribe and a reported rival of Mahsen Naif 
al-Faisal.  Sheik Dari, brother-in-law of Saudi Crown Prince 
Abdullah and a distant relative of Iraqi President Ghazi 
al-Yawer, told emboff on December 1 that, while he personally 
advocates Sunni Arab political participation in the 
elections, the "Sunni street" currently perceives the 
election as a calculated step toward Shi'a/Iranian domination 
of Iraq.  He stressed that while the concept of democratic 
elections is overwhelmingly supported by Sunnis, 
participation in elections "stacked" against Sunni interests 
is not.  He estimated that at least a third of influential 
Sunni figures currently support an organized boycott if the 
January 31 elections go forward, with most of the others 
sitting on the fence.  Dari downplayed Allawi's efforts to 
meet with oppositionists in Amman, and said that he 
personally could not be seen meeting with Allawi at this 
point - not least because the "Sunni street" blames the IIG, 
"not the Americans," for the Fallujah attack. 
HENZEL