US embassy cable - 04MANAMA1814

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MANAMA 001814 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2014 
TAGS: PREL, BA, GCC 
SUBJECT: SAUDI STATEMENT ON GCC BILATERAL AGREEMENTS 
CONCERNS BAHRAIN 
 
REF: A. MANAMA 1792 B. MANAMA 1708 
 
Classified By: Ambassador William T. Monroe.  Reason: 1.4 (b)(d) 
 
 1. (C) Summary. Saudi FM Prince Saud, speaking at a 
conference in Bahrain December 5, criticized bilateral 
security and economic agreements between GCC countries and 
international powers.  Bahrain quickly reacted publicly and 
privately.  Publicly, it issued a statement defending its 
signing of the FTA with the U.S. as in full accord with GCC 
commitments.  Privately, the Crown Prince summoned the U.S. 
and British Ambassadors to register concern, and the King is 
set to travel to Saudi Arabia December 7 to raise the issue 
personally with CP Abdullah.  The Bahrainis are concerned 
about an apparent Saudi effort to ratchet up pressure on 
them, but have also made it clear this will not impact on 
their enthusiasm for the FTA.  End summary. 
 
2. (C) Crown Prince Shaykh Salman Al-Khalifa summoned the 
American and British Ambassadors December 6 to register 
Bahrain's concern about remarks delivered the day before in 
Bahrain at the concluding session of the IISS-sponsored "Gulf 
Dialogue" conference by Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud Al 
Faisal criticizing GCC countries who enter into bilateral 
agreements with international powers. 
 
3. (U) In his speech, entitled "Towards a New Framework for 
Regional Security," Prince Saud called for a new framework 
based on three interdependent components: sub-national, 
regional, and international.  At the sub-national level, 
Prince Saud recognized the need for meaningful political, 
economic, social, and educational reforms, but said they 
needed to be prioritized and designed on a country-by-country 
basis.  On the regional level, he said that security of the 
GCC countries will depend on collective efforts, stating: 
 
"It is thus alarming to see some members of the GCC enter 
into separate bilateral agreements with international powers, 
on both security and economic spheres, as precedence over the 
need to act collectively.  These separate arrangements are 
not compatible with the spirit of the Charter of the GCC. 
They diminish the collective bargaining power and weaken not 
only the solidarity of the GCC as a whole, but also each of 
its members in both the immediate and long terms.  In the 
economic sphere, the agreements entered into are in clear 
violation of the GCC's economic accords and decisions.  What 
is more important, these agreements shall impede the 
progressive steps needed to achieve full Gulf economic 
integration...."  (Full text of speech faxed to NEA/ARPI.) 
 
4. (C) Coming on the heels of press reports citing an unnamed 
official from a GCC country saying the U.S.-Bahrain FTA 
violated the GCC charter (ref a), Bahraini officials felt 
they were a particular target of this statement (although 
Shaykh Salman said the Kuwaitis "were jumping up and down" 
after the speech).  Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign 
Minister Shaykh Mohammed promptly issued a statement to the 
press defending the FTA, saying that it was consistent with 
its GCC commitments and that "there is nothing that violates 
the agreements." 
 
5. (C) In his meeting with the U.S. and British Ambassadors, 
CP Shaykh Salman said the King had been briefed on the speech 
upon his return to Bahrain the night before and instructed 
the CP to pass on his concerns to the two Ambassadors. 
Shaykh Salman said there is a danger for all of us if Saudi 
Arabia starts throwing its weight around.  This is something 
that needs to be managed, he said, and wondered if Washington 
or London had a position on this.  The Saudi position is not 
rational, he said, and if it becomes an issue at the upcoming 
GCC Summit, it could be a problem.  He added that Bahrain 
does recognize that Saudi Arabia is the most important 
country in the region, and that Bahrain will of course stand 
firm with the Saudis as they go through this "hissy fit." 
 
6. (C) The Crown Prince said that it was Bahrain's impression 
that Prince Saud was uncomfortable delivering a message that 
was dictated to him from above.  Before actually giving his 
speech, he shared the text with the Bahrainis, saying that he 
tried to tone down the message as much as he could.  The 
Crown Prince said that King Hamad will travel to Saudi Arabia 
on December 7 to meet with CP Abdullah and tell him that this 
statement was not helpful and was detrimental not only to 
Bahrain and other GCC countries, but also the U.S.   He will 
say that GCC countries need to work as partners with 
countries outside the region.  If Bahrain can't sign an 
agreement such as an FTA with the U.S., the CP asked, who can 
it sign such an agreement with?   Djibouti?  How will that 
help?  And what do the Saudis want Bahrain to do?  Withdraw 
from the Free Trade Agreement? 
 
7. (C) The Crown Prince reiterated concerns he and the King 
had made to Deputy Secretary Armitage last month about recent 
actions by the Saudis against Bahrain, including a cut-off in 
sales of sand (essential for the cement industry), and a 
failure to restore 50,000 b/d of oil that had previously been 
given to Bahrain (ref b).  He said that the King would raise 
the oil issue in his meeting with CP Abdullah. 
 
8. (C) Separately, just after Prince Saud's speech, UAE MFA 
Undersecretary Abdullah bin Rashid Al-Nuaymi told NSC PG 
Director Theroux that Saudi Arabia is "squeezing" Bahrain, 
cutting aid (both financial and oil).  "Please do something," 
he said, "This is bad."  He added that he was mentioning this 
as a personal comment, and not as an official message. 
 
9. (C) Comment: Bahrainis have made it clear, both publicly 
and privately, that Saudi pressure will not impact on their 
enthusiasm for the FTA, which they see as strongly in their 
national interest.  Nonetheless, there is clear concern that 
the Saudis are ratcheting up pressure on them.  Given 
Bahrain's economic dependence on Saudi Arabia, it will most 
certainly want to stress resolution, rather than 
confrontation, with the Saudis on this issue. 
 
10. (U) Baghdad minimize concern. 
MONROE