US embassy cable - 04ABUDHABI4411

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABU DHABI 004411 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/30/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, MARR, AF, IR, IZ, SA, SY, TC 
SUBJECT: CENTCOM CDR VISITS UAE 
 
Classified by Ambassador Michele J. Sison.  Reasons 1.5 (a) 
and (d). 
 
1. (C) Summary: During his November 28-30 visit to UAE, 
Commander USCENTCOM General Abizaid met Abu Dhabi Crown 
Prince/UAE Armed Forces Chief of Staff Mohammed bin Zayed 
(MbZ) and Dubai Crown Prince/UAE MinDef Shaikh Mohammed bin 
Rashid (MbR); toured Jebel Ali port and Al Dhafra and Minhad 
Air Bases; and visited aboard the USS Essex.  General 
Abizaid's discussions focused on UAE's important role as a 
stable and successful model for the region, Iraq, and U.S. 
military expansion efforts at key UAE installations.  End 
Summary. 
 
UAE Succession, Stability 
------------------------- 
 
2. (C) CENTCOM Commander Abizaid visited Dubai the evening of 
November 28 to dine with Dubai Crown Prince Sheikh Mohammed 
bin Rashid Al Maktoum.  Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Sheikh 
Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) joined MbR, along with Interior 
Minister Sheikh Saif and Dubai SSD Director Mohammed Al 
Qamzi. General Abizaid opened the conversation by offering 
his condolences on the death of late President Zayed.  MbR 
noted that according to the UAE constitution, his brother 
Maktoum (titular UAE Prime Minister) was to have served as 
acting UAE President for 30 days.  He and Maktoum had 
discussed this, however, and had agreed that it would make 
more sense to avoid an interim period.  When this idea was 
put to Sheikh Khalifa, MbR reported, Khalifa initially 
rejected it, insisting that Maktoum remain the acting 
President until the rulers of the seven emirates could agree 
upon a new President.  MbR then spoke up in the presence of 
the other rulers, and said "We rulers have already all 
decided that you should become President, and now."  In 
reality, MbR told Abizaid, he had not actually discussed this 
in advance with the others, but once he had made the 
announcement, they could not contradict him.  Khalifa 
accepted the Presidency, thereby avoiding a period of 
uncertainty. 
 
3.  (U) General Abizaid congratulated the UAE on the smooth 
and peaceful transition.  He also expressed admiration for 
the UAE's market-oriented growth strategy and economic 
diversification.  MbR and MbZ welcomed General Abizaid's 
description of the UAE as a model for other economies in the 
region, especially those struggling with violence and 
extremism. 
 
Iraq 
---- 
 
4. (S/NF) During the dinner hosted by MbR on 11/28, and at 
his dinner with MbZ on 11/29, General Abizaid thanked the 
Emirati leaders for UAE's support for U.S. and Coalition 
efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. He expressed appreciation 
for U.S. access to Al Dhafra Air Base and logistical support, 
and cited the ongoing training at the Gulf Air Warfare Center 
as a key example of bilateral cooperation.  On Iraq, General 
Abizaid emphasized several times that recent operations in 
Fallujah had revealed surprising information about the 
identity of those who were providing financial support for 
the terrorists there.  It was important to crack down on 
those who had been sending money to Fallujah. It was not a 
case of charity going astray, but a case of people giving 
money directly to the insurgents.  Those donors were as 
guilty as the insurgents themselves. The U.S. would be 
providing names to the UAE soon. MbZ and MbR indicated that 
they shared Abizaid's perspective. MbR reported that his 
State Security Directorate had recently uncovered a network 
of people, one of whom headed a company in Dubai, that was 
providing transportation assistance to fighters headed to 
Fallujah and safe havens to terrorists fleeing Fallujah. 
(Additional information on this development passed septel.) 
 
5. (C) MbZ mentioned to General Abizaid that he had 
first-hand information that to him suggested a clear link 
between Saddam and Al Qaeda: his personnel in Afghanistan had 
seen land mines originally provided by the Italians to Saddam 
that had been used (presumably by the Taliban) in 
Afghanistan.  MbR expressed irritation that Al-Jazeerah and 
other Arab satellite TV stations didn't show US troops 
"eating and fighting" alongside Iraqis. But at the following 
evening's dinner, MbZ and his brother, nformation Minister 
Sheikh Abdullah, voiced disdain of Al-Jazeera for its 
broadcast of the latest Ayman al-Zawahiri videotape. 
 
6. (C) MbZ said he was impressed by the positive coverage 
shown on Fox News of what the U.S. was doing in Iraq -- 
building schools and hospitals.  MbZ urged the U.S. not to 
allow captured prisoners to appear on TV unless they had 
first been "roughed up for a day" by Iraqi security forces. 
"When you put them on TV in nice clothes, with no bruises and 
their noses still straight," he said, it sent a message to 
other potential fighters that "if you go to be a martyr, this 
is how you will be treated." The U.S. needed to avoid sending 
the message that people who attacked us would be treated well. 
 
7. (C) MbR urged the U.S. to find "peaceful Sunnis" to run in 
the Iraqi elections so that "the Shi'a don't take it all." It 
was also important to work quickly to improve the economic 
situation.  MbZ asked whether the elections could be delayed. 
His concern was not the likely lack of Sunni participation; 
they could participate in the next elections.  What worried 
him was the strong Iranian influence. Yes, most Shi'a Arabs 
would vote first as Arabs, but many had been in Iran for many 
years and their votes will reflect that.  Abizaid responded 
that any delay in the elections would be a political 
decision, but that in his opinion it was best to move 
forward. MbZ asked about Sistani: he liked the man; saw him 
as a force for stability who quieted people, but wondered why 
he still had an Iranian passport.  Why couldn't he apply for 
an Iraqi one? 
 
8. (C) The following evening, MbZ again expressed great 
concern about the potential of a post-election Iraq heavily 
influenced by Tehran.  General Abizaid observed that a stable 
Iraq was also in Iran's interest and it was not helpful for 
Iran or Syria or any other nation to interfere with the 
process of stability in Iraq.  It was important for the U.S. 
signal that our goal was to ensure stability and to fight 
extremism.  Extremists would, given the opportunity, attack 
any government in the region. It was not in Iran --or Syria's 
-- interest for such extremists to succeed.  MbZ told General 
Abizaid that his brother, Sheikh Abdullah, had a "strong" 
relationship with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.  MbZ 
suggested that Abdullah should make a visit to Damascus soon 
to underline to Bashar that Saudi and other extremists 
represented a threat to him and his country.  If Syria was a 
hub for Al Qaeda and Ansar al Islam to move extremists into 
Iraq, then Bashar's sophisticated security services should be 
aware of this activity, MbZ and Abdullah averred.  Perhaps 
Bashar was not well-served by his subordinates, or perhaps 
some of them were being paid off. 
 
Saudi Arabia 
------------ 
 
9. (C) General Abizaid asked MbZ and MbR how they saw the 
situation in Saudi Arabia.  Was the country moving in the 
right direction internally?  MbR responded that, whereas 
leaders like he and MbZ "looked out 100 kilometers," the 
Saudi leadership looked out "only 2 kilometers."  With no 
long-term vision they had allowed extremists to become 
powerful, and now the region was suffering. MbZ added that 
the Saudi leadership was "too old." 
 
Afghanistan/Pakistan 
-------------------- 
 
10. (S) General Abizaid told MbZ and MbR that UAE troops in 
Afghanistan were doing a good job; President Karzai was very 
grateful. MbZ responded that the UAE was likewise very 
satisfied with its special forces' efforts in Afghanistan. 
Abizaid said the U.S. was in general pleased with the 
progress in Afghanistan.  The U.S. had recently killed seven 
Al Qaeda there, and the information on their computers had 
revealed that they had been there since August, but had been 
unable to carry out any operations. Next door, Musharraf was 
doing a very good job.  MbZ agreed that Musharraf was an 
important player, and urged the U.S. to support him. 
 
Dubai Port Visit 
---------------- 
 
11. (C) General Abizaid toured the Jebel Ali Port and Free 
Zone on 11/29, receiving a briefing on ambitious expansion 
plans by Managing Director Jamal Al-Majid.  Al-Majid 
emphasized that expansion was necessary because it was clear 
the region was going to need greater capacity, particularly 
as Iraq emerged as a strong market. The Iraqis moved quickly 
when they spotted an opportunity; for example, the number of 
used cars being shipped from Dubai to Iraq had recently 
skyrocketed. Likewise, business with China was up 
dramatically.  Business with Iran was strong and steady; 
activity at Bandar Abbas port had recently grown by 25-30 
percent, but the capacity at that port was now maxed out, 
with no room for further increases.  Noting 
that there had been some 630 US Navy ship visits to UAE ports 
Dubai and Fujairah in the previous year, General Abizaid 
expressed appreciation for the excellent support from Jebel 
Ali. 
 
USS Essex, Minhad AFB 
--------------------- 
 
12. (C) Following lunch on board the USS Essex and a tour of 
"Shed 66" (the Navy's warehousing facility in the port), 
General Abizaid boarded a helicopter for a trip to the UAE 
military's Minhad Air Base, where the UAE recently completed, 
at a cost of $20 million, a large warehouse and ramp facility 
that will facilitate provision of supplies to U.S. Navy ships 
in the Gulf.  The facilities were completed in late September 
2004, but remain unused pending further discussions between 
USG and UAEG.  (Note:  The UAE has asked for a single 
government-to-government agreement covering U.S. tenancy at 
all UAE military facilities rather than NAVCENT and CENTAF 
efforts to obtain separate agreements for their respective 
initiatives at Minhad and Al Dhafra.  Action on this UAEG 
request has stalled due to Defense Cooperation Agreement 
concerns.  Although the DCA was signed in 1994 by MbZ, the 
UAE contends that the agreement was never ratified by the UAE 
Supreme Council -- Rulers of the seven Emirates and is 
therefore non-binding.) 
 
13. (C) During his 11/29 dinner with MbZ, General Abizaid 
broached the issue of Al Minhad Air Base and asked what could 
be done to move forward.  After reminding the General that 
the UAE had paid for the Minhad facilities, MbZ  stated that 
the U.S. and the UAE need to negotiate a basing agreement. 
General Abizaid responded that the U.S.-UAE relationship, 
built on mutual trust and respect, was one of the most 
important relationships in his AOR.  He undertook 
to follow up on the basing issue with SECDEF. 
 
14. (U) This cable was jointly drafted by ConGen Dubai and 
Embassy Abu Dhabi. 
 
15. (U) This message was cleared by Commander USCENTCOM 
General Abizaid. 
 
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SISON