US embassy cable - 04TAIPEI3851

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 TAIPEI 003851 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PASS AIT/W 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, TW 
SUBJECT: CHEN PLANNING NEW STRATEGY FOR UN BID 
 
REF: TAIPEI 3604 
 
Classified By: AIT Director Douglas Paal; Reasons: 1.4 (B/D) 
 
1. (C) Summary.  Foreign Minister Mark Chen told the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) that he was surprised by President 
Chen Shui-bian's recent announcement that Taipei plans to 
apply for UN membership under the name "Taiwan" instead of 
the "Republic of China" (ROC) in 2005.  Officials claim that 
the policy debate is being driven by frustration over the 
failure of the existing approach rather than a desire to 
provoke Beijing.  Taiwan officials say that the Foreign 
Ministry is opposed to the proposal, that there has been no 
interagency coordination on the issue, and that the 
Legislative Yuan (LY) passed a law in 1991 stipulating that 
Taipei apply under the "ROC" title.  While MOFA officials 
claim that they will consult with Washington before any 
decision is made over the nomenclature issue, that process 
will likely have little impact.  Strong public and private 
cautions by the U.S. may be the only way to deter President 
Chen from his initiative.  End summary. 
 
Announce First, Coordinate Later 
-------------------------------- 
 
2. (C) Taiwan MOFA officials tell AIT that President's Chen's 
November 14 assertion during a campaign rally in Tainan that 
Taipei will apply for UN membership under the title "Taiwan" 
(Reftel) does not yet represent a formal change in policy. 
Victor Chin, Director General of North American Affairs at 
MOFA told AIT Deputy Director December 2 that on Monday, 
November 29, Foreign Minster Mark Chen informed MOFA office 
directors and other senior staff at a regularly scheduled 
meeting that the President had not consulted with him before 
he made his November 25 announcement on the campaign trail 
that Taiwan should seek to apply to the United Nations under 
the name "Taiwan." Minister Chen opened the floor for 
discussion, and all of the professional diplomatic staff 
strongly opposed the idea. 
 
Act of Frustration 
------------------ 
 
3. (C) When pressed on the motives for changing Taipei's UN 
strategy, officials universally cite frustration over the 
failure of previous attempts in the face of PRC pressure. 
MOFA's Deputy Director General for International 
Organizations Jieh Wen-chi maintained that there is growing 
sentiment in Taiwan that the 23 million people in Taiwan have 
been denied representation in the UN, a violation of the UN's 
principle of universality.  Jieh added that the annual UN bid 
forms a cornerstone of Taipei's foreign "political" strategy. 
 Jieh said that Taipei has tried to be reasonable in the 
past.  However, with no prospects for better treatment in the 
future, Jieh said Taiwan must raise the stakes, take some 
risks, and make a bid that is more distinguishable. 
According to Jieh, the new name could force both Taiwan's 
diplomatic partners and other nations to clarify their 
positions on Taiwan's status. 
 
If Not "Two China's," then "One China, One Taiwan" 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
4. (C) Former NSC Deputy Secretary General, Antonio Chiang, 
echoed Jieh's sentiment.  He told AIT that Taipei has been 
forced to choose "Taiwan" as its name because the PRC 
continues to reject the "ROC" in international fora.  Chiang 
asserted that Beijing's opposition to the "ROC" name in the 
UN and other venues is fueling the Taiwan identity movement 
and undermining the Chen administration's attempts to 
maintain the "ROC" status quo.  Chiang asserted that if 
Beijing really wanted to encourage Taiwanese to reject 
independence and keep open the possibility for eventual 
integration, it would agree to some form of divided 
sovereignty along the "Two Germanies/Two Koreas" model. 
 
Proposal will be Coordinated 
---------------------------- 
 
5. (C)  MOFA's Jieh told AIT that a proposal to change the 
nomenclature for Taipei's UN bid would need to go through an 
established interagency policy review process.  Jieh asserted 
that such a plan would also likely require approval by the 
LY, which in 1991 passed a resolution that authorized Taiwan 
to seek UN membership under the name of "ROC." Jieh 
acknowledged, however, that the UN initiative is currently 
under active consideration inside the Foreign Ministry.  Jieh 
said that the ministry has planned a series of strategy 
meetings in early 2005 that will address the legal, 
diplomatic, cross-Strait, political, and other aspects of 
changing Taiwan's UN nomenclature.  Jieh assured AIT that the 
Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) will also have input in this 
process.  Jieh said that the MAC will be commissioned to do a 
study on the impact of using "Taiwan" instead of the "ROC" on 
cross-Strait stability.  Jieh also stated that the strategy 
group would consider the potential domestic political 
implications of dropping the "ROC" in favor of "Taiwan" for 
the UN bid. 
 
USG Views Key 
------------- 
 
6. (C) Jieh emphasized that Taipei plans also to seek USG 
input into the initiative before making any formal decisions. 
 (Note: President Chen did not repeat the UN formulation in 
his December 5 DPP press conference, Septel.  End note). 
Jieh assured AIT that this strategy was not meant to move 
towards independence.  If the plan were adopted, Jieh 
asserted that Taipei would make clear caveats on this point. 
(Note: When Chen first raised the topic at a September press 
teleconference with New York-based journalists, he asserted 
that Taiwan's bid would be within a "divided sovereignty" 
framework akin to that used for the two Koreas and Germanies. 
 End note).  Jieh said that USG views would be the most 
important consideration in upcoming discussions and invited 
AIT to offer likely USG reactions to the plan. 
 
Will Politics Override MOFA? 
---------------------------- 
 
7. (C) It is probable, however, that politics will accelerate 
consideration of Chen's UN initiative faster than MOFA might 
like.  When Minister Chen told senior MOFA officials of the 
President's uncoordinated initiative, only Yang Huang 
Mei-hsin, a political appointee from the President's 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) defended the idea.  She 
argued that previous efforts to seek international support 
for Taiwan's right to be represented at the UN had failed, 
and its efforts to enter other international organizations 
had also failed.  She attributed this failure to the 
continued acceptance of the name "ROC." She urged that Taiwan 
needed to take a bold step in a new direction.  Using a new 
name would give the campaign new energy and momentum. 
Director General Chin observed that there is sometimes a 
value to novel approaches, but not when they risk the 
destruction of the nation and when there is no possibility of 
a safe withdrawal. 
 
8. (C) Yang, like Minister Chen, comes from the more 
fundamentalist pro-independence wing of the DPP.  Over the 
past several months she has successfully urged the Minister 
to support the increased use of "Taiwan" rather than "ROC" in 
Taiwan's international activities despite the objections of 
MOFA professional diplomats.  Both Yang and Minister Chen 
have had close relations with Vice-President Annette Lu 
(Hsu-lien), who has also been among the most passionate DPP 
fundamentalists. 
 
9. (C) Other MOFA office directors countered that an approach 
such as the President proposed would be highly provocative. 
It would require Taiwan to present a formal diplomatic 
communication to the UN Secretary General announcing that 
Taiwan is country, with the formal tittle of "Taiwan" or 
"Republic of Taiwan" and was therefore qualified to be a 
member of the UN.  These directors argued, according to Chin, 
that many of Taiwan's formal diplomatic partners as well as 
the U.S. would all strongly oppose this step.  Rather than 
increase international support, such an initiative would 
further diminish Taiwan's already limited international 
backing.  In addition, this step would clearly constitute a 
declaration of independence and cross the most important PRC 
redline.  As such it would isolate Taiwan and expose it to 
PRC attack, probably without U.S. military assistance. 
10. (C) Chin said that the Minister was clearly taken aback 
by the strong response of his staff to the President's 
proposal.  He instructed the International Organizations 
Department to prepare a summary of the Ministry's position 
and promised that he would convey this position to the 
President. 
 
Comment: How to Stop a Tram Wreck 
--------------------------------- 
 
11. (C) Given Mark Chen's long history as a supporter of 
Taiwan independence, given also his reliance in recent months 
on the counsel of DPP political appointee Yang Huang 
Mei-hsin, it is far from certain that he will in fact urge 
the President to accept the cautions of the MOFA professional 
diplomats.  Even if he does, President Chen has made it very 
clear that he does not place a high value on MOFA's advice, 
particularly when it would deter him from some new 
initiative.  Once again, it may require that the U.S. use 
coordinated private and public statements to make clear 
objections to what Beijing is likely to view as unilateral 
violations of the cross-Strait status quo by Taiwan. 
PAAL