US embassy cable - 04AMMAN9593

S E C R E T AMMAN 009593 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2014 
TAGS: PREL, ASEC, IZ, JO 
SUBJECT: KING ABDULLAH ON IRAQI ELECTIONS AND ALLAWI VISIT 
 
REF: STATE 254809 
 
Classified By: CDA David Hale for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
1.  (S) Summary:  The GOJ remains deeply worried that January 
31 elections in Iraq will produce either chaos, a Shia 
landslide, or both.  King Abdullah reiterated his support for 
Allawi and his readiness to help with outreach to Iraqi Sunni 
Arabs if Allawi wants it.  Allawi generated goodwill among 
some Iraqi Sunni in Amman.  End Summary. 
 
2. (S) Charge delivered reftel points, urging the GOJ to 
encourage Sunni Iraqi participation in elections, in the 
course of December 2 meetings with the King, including with 
visiting CENTCOM commander General Abizaid.  King Abdullah 
said he considered Allawi to be "on board" for elections as 
scheduled.  But both King Abdullah and Allawi were concerned 
over what happens if the atmosphere is not conducive to 
peaceful polls.  Allawi was candid, the King said:  the IIG 
is "committed" to elections, but, at the same time, it has to 
be flexible "and be reaching out to the Sunnis."  The King 
said Jordan still supported elections January 31, and would 
do what was needed to help, including by encouraging Sunni 
participation.  If there is a delay, Allawi should make clear 
that the reason is the need to include the Sunnis, not the 
insurgency. 
 
2.  (S) The King reiterated that the Amman conference of 
Sunni Iraqi Arabs, planned for November 10, was postponed at 
Allawi,s request because of the operations in Fallujah.  It 
will be Allawi,s call, the King said, on when the atmosphere 
is right to reconvene a conference.  Jordan was working hard 
to help; its support was "110 percent."  "We can hold a 
conference in Jordan at any time" if the IIG requests it. 
 
3.  (S) King Abdullah made similar points during a December 1 
luncheon with Senators Hagel, Biden, Feinstein and Chafee. 
The King said "we all want to make elections happen on time." 
 But it will be hard to do so if instability continues. 
Elections will produce a parliament to write a constitution; 
how, the King asked, can that work if all elements are not 
represented?  The King was worried that elections held 
without credible Sunni participation could lead to 
cantonization or civil war.  If there is a delay of the 
elections, he added, it should be accompanied by a program 
and timetable for a new electoral process.  An indefinite 
delay would be a mistake. 
 
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A Shia Menace? 
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4.  (s) Echoing a presentation made to the CoDel earlier by 
intelligence chief Saad Kheir, King Abdullah warned against 
Iran,s "negative role."  Iraqi Shias, loyalty was to Iran, 
not Iraq, and Sistani was working on their behalf, he said. 
The King painted a picture of a monolithic Shia Arab/Iranian 
threat to Jordan and Israel if they "take over" southern 
Iraq. 
 
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Some Iraqi Sunnis in Amman Take to Allawi 
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5.  (SBU) Meanwhile, PM Allawi and DPM Barham Salih met with 
a number of Iraqis in Amman, including Anbar province 
sheikhs, but there was still no sign of the large-scale 
conference that has been rumored for weeks.  Post,s Iraqi 
Sunni contacts were favorably impressed with Allawi, and 
claimed they were willing to take up his offer to ally 
against Shia extremists and work with him on persuading 
kinsmen in Iraq to participate in elections.  Some claimed 
Allawi was considering convening a political conference in 
Dubai in the coming weeks. 
 
6.  (S) Comment:  King Abdullah,s support for Allawi remains 
solid, and he will take his cues from Allawi when it comes to 
dealing with the problem of maximizing Sunni participation in 
elections.  The King is genuinely worried about the fortunes 
of Iraq,s Sunni Arabs, which he sees as linked to Jordan,s, 
and he shares the common Jordanian phobia toward Shi,ism. 
Post,s Iraqi Sunni contacts were uniformly positive on their 
meetings with Allawi, but admitted that the kinds of emigres 
who would say otherwise don,t meet with Allawi, or with us. 
 
7.  (U) Baghdad minimize considered. 
HALE