US embassy cable - 04BRUSSELS5125

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BRUSSELS 005125 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NOFORN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2014 
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, HR, TU, ICTY, EUN, USEU BRUSSELS 
SUBJECT: EU WRESTLING WITH WHAT TO DO ABOUT CROATIA NOW 
 
REF: A. STATE 254097 
     B. THE HAGUE 3133 
     C. VIENNA 4164 
 
Classified By: Rick Holtzapple, PolOff, Reasons 1.4 (B/D) 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
1. (C) The discussions among EU Member States in the Council 
on Croatia have been tense, and the EU remains fairly evenly 
divided on how strictly to condition open accession 
negotiations with Croatia on improved cooperation with the 
ICTY.  The Commission supports our position (REF A) and High 
Rep Solana has been delivering a firm message to the Croats, 
even if he is not taking any explicit position in the EU's 
internal debate.   For now, the Dutch and the British are 
optimistic that the Presidency's proposed text will hold 
through next week.  But Germany, at the level of Chancellor 
Schroeder, is pushing hard for a softer text.  Both the Dutch 
and British reps in Brussels would like to reach consensus at 
25 in COREPER on Dec. 8 on the Croatia text for the European 
Council Conclusions, to reduce the risk of trade-offs over 
Turkey or elsewhere in the end game closer to Dec. 17. 
Whatever we could do to persuade doubters (and stiffen 
supporters) that Croatia really can do more to meet its ICTY 
obligations on Gotovina would help.  END SUMMARY. 
 
2. (C) The meetings of the EU's Balkans Working Group (COWEB) 
on Nov. 29 and Committee of Permanent Representatives 
(COREPER) on Dec. 1 established that the EU remains firmly 
split on what to decide about opening accession negotiations 
with Croatia in early 2005.  The starting point of the debate 
has been the summit Conclusions language circulated by the 
Dutch on Nov. 29.  Two phrases are at the core of the 
discussion: 1) "that the remaining indictee must be located 
and transferred to the Hague as soon as possible"; and 2) 
"opening the accession negotiations on (date) provided that 
full cooperation with ICTY has been confirmed by the Council." 
 
3. (C/NF) The UK has been leading the camp pushing for even 
tougher language, such as by dropping mention of a specific 
date.  A UK contact (strictly protect) involved in the 
negotiations told us Dec. 3 that the UK position is a 
negotiating ploy, and London would be fully satisfied with 
the current proposed language, since it means accession talks 
would only open on that date after another Council decision 
-- by consensus.  The UK does not, however, want the Dutch or 
others to know that.  Joining the UK in support of a tough 
line has been the Netherlands; Denmark, Sweden, Finland and 
Lithuania ("all rock solid"); Poland ("so far"); and Belgium 
("a bit wobbly").  The Czech Republic and Portugal have only 
been willing to say that ICTY conditionality is important, 
but have not taken a clear position on Conclusion language. 
Slovenia's position is currently unclear to the British or 
Dutch.  In COWEB they supported the UK line, but the Brits 
now fear they may be willing to negotiate over ICTY language 
as they appear to be putting their highest priority on 
getting the Conclusions to include a reference to their 
bilateral border dispute with Croatia. 
 
4. (C) The Commission does not get a vote on the Council's 
decision, but sits in on all discussions.  Mia Asenius, who 
handles Croatia for new Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn, 
told us that he is satisfied with giving a date provided that 
Croatia cooperates with ICTY.  The Dutch proposal, she said, 
"could have been worse.". 
 
5. (C) Another camp, led by Germany and Austria (despite the 
Austrians' REF C claim they would support language setting a 
date but making cooperation with ICTY a condition for 
starting the negotiations), has been pushing to weaken the 
Dutch proposal.  They are joined in this effort by France, 
Italy, Spain, Ireland, Greece, Cyprus and Slovakia.  Hungary 
has been unclear, but appears inclined to go along with 
Austria and Germany.  Estonia and Latvia supported Germany at 
the Nov. 29 COWEB, and then were silent at the Dec. 1 COREPER. 
 
6. (C) Nonetheless, our contacts report that the current 
proposed language seems to be holding.  Dutch PermRep De 
Bruijn, summarizing the COREPER discussion, was reported to 
have said that they heard arguments coming from both sides, 
and so were inclined to stick with their original language. 
A Dutch redraft of the entire Conclusions for the Dec. 17 
summit is due to be circulated on Dec. 6, and expectations 
are the Croatia language will be unchanged (though our Dutch 
contact pointed out that the pen is being very closely held 
up in the Hague).  COREPER will debate the Dec. 6 draft again 
on December 8.  Both the UK and the Dutch would like to reach 
agreement on the Croatia text at that meeting, but are unsure 
of the chances. 
 
7. (C/NF) The major risk, from both the Dutch and British 
perspective, is what kinds of deals, potentially involving 
Conclusion language on Turkey, might be made if the issue 
gets pushed higher than COREPER.  And Berlin is reported to 
have already begun.  Chancellor Schroeder has been arguing 
the German view with Chirac, and on Dec. 3 spoke with Belgian 
PM Verhofstadt, and is calling around to several other 
capitals.   This German lobbying effort has left the UK 
worried that support from Belgium (despite a strong stand at 
the level of FM de Gucht) and Poland could go wobbly (our 
contacts even worry the UK might wobble if this language 
isn't locked in prior to the summit).  The Vatican has 
reportedly also weighed in, with a series of demarches to EU 
Member States arguing that the EU should not hold an entire 
country hostage to the fate of one man. 
 
8. (C) The Croatians, meanwhile, continue a furious round of 
diplomacy.  FM Zuzul met with Solana on Dec. 3, looking "very 
nervous", according to an EU official.  Zuzul argued the 
GoC's overall good record of cooperation with ICTY recently 
should not be ignored just because of the Gotovina case. 
Solana's response, we were told by his staff, was "you have a 
problem, you know the rules, you have a couple of weeks.  We 
understand it may not be easy for you, but do your best to 
solve this." 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
9. (C) We do not expect the EU will solve this issue on 
December 8.  If Schroeder is making calls, Berlin is unlikely 
to let the issue be resolved at PermRep-level.  The German 
lobbying effort is particularly worrying, and is reportedly 
based largely on arguing the unreliability of Carla del 
Ponte.  While we may share their doubts about del Ponte, 
Berlin is vulnerable in its arguments that the EU should 
disregard the judgment of a duly appointed, UN-authorized 
official under international law.  Member States such as 
Greece, Spain, Italy or Austria, who have never been strong 
advocates of conditionality, are likely beyond reach.  But we 
fear several other Member States just do not understand that 
between now and any date proposed for opening Croatia's 
negotiations (March 22 currently leads the betting) is the 
window of maximum leverage over the GoC.  As such, they are 
susceptible to Croatian and German arguments that there is 
nothing more Zagreb could be doing to catch the man. 
Whatever we could do to persuade doubters such as Hungary, 
Slovakia, Estonia or Latvia (and stiffen supporters such as 
Poland, Belgium, Portugal or the Czech Republic) that Croatia 
really can do more to meet its obligations would help. 
 
MCKINLEY