US embassy cable - 04DJIBOUTI1542

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 DJIBOUTI 001542 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF, AF/E AND PM; DOD FOR ISA AFRICA DAS THERESA 
WHELAN; CJTF-HOA FOR MARCENT COMMANDER AND CJTF-HOA 
COMMANDER GENERAL SAMUEL HELLAND 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/03/2014 
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, MARR, MASS, EAIR, DJ 
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT GUELLEH ON CAMP LEMONIER ACCESS 
NEGOTIATIONS 
 
REF: DJIBOUTI 1498 
 
Classified By: AMBASSADOR MARGUERITA D. RAGSDALE. 
REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
1. (C)  Ambassador met with President Ismail Omar Guelleh 
December 2, at her request, to review progress in the U.S. 
bilateral relationship and to solicit the President's 
perspectives on regional developments.  The meeting took 
place at the Presidential Palace.  Ambassador and Guelleh 
were joined by Pol/Econ officer (notetaker for Embassy) and 
Minister of the Presidency Osman Ahmed (notetaker for 
Guelleh).  During the discussions, Ambassador raised Camp 
Lemonier access/lease negotiations currently underway in 
Washington between the U.S. Department of Defense and 
Djibouti's ambassador, Roble Olhaye. 
 
2. (C) Speaking in English, Guelleh responded that talks were 
proceeding slowly and that it had been difficult working with 
interlocutors at the Department of Defense. He said he did 
not understand why the Department of State and White House 
were not engaged in the negotiating process.  The Department 
of Defense "lacks experience" and prefers to "impose demands" 
rather than negotiate.  He concluded that the Department of 
Defense "had become so large" and "tentaculaire" (French, 
meaning tentacular, sprawling) "that it now wants to act 
fully independent of the State Department."  Guelleh said he 
had asked Olhaye to seek a meeting with White House staff and 
State to make them aware of difficulties in negotiations, in 
order that they can assist should problems arise. 
 
3. (C) Ambassador asked Guelleh if Olhaye had briefed him on 
the U.S. military's land requirements at Lemonier.  She 
explained that the U.S. military was interested in use of all 
the territory extending from the existing Camp perimeter to 
and including the nearby island.  Guelleh nodded that he was 
aware, and said "that's a lot of land."  "We are ready to 
give you all the land you want," he added, "but you have to 
give us a place to go."  Ambassador noted that Sultan Sulayem 
and Abdurrahman Boreh had put forward a proposal to her and 
General Helland, in a recent meeting (see reftel), that the 
U.S. take over the existing Ambouli airport for military use 
and construct a new international airport elsewhere in 
exchange.  She said the Sulayem/Boreh proposal initially had 
no clarification of a role for France, although the two 
subsequently suggested that France and the U.S. could share 
use of Ambouli.  She asked Guelleh if he was aware of the 
proposal.  He said he was aware of it and that he had also 
briefed Olhaye.  He asked the Ambassador what the U.S. 
thought of the proposal. 
 
4. (C) Ambassador replied that it was difficult for the U.S. 
to respond.  She said Sulayem and Boreh are not members of 
the Government of Djibouti.  If their proposal is a 
Government proposal, then he (Guelleh) might ask Ambassador 
Olhaye to raise it directly with Deputy Assistant Secretary 
Whelan.  Guelleh responded that he did not wish to put the 
proposal on the table until he had some preliminary reaction 
from the U.S.  If the U.S. were interested, Dubai Ports 
International (Sulayem's company) would be responsible for 
building a new terminal building and for extending and 
preparing the runway.  The U.S. would be responsible for 
taxiways, aircraft parking areas, and the air traffic control 
tower.  France would cover the rest of the airport 
infrastructure.  Ambassador asked Guelleh if he thought 
France would/could finance construction of a new airport? 
Guelleh responded that he "would talk to them" and also that 
he was certain they would be willing to pay their share of 
costs. (Comment: It was clear to Ambassador that Guelleh was 
not prepared to raise it with the French until he had an 
indication of U.S. interest in the overall plan. End comment) 
 Ambassador told Guelleh she would share his views with 
Washington. 
 
5. (C) Guelleh went on to say that he wanted a single 
agreement to encompass all issues surrounding the U.S. lease 
of Lemonier.  Ambassador explained that it would not be 
possible to combine the three into a single element, given 
the need for new negotiating authority, possibly under 
congressional mandate, were there to be a single agreement. 
Such a move would only further delay matters.  Guelleh 
appeared to understand, saying that "if it is the desire of 
our counterparts, we don't mind keeping those as three 
different ones."  Ambassador recounted the three for 
information purposes, to which Guelleh responded that the 
"Acquisitions and Cross Services Agreement (ACSA)" was "the 
most important."  He said the ACSA was "more profitable" for 
Djibouti.  However, he continued, it is not being implemented 
"perhaps because of the laxity of Djibouti."  Ambassador 
stated that the ACSA remains in force but that she understood 
Djibouti had not presented the necessary documentation to 
enable that payments be made.  Guelleh admitted that this was 
a problem, saying "that is why I refer to our laxity."  He 
did not say if there were immediate plans to address the 
issue. 
 
6. (C) Comment: Guelleh is clearly ill-at-ease by what he 
sees as "slow" and "difficult" negotiations in Washington. 
Some of this concern may reflect the influence of Abdurrahman 
Boreh, who made a similar point recently to Ambassador. 
Guelleh and Boreh want to keep the U.S. military account in 
Djibouti. There is no doubt on this score.  The proposal that 
the U.S. military join in an airport construction project in 
exchange for more land and benefits at Lemonier  -- which 
Guelleh appears to support in principle -- is intriguing on 
the surface.  How it would/could work in practice is another 
matter.  Sulayem has estimated a total construction price tag 
of USD 100 million.  If accurate, the U.S. share would be 
roughly a third -- not bad if the U.S. had a long-term lease 
and no other cost requirements under a new lease agreement. 
However, maintenance and preparation of Ambouli would need to 
be factored into the equation as well as whether a mechanism 
exists within Defense to accommodate such a scheme.  For the 
new airport, would there be a fixed charge to each partner? 
Who would manage the project?  How would cost overruns be 
handled?  Guelleh implies that details such as these could be 
worked out IF the U.S. first expresses interest.  Over to the 
Defense negotiating team.  End comment. 
RAGSDALE