US embassy cable - 04OTTAWA3240

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CANADIAN PARLIAMENT'S INITIAL REACTION TO PRESIDENT'S VISIT FOCUSES ON BSE AND MISSILE DEFENSE

Identifier: 04OTTAWA3240
Wikileaks: View 04OTTAWA3240 at Wikileaks.org
Origin: Embassy Ottawa
Created: 2004-12-02 22:12:00
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Tags: CA PARM PGOV PREL Missile Defense
Redacted: This cable was not redacted by Wikileaks.
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 OTTAWA 003240 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/01/2009 
TAGS: CA, PARM, PGOV, PREL, Missile Defense 
SUBJECT: CANADIAN PARLIAMENT'S INITIAL REACTION TO 
PRESIDENT'S VISIT FOCUSES ON BSE AND MISSILE DEFENSE 
 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission John Dickson, reasons 1.4 (b) (d 
) 
 
1. (C) Summary: Initial public and political reaction to the 
visit of President Bush has been largely positive; we have 
received the "bounce" to the bilateral relationship that we 
were hoping for.  Attention has quickly come to focus on the 
issues of immediate concern to Canadians however, which are 
missile defense and BSE.  PM Martin was handed what one 
commentator called a &ticking time bomb8 when missile 
defense was made a priority in the bilateral relationship 
during the visit and he now must develop a strategy to 
deliver the goods while minimizing any political fallout.  In 
the December 1 Parliamentary question period the NDP and Bloc 
wasted no time in pressing the government to make a decision 
on missile defense and signaled that the Parliament will not 
be an idle bystander during the debate.  The Conservatives, 
for their part, attacked the lack of movement during the 
visit on the BSE issue, and Martin's lack of strategic focus 
on the bilateral relationship in general.  BMD remains 
Martin's open flank, and without inferring any form of 
linkage between the two issues, rapid movement on BSE could 
go far to strengthen Martin,s hand on this and other issues 
in which Canada's help is desirable by showing his ability to 
deliver for Canada.  It would also reinforce the visit as the 
new beginning in the bilateral relationship that we have been 
hoping for.  End Summary 
 
2. (C) Coverage of the President's visit has dominated the 
press here for three days.  It has been generally positive, 
acknowledging the effort the White House put into making the 
visit a success and the President and Mrs. Bush's 
multi-faceted meetings and appearances.  The Halifax speech 
was carefully scrutinized both for its Canada content and its 
broader international themes, again largely positive.  But by 
the afternoon of December 1 the Parliament and PMO were 
quickly pulling to the top of their in-boxes the issues that 
mattered most to Canadians -- namely BSE and Missile Defense, 
and more broadly the management of the bilateral relationship 
in general.  A view of the domestic political framework of 
the debate could be seen in PM Martin,s press conference in 
Halifax December 1 and the Parliamentary question period 
later in the day. 
 
3. (C) The Conservatives did not even allow their leader and 
the PM to return from Halifax before they criticized the 
Liberals for not delivering on the BSE issue during the 
visit.  During question period December 1, Peter McKay 
accused the PM of being more concerned with photo ops than 
substance and asked the Agriculture Minister to give a 
specific date when the border would be open to cattle 
exports.  Belinda Stronach complained that the issue is 
locked in a bureaucratic process that could take an 
additional six months and cost another $2 billion.  When the 
Agriculture Minister suggested the Conservatives not use the 
issue to score cheap political points, Stronach retorted that 
Canada was not making any movement on the issues that matter 
to Canada because U.S.-Canadian relations are simply not a 
strategic priority for this government.  NDP MP Charlie Angus 
(no kidding) returned to the issue later, saying that most 
Canadian cows will die of old age before they get mad cow 
disease and urged the government to work faster to get the 
issue resolved. 
 
4. (C) Bloc Quebecois, Michel Gauthier then asked whether 
the discussions on missile defense during the visit would be 
the beginning of cooperation on the weaponization of space. 
He said it was embarrassing that President Bush was providing 
more information on BMD to the Canadian people than the 
government had, and suggested that since President Bush has 
now openly stated that negotiations are well advanced (sic), 
the government should admit that there is an agreement in 
process.  (Note: Like the Conservatives, the BQ incorrectly 
believes that officials negotiations have taken place). 
 
5. (C) NDP Leader Layton then struggled through a BMD 
question after being shouted down three times by the entire 
house when he broke the cardinal rule of not naming names in 
the Parliament.  He said that Secretary Powell had told him 
that there would be weapons in space but they would not be 
aimed at earth.  He asked whether the government is now 
prepared to simply say no to putting a Canadian flag on 
President Bush,s missile defense program (this comment truly 
did have a Stranglovian feel to it -- with images of missiles 
hurling through space flying the Canadian flag). 
 
6. (C) PM Martin, mindful of the split in his own caucus on 
the BMD issue and the Liberal's united opposition to the Iraq 
war, needed to show a warming of relations with the United 
States while maintaining a healthy independence on these 
contentious issues.  In a press conference following the 
Halifax speech, Martin placed the missile defense debate in 
the larger context of continental security, stating clearly 
that &we will make our decisions on the wider interests of 
Canadian sovereignty.8  He reiterated in December 2 question 
period that questions of timing and involvement would be made 
by Canada for Canada.  He also needed to deflect the 
implication that he is no MacKenzie King, whom it was implied 
would have been more forward looking in dealing with the 
evolving threats in the world.  &Terrorism is a global 
threat that,s very, very different from the situation we 
were facing in the Second World War,8 he told reporters. 
Above all, Martin felt he could not be seen as blindly 
following an American lead, but rather as working in full 
partnership with the U.S. on issues of mutual concern, while 
delivering on Canada's key interests. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
7. (C) The President,s Halifax speech will certainly 
accelerate the BMD debate here.  It is an issue that is 
fraught with minefields for all parties, but especially this 
minority government.  The NDP and Bloc will oppose any BMD 
proposal and will attempt to score as many political points 
in the process as they can.  It has been suggested that one 
of these entities could bring the BMD debate to the floor and 
force a non-binding vote before the government is ready.  The 
Conservatives, who themselves view BMD as a political 
liability in Ontario and especially Quebec, will probably at 
this point back off from using the issue to beat up the 
government -- the President,s meeting with Party Leader 
Harper was very well received by Harper personally and by the 
party.  They can be expected to go along with a moderate and 
well-presented proposal on BMD.  The Liberals will remain 
split on the issue and could either allow members to vote 
their conscience, thus exposing cracks in the caucus, or 
attempt to impose party discipline, eliciting back-bench 
complaints to the press.  Either way it will be a contentious 
issue for the Liberal Party, which has a number of hard-core 
opponents of anything related to missile defense. 
 
8. (C) Martin would be helped in shepherding the program by 
several things.  First, he needs to be able to credibly, and 
technically, show that BMD categorically will not lead to 
"weaponization" of space.  Second, he needs to persuade 
Canadians that Canada's refusal to take part in the missile 
defense program would sour relations with the U.S. in the 
same way as the Iraq war (this point is already being made by 
columnists and pundits).  Third, he would be greatly helped 
by visible movement on the BSE issue.  No Canadian believes 
there is linkage between BSE and BMD, but all Canadians are 
sore about the former and most are hesitant about the latter. 
 If the USG could demonstrate good faith in quickly pushing 
the BSE review through OMB well ahead of the three month 
limit, it would generate good will that would make it easier 
for Martin to line up the votes on BMD, and would allow him 
some flexibility on other difficult requests in the U.S. file. 
 
Visit Canada's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/ottawa 
 
DICKSON 

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